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AQUARELLE VOJVODINA 
 
 
 
The emphasis on Vojvodina ethnic pluralism marks the rhetoric of 
provincial politicians, media and civil society organizations. Their rhetoric 
interprets the fact that members of a number of national minorities live in the 
territory of Vojvodina as an advantage and the value of the province. Such 
emphasis placed on multi-ethnicity is far from being coincidental.  
The multiethnic character of Vojvodina’s society was often targeted at the 
time of ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Confronted with the society’s 
heterogeneous nature, a new political ideal – the nation-state – promptly released 
its destructive potential. Nationalistic hysteria, violence, reduction of minority 
rights and humiliation to which they were exposed led to minorities’ 
marginalization, self-isolation within the bounds of ethnic communities, 
withdrawal from the public sphere, and migration to mother countries or the 
third countries.  
After October 5, 2000, significant steps were taken to alleviate the 
consequences of the Milosevic regime. Those steps, however, were and remained 
half-finished. For instance, the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms 
of National Minorities was passed but a law on the election and competencies of 
national councils has not been adopted since. Councils for national minorities 
were set up at provincial and republican levels in the aftermath of the outburst of 
ethnically motivated violence in Vojvodina. But, not invested with any actual 
powers, those councils have been vegetating as façade institutions only. More 
often than not, the state was not willing to decisively counteract the hate speech 
and ethnically motivated violence. It was only logical, therefore, that minorities 
were left under the impression that penal provisions are applied selectively. The 
tolerance campaign staged by the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights ended 
up in failure. The ongoing project by the Provincial Secretariat for Administration, 
Regulations and National Minorities will also be doomed to failure unless major 
social subsystems fail to decisively support its advocacy for tolerance and 
multiculturalism.  
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Dramatic developments in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia not only breathed 
life into ‘old’ stereotypes but also brought about new ones. Formally proclaimed 
citizens’ equality has hardly removed predominant suspiciousness about 
members of minority communities. Not even a landmark event such as 
declaration of a new constitution has been used to include minority 
representatives as well in its drafting. The opportunity to strengthen minorities’ 
feeling that the larger community rests on their consent was thus missed. True, 
adoption of a new constitution did not manifest only distrust in minorities but 
also contempt for democratic public and democratic procedures. 
Almost the entire Serbian political society has been preoccupied with the 
Kosovo issue in the past period. In such political ambiance – utterly adverse to 
minorities – minority representatives endeavored to keep the minority issue open 
and get international institutions interested in its solution. The authorities 
responded nervously – they interpreted any attempt to get the international 
community involved as unnecessary, inappropriate, harmful and dangerous. The 
Serbian political establishment criticized not only minority political 
representatives and civil society activists but also actions taken by some 
international institutions. So, for instance, Serbia’s politicians called the 
Resolution on the Protection of Multi-ethnicity in Vojvodina – the European 
Parliament adopted in September 2005 – too strong, unfair, malicious, the 
outcome of lobbying and tendentious reports by non-governmental organizations, 
etc. They were the more so nervous since the Resolution called upon the Serbian 
authorities to restore Vojvodina’s autonomy. 
The 1990 Constitution had turned Serbia into a rigid, centralistic state, 
boiled down Vojvodina’s autonomy to façade autonomy and reduced minority 
rights. However, despite nationalistic euphoria1 the demands for maintenance of 
Vojvodina’s autonomy had not vanished into thin air. Individuals, non-
governmental organizations and political parties voicing those demands were 
                                                 
1 There is a number of rightist and ultranationalist organizations in Vojvodina 
advocating a unified Serb state. Their activism includes assaults against and brutal 
disqualification of autonomists. Following the incident of November 9 when they attacked 
the participants in the round table marking the International Day against Fascism, Anti-
Semitism and Racism at the Novi Sad Faculty of Philosophy the Assembly of Vojvodina 
requeted the republican government to ban all neo-Nazi organizations. However, the then 
cabinet, headed by Vojislav Kostunica, turned a deaf ear to this request. Moreover, in the 
aftermath of physical attack by members of the so-called National Guard /Nacionalni stroj/ 
against participants in the anti-Fascist protest in October 2007, some MPs publicly 
equalized the League of Vojvodina Social Democrats and members of extremist 
organizations.  
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often accused of secessionism. According to nationalists, autonomy made sense 
only at the time Vojvodina was a part of a foreign country. The moment it was 
integrated into Serbia any request for a higher degree of (legal, political, judicial 
or economic) autonomy turned senseless and unjustified, claim nationalists.  
Their criticism targeted not only the requests for a higher degree of 
autonomy but also the efforts to strengthen Vojvodina’s identity as a specific 
region – in Serbia and in Europe alike. Moreover, the efforts for Vojvodina’s 
identity-building were labeled nation-building, i.e. the building of a new, 
Vojvodina nation. 
Obviously, for those interpreting the rhetoric about Vojvodina’s identity as 
an attempt to build a new nation an identity is acceptable only if nationally 
defined. When compared with national identity any other form of identity is 
either insignificant or veils bad intention. The intention in this specific case, claim 
nationalists, is to further fragmentize the ethnic majority. Only the Serbs would 
identify themselves as Vojvodinians, whereas Croats, Slovaks and Hungarians 
would remain what they are – Croats, Slovaks and Hungarians, argue 
nationalists. 
One of crucial reasons why nationalists so fiercely assault Vojvodina’s 
identity is its potential use for successful mobilization of political support to the 
province’s autonomy – and that is what nationalists try to interpret as senseless 
and to relativize. That’s why they claim that Vojvodina’s autonomy within Serbia 
makes no sense whatsoever on the one hand, and appropriate Vojvodina as an 
exclusively Serb province and incite nationalists among minorities as well to insist 
on territorial autonomies of their ethnic communities rather than on Vojvodina’s 
autonomy on the other.2  
Having posited that Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity could considerably 
weaken and slow down the processes of ethnization3 on the one hand, and 
                                                 
2 In this context, pointing a finger at the Hungarian minority as the largest and the 
only community in Vojvodina puting forth territorial autonomy indicates the attempt to 
weaken the autonomist bloc on the one hand and to spur assimilation of minorities on the 
other. It should be noted that the Hungarian community is not only the largest and best 
organized minority in Vojvodina but also that it has poweful political and cultural elites 
and is perceived, more than any other minority community in Vojvodina, as an 
autonomous political factor capable of influencing both inter-ethnic relations and 
instruments regulating minority rights.  
3 Today Vojvodina is habitually claimed Serb, Hungarian, Slovak…Interestingly, no 
one has ever claimed it Romany. And what about the people who have declared 
themselves Vojvodinians at the last census, let alone those calling themselves Yugoslavs 
and who are fifth by size community in Vojvodina? The question is whether anyone else 
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advance ethnic tolerance of the other, the Helsinki Committee – with the 
assistance of the European Union – organized four brainstorming sessions 
assembling public figures from different ethnic communities, and with different 
professional and political profiles to discuss the ways to safeguard that 
multiethnic identity.  
Acknowledging the contributions by all the participants in the 
aforementioned sessions and presenting to the public eye the contents of 
discussions, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia reiterates its 
strong belief that Vojvodina – ethnically the most plural part of Serbia – needs the 
institutions capable of keeping together everything that aspires to ethno-cultural 
diversity. In this context, the Helsinki Committee recommends that 
- All authorized institutions, the Vojvodina Assembly and the Provincial 
Executive Council in the first place, as well as civil society organizations and 
activists should dedicate themselves to fostering Vojvodina’s identity;  
As for political factors in the Province and in the Republic of Serbia, the 
Helsinki Committee suggests that they should start working on a constitutional 
reform that would  
- Redefine Serbia’s constitutional identity, i.e. define the Republic of Serbia 
as a state of equal citizens rather than as the state of the Serbian people and other 
citizens that live in it; 
- Shape Vojvodina’s autonomy in accordance with latest European 
experience, and, in this regard, provide constitutional guarantees for the 
province’s legislative powers in the domain of its basic competencies;  
- Include minority communities in the process of constitutional reform, 
develop a coherent minority policy and continually endeavor to change the 
general discourse about minorities; instead of insisting of minorities’ ‘loyalty,’ 
they should keep stressing that members of minority communities are equal 
citizens of Serbia, who, for the sake of the safeguard of their identities, need to be 
protected by special measures ranging from education to the election of their 
representational bodies.  
Bearing in mind that the issue of political representation has twofold 
significance for members of minority communities – as it relates not only to 
constitution of their representational bodies at local, provincial and republican 
                                                                                                                           
except for ethnic collectives has the right to Vojvodina. And indeed, what is it that keeps 
members of different ethnicities together? What is it that all those specific and mutually 
different ethnic entities have in common? Insistence on differences is characteristic of 
primitive political cultures. Apparently, Vojvodina’s autonomy exists because of ethnic 
communities only and as such even turns superfluous once some of them start insisting of 
their special, territorial autonomy.  
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levels but also to the relations within minority communities themselves – the 
Helsinki Committee indicates a notable absence of systematic and well-thought-
out measures in the sphere of minorities’ representation. Reminding that 
minorities’ political representation is usually discussed under the pressure of 
crucial political events such as elections, and that the issue itself is often simplified 
and reduced to political bargains among party officials, the Helsinki Committee 
suggests that huge discrepancies in size and levels of political organization 
between the province’s minorities should be taken into consideration in the search 
for an optimal model and instruments of positive discrimination.4  
Speaking of minorities’ representation via national councils, the Helsinki 
Committee’s recommends the following:  
- National councils should be elected in direct elections and their 
competencies, as well as modes of financing, should be clearly defined;  
Convinced that consequent implementation of the decision of the 
privatization of local broadcasters should negatively affect the safeguard of 
Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity as it would both weaken its institutional 
foundation and frustrate minorities, the Helsinki Committee puts forth the 
following:  
- Legal provisions should pay heed to minorities’ acquired rights;  
- Apart from governmental institutions and agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, expert circles and the interested public should be included in the 
development of minority information policy;  
- Media outlets in minority languages should be professionally 
strengthened, technically upgraded and secured stable sources of financing;  
The safeguard of Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity more than ever before 
necessitates:  
- Promotion of inter-ethnic tolerance and multiculturalism in the programs 
in Serb and minority languages alike;  
- Subtitling of programs in minority languages for Serb-speaking and other 
minority audiences;  
- Program exchanges and mutual shows; instead of the existing ethno-
cultural segmentation the audiences should be given a coherent picture that 
interlinks different segments and secures cohesion to Vojvodina’s plural 
community.  
                                                 
4 It is disputable whether the system of guaranteed mandates should be applied to 
all minorities in Vojvodina (and in Serbia) or just to the parliamentary representation of 
which is constantly disadvantaged by their small electorates.  
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The type of the policy of multiculturalism implemented in a heterogeneous 
community such as Vojvodina is of major importance. Since culture in itself is 
open, hybrid and inclusive, the Helsinki Committee takes that the network of 
multicultural ties and fruitful interactions that have influenced each and every 
culture in Vojvodina should be in the focus of the process of developing a policy 
of multiculturalism. Culture is not a static, self-isolated universe. It cannot 
develop against the backdrop of strict demarcation lines but only through 
communication with other cultures. The more so does the presence of the 
elements of other cultures in our own reflect its receptiveness, dynamics, 
capability for change, advance and improve.  
Convinced that the safeguard and advancement of Vojvodina’s identity 
contributes to Serbia’s European prospects, the Helsinki Committee insists on the 
progress in the negotiations with the European Union, on Vojvodina’s inclusion in 
European integration processes and on productive utilization on the province’s 
geographical position, resources, civilizational heritage, tradition and culture. 
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FOSTERING VOJVODINA’S  
MULTIETHNIC IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 
 
Bojan KOSTRES 
VOJVODINA: THE STATE OF MIND 
 
Speaking of Vojvodina’s identity, I take we should firstly ask ourselves, 
“Actually, what is Vojvodina’s identity about?” Does it really exist or is it 
something we would like Vojvodina to have? 
I do believe Vojvodina’s identity exists in the same as Vojvodinians. 
However, for me the term Vojvodinians does not refer to a nation or a national 
entity but, above all, to a state of mind. In my view, a Vojvodinian is any person 
endorsing multi-ethnicity, religious diversity and multilingualism as values, as 
something one can live with that not only enriches us as people but also makes us 
worthier human beings. It is, therefore, the most important to maintain Vojvodina 
as such concept. Because, not all Vojvodinians are prone to accept those ideas, not 
all of them are tolerant people or oriented towards Europe. And yet, the people 
believing in European values and upholding that value system are mostly 
concentrated in the territory of our Province. This is why we, Vojvodinians, have 
the duty to pass on the ideas we believe in to the entire Serbia and thus help all 
the citizens of the Republic of Serbia speed up their movement towards the goal 
we should all attain – the European Union.  
In order to safeguard Vojvodina’s identity we must, first of all, give it a 
shape and make it recognizable to as many as possible citizens so that they can 
identify themselves with the value system it implies. Only then we could pass on 
this value system to the rest of Serbia. This is why I am very glad that the Helsinki 
Committee organized this session and plans to stage a series of similar meetings 
dealing with the safeguard of Vojvodina’s identity. It is on us, who live in 
Vojvodina and care about Vojvodina’s identity, to tackle this issue. Otherwise, no 
one else would. 
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Sonja BISERKO 
FUNDAMENTAL VALUES SHOULD BE PROTECTED  
 
Vojvodina is the most pro-European region of Serbia and the one closest to 
Europe. When Rumania and Bulgaria accessed the European Union Vojvodina 
actually became its central part without officially being in the membership. 
Firstly, this indicates that Serbia lags behind its neighbors. And secondly, that if it 
really wants to become an EU member-state, Serbia should put to good use 
Vojvodina’s potential for modernization.  
Despite its pro-European rhetoric and advocacy for European principles 
and values, Belgrade’s political class has been lately promoting the concept of 
Serbia’s so-called neutrality. In reality, this concept stands against the European 
Union and NATO. It implies stronger reliance on Russia, which was more than 
evident in the last couple of months when it came to the issue of Kosovo. Belgrade 
expects Russia to postpone the settlement of the Kosovo status and thus impose 
Kosovo’s partition. Kosovo’s partition is actually the only strategy the official 
Belgrade has. And for that strategy the official Belgrade obtained support even 
from Vojvodina’s resistents, from those, say, in Subotica, Zrenjanin, Senta, Backi 
Petrovac, Pancevo or Vrsac. Vojvodina’s autonomy is the litmus test for any 
government claiming its pro-European orientation. For, Vojvodina’s autonomy 
testifies not only of a wish to join the EU but also of capacity and wisdom to 
create Europe from within, to think and act in the manner Europe thinks and acts.  
The settlement of the Kosovo status influences developments in Vojvodina 
as well. Namely, as an excuse for Kosovo’s unavoidable independence official 
Belgrade tries to “trample down” Vojvodina’s autonomy and keeps treating it as 
its protectorate. This is why any discussion of Vojvodina’s true autonomy is seen 
as secessionism in Belgrade. 
Vojvodina is vitally interested in the continuation of SAA negotiations with 
the European Union. Vojvodina has proved this interest by a series of actions and 
measures testifying its pro-European option. Having recognized Vojvodina’s 
readiness, Europe has opened many channels for its speedier integration into 
European processes. On the other hand, Serbia’s new Constitution targeted 
Vojvodina’s interests and its pro-European orientation the most by reaffirming 
centralism that stands in the way of local initiative. By casting their vote against 
the Constitution in the referendum, citizens of Vojvodina clearly messaged the 
political class in Belgrade that they would not accept the role of passive subjects 
acting against their own identity and specificity. With the failed referendum in 
Vojvodina, Serbia’s political community faces the problem of legitimacy. The fact 
that the Constitution was demonstratively turned down in Vojvodina might 
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revitalize the autonomist movement. Under present circumstances, that’s 
something the province should profit on to create a European model of 
autonomy.  
Bearing in mind their experience in the past two decades, minorities are 
justifiably anxious about the outbursts of nationalism. Ever when it demands 
some authority over the police Vojvodina does not have in mind to become “a 
state within the state” – as critics in Belgrade put it – but only wants to function as 
a modern region capable of protecting the values that make it a factor of 
modernization – multiethnic peace, safety for all citizens without exception and 
their right to safely exercise constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms.  
Vojvodina is not only Serbia’s the most “European” part but also ethnically 
the most plural one. Vojvodina has always been specific for its multiculturalism 
and, as such, unprecedented in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. However, in the 
past 20 years ethno-nationalism has been assaulting its biggest value the most. 
Those assaults have been and still are meant to annul Vojvodina’s identity. With 
this session the Helsinki Committee wanted to initiate a debate on the safeguard 
of Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity and the minority-majority relationship 
sustaining Vojvodina’s – and Serbia’s – European prospects.  
 To conclude with, let me underline that this is about a hot topic troubling 
the entire region and, of course, the EU member-states. Public debates going on 
in, say, France, Denmark or the Netherlands, seek to find a formula for integrating 
Muslim communities into larger political and cultural communities. People are 
discussing models of multiculturalism and outstanding thinkers and public 
figures take active part in those debates. Among them are the figures such as 
Pascal Bruckner, Ian Buruma or Timothy Ash Gordon. 
 Today’s session could be a small step forward in that direction.  
 
 
Jovan KOMSIC 
VOJVODINA BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC TOLERANCE  
AND POLITICAL RADICALISM  
 
- Theses - 
 
1/ If there was no Vojvodina it should be made up for the sake of Serbia’s 
European future. Unlike a considerable number of extreme nationalists, who 
regret it, I would say we are fortunate that history bestowed on this portion of the 
Pannonian Plains the valuable identity of unity of differences that need to be 
maintained in good will and for the benefit of true interests of all its citizens, the 
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state and the entire regions of Middle and South Eastern Europe. Be it as it may, 
Vojvodina – by its very being and historical outputs – is an European project and 
an European region in the true sense of these terms.  
2/ Speaking of European Modernism, it should be noted that in these areas 
it begun with the enlightened absolutism of the Hapsburg family and in the 
manner of Emperor Joseph II slogan, “All for people and nothing with people!” On 
the other hand, in later, brief and discontinuous periods of democratic “rule of 
people, by people and for people” it was also not easy to form the policy pattern 
of sustainable and institutional unity of differences founded on the consensus 
between citizens and political representatives from all national communities. On 
the contrary – for three centuries of its modern history Vojvodina has been 
permanently in the focus of confronting state-building policies of old and big, and 
young and small nations alike. Arms, rhetoric and a plethora of symbols have 
made an unavoidable arsenal of the attempts to appropriate this small part of 
Europe.  
3/ It goes without saying that here – the same as in other places – heritage 
bears different meanings. And criteria for assessing the past and the present alike 
are different. Even in the worst episodes of history – when big crises and conflicts 
produced ethnically motivated paranoia and fanned the flames of collective 
consciousness about “others denying our identity and preventing us from being 
what we really are” /Konrad/ - the best people in these areas, coming from 
different ethnic communities, have been risking their lives to consequently 
promote the idea of a social order guaranteeing equality to all people regardless 
of their ethnic origin, religion, gender and political affiliations. In this context, the 
first outstanding, pro-European Serb and the founding father of Serb 
enligthenment, Dositej Obradovic, advocated a new, “rational and all-inclusive, 
humanitarian patriotism,” while condemning “national arrogance, intolerance 
and hatred for other nations” /Skerlic/. His followers and supporters were 
expressing their rational patriotism by calling Vojvodina “New Switzerland in 
Eastern Europe” /Miletic/ or “Europe in a nutshell” /Stajic/.  
4/ More importantly, by following the rule “live and let live,” ordinary 
citizens were developing and affirming the custom identical to Voltaire’s earliest 
definition of tolerance as a remedy for human imperfect nature – Discord is a big 
evil of humankind, and tolerance is the only remedy for it, messaged the French 
enlightener. Periods of peace and economic prosperity in these regions handed 
down the same precious message. Those were the periods when “new” and “old” 
residents of the valley were reviving good-neighborly traditions, learning lessons 
of civilizations and convincingly proving that diversity was richness, coexistence 
inspiration and mutual respect – civic virtue.  
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5/ Unfortunately, the years of nationalistic homogenization, dissolution of 
the former Yugoslavia and of warring-nationalistic transition considerably 
dispelled the preconditions for sustainable multiculturalism and equality we 
inherited from the period of the so-called socialist autonomy. And those were 
most vulnerable preconditions. As Tibor Varadi put it, “sustainable adjustment of 
ethnic identities” was based on “mixture of cultures and party discipline – in 
some cases more on culture, and in other more on discipline.” This mixture is now 
replaced by “some democratic procedures with uncertain outcomes,” including a 
rather changed cultural context.  
“War is bad because it spoils more people than destroys those rotten,” said 
an ancient Greek historian. True, in parallel with winning the freedom of 
expression and political association, many evils and mutual distrust negatively 
affecting interethnic relations in Vojvodina have been released over the past years 
in the ambiance of war and the big change crisis.  
6/ At political level, a new problem and big challenge that can be labeled a 
paradox of early democracy emerged thanks to ethnic, political entrepreneurs prone 
to fan the flames of mass passions and profit from – justifiable and unjustifiable – 
anxieties of numerous transition losers. This is about a hybrid between intolerant 
liberalisms and ethnic semi-democracy on one hand, and partially consolidated 
liberal democracy by European standards on the other.  
7/ No wonder, therefore, that sociological researches conducted in the past 
decade registered a raise in more or less intolerant nationalisms in all ethnic 
communities, and particularly among the members of bigger ethnic collectives – 
Serbs and Hungarians. Segmentation and ever bigger ethnic distance became a 
trait of Vojvodinians’ consciousness. Citizens’ responses to the questions about 
the state’s major strategies, institutional models of decentralizations and the 
settlement of the so-called Vojvodina issue in Serbia’s new Constitution also 
testify of political splits that coincide with ethno-national and regional divisions.  
Fortunately, there are empirical reasons for moderate optimism. Almost all 
recent sociological findings demonstrate the presence of the so-called alternative 
syndrome in Vojvodinians’ consciousness (absence of authoritarianism, 
modernism, liberalism, well-balanced attitude towards nations, etc.). And this 
gives rise to the hope that Serbia – and Vojvodina within it – could overcome 
considerable obstacles in the process of building a new project of autonomy and 
ethno-cultural justice, and thus deny the old and widespread doubts about the 
possibility of having a stable democracy in ethnically mixed societies.  
8/ Recognizing the high price we had to pay for all unlearnt lessons – that 
boil down to the fact that postponement of unavoidable has never been a good 
ally – could uphold the above-mentioned hope. And speaking of rational coping 
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with modern times demands, and those of the future in particular, the most 
rational assumption is that the road would be by far less thorny should political 
players in Vojvodina and in the entire Serbia genuinely opt for integration into the 
European Union as a prestigious alliance of nations, association of regions, a 
warrant of minority freedom and a frame for multicultural civil society.  
9/ Unfortunately, rationalism, enlightenment and properly perceived 
interests of individuals, social groups and the majority of population have not 
been a predominant constant in these areas both in recent and far past. Not even 
today are they the most powerful driving forces and mechanisms of the society’s 
mindset and actions. Under present circumstances it is hard to expect that the 
policy’s rational component would overcome its irrational one.  
10/ In the atmosphere of widespread deregulation, confusion and fears, 
flooding sense of helplessness and transition defeat, and in the midst of the crisis 
of failed expectations and distrust in public institutions and actors, and in the so-
called international community, plus un-readiness to cope with the shocks of the 
reality and face up the causes of troubles, regression, historical blind alleys and 
delusions, it is only logical to expect a pattern of behavior that rests on escapism, 
escape from freedom /Fromm/ and simulation of life /Baudrilliard/. By this 
pattern people take that the areas of irrational and black-and-white picture of the 
world are their best ally in making more or less supportable sense of the utterly 
harsh and complex daily life.  
Material poverty combined with the feeling of post-war deprivation, with 
historical, cultural, ideological and political splits and controversies marking key 
political players and the general public, as well as the absence of a clear-cut vision 
and hope in the nation’s and the state’s prosperity bring about mass need for 
simple and appeasing answers, for some political-ideological Valium of some 
surrogate for this sedative that is in demand the most in domestic pharmacies. It 
is common knowledge that such answers, in crisis societies, became “the 
property” of political extremists – social and nationalistic. The worst scenario is 
when a more or less consistently articulated state and national project – the one 
that rests on extremist combination of “social” and “national” question - takes 
root at the political scene.  
11/ The ideological fiber of such radicalism fully corresponds to individual 
and collective psycho-dynamics of the nationalistic syndrome of consciousness Rudi 
Supek had illustrated with the following predominant topics: 1) nation’s 
deprivation; 2) complot against nation and state; 3) biologically jeopardized 
nation; 4) ideological alarm to finally “awaken” people from lethargy and 
motivate them for “renewal;” 5) ethno-centric superiority; 6) authoritarianism and 
sadomasochism of the masses that show “respect” for force and power only; 7) 
21 
revenge and retaliation for tragedies and the crimes committed against one’s 
compatriots, and the like. Some other authors warn about the following 
characteristics of the rightist extremism: 1) racism, nationalism and clericalism; 2) 
anti-Semitism; 3) anti-Islamism; 4) anti-liberalism; 5) anti-socialism, anti-
anarchism and anti-communism; 6) homophobia; 7) sexism and anti-feminism; 8) 
xenophobia; 9) anti-Americanism; 10) anti-Masonry; 11) anti-globalism and Euro-
skepticism; 12) rehabilitation of fascist ideas; 13) authoritarianism; 14) racial, 
ethnic and national “purity” /Bakic/. 
 12/ As it seems the above-mentioned paradox of Serbia’s early democracy 
and unfinished state will be reflected in boosted extremists policies and anti-
European options that will stand for a nominal response to the settlement of the 
Kosovo status outside the UN Security Council, and for a nominal response to the 
US’ and the EU member-states’ unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s independence. 
In the event such a scenario takes place and Serbia responds to it by breaking 
diplomatic relations with the states that have recognized independent Kosovo, 
Vojvodina’s anyway ambivalent society will become the most vulnerable point at 
Serbia’s sociopolitical map. The inherited splits will grow deeper and deeper 
along ethnic, ideological and political lines. To all appearances, the stale 
“national-patriotic” food sold at socialist-radical “flea markets” will became again 
the most profitable merchandise at domestic political market. But now the radical 
“prefix” will definitely overshadow not only the government’s socialist partner 
but also some other overt and covert associates tasked with turning Serbia 
towards Euro-Asia.  
13/ So, under most unfavorable circumstances for liberal democracy and 
tolerance, citizens of Serbia and citizens of the Province will find themselves, for 
the umpteenth time, in the situation when they are expected to cope with an 
epochal state, constitutional and political question. Let’s call it “an agreement on a 
citizen’s capacity” and foundations of the state and democracy, supposed, as a 
great theoretician of freedom (John Stuart Mill) put it, “to make virtue out of 
necessity” and enable different ethnic communities “to accept living side by side 
with equal rights and under same laws.”  
Therefore, instead of mythologizing the past with such unbearable ease and 
belligerently politicizing the present we need to renovate our “roots” – and look 
towards the future. Generally speaking, that boils down to responsible search for 
the solutions that bring us together as people who are self-assured, autonomous 
and free to choose their life maps; the people who are institutionally guaranteed 
the rights to difference and similarity, to information and communication, to 
property and solidarity, to peace and tolerance; and to the people who are duty-
bound not to tolerate intolerance and entitled to rational, constitutional patriotism 
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and loyalty to the state – which is the place we have been born in - and in which 
we feel good.  
14/ The crucial fact in the context of the new Constitution (2006) and 
Vojvodina’s pro-European potential and political circumstances that would foster 
and revitalize that potential is that Vojvodina has been deprived the right to its own 
legislation in the domains of its constitutionally guaranteed authorities – the legislation 
that would correspond to its needs and those of the entire republic, as well as to European 
experience and regionalization standards.  
No wonder that against so perceived “façade” autonomy – i.e. a 
permanently supervised self-governance – the province’s actual autonomy – 
implying not only the right to independence from the overwhelming control by 
the “centre,” but also a relevant scope of responsibilities, self-initiative by 
provincial political actors and institutions, and participation in lawmaking as a 
precondition for efficient interaction with citizens – depends, in the first place, of 
the changeable good-will of the national parliament’s majority. In other words, 
Vojvodina’s autonomy is a variable totally dependent on the almighty republican 
legislation.  
15/ So, to what extent will everything referred to in the paragraphs above 
help Vojvodina to maintain and advance the most prestigious part of its social 
being? Here I refer to Vojvodina as an European project, and to Vojvodina’s 
capacity and experience as proper “measures” for Serbia’s movement towards the 
EU. Vojvodina’s most realistic chances are in its still preserved potential to 
safeguard its half-and-half subjectivity and European identity.  
Only new constitutional-legal reforms could foster this potential by 
European standards. On the other hand, citizens, the state and the Province alike 
will have to be really lucky in the months to come to reach even this stage of the 
stage’s stabilization and democratic development.  
 
 
Dimitrije BOAROV 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONS AS  
VOJVODINA’S LOGICAL INTEREST  
 
- General theses - 
 
1. European integration processes are crucial interests of Vojvodina as 
Serbia’s autonomous province. Without those integrations Vojvodina could 
neither fully valorize its geographic position and natural resources nor its 
historical tradition and material heritage.  
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2. All the countries bordering on Vojvodina are either in the EU 
membership (Hungary and Rumania) or candidates for the full-fledged 
membership (Croatia). Therefore, Serbia’s accession to the EU practically depends 
on Vojvodina’s normal economic communication with neighboring countries;  
3. As a province geographically belonging to the Central Europe and to the 
Danube River basin Vojvodina is not only surrounded by the countries integrated 
into Europe but also at the crossroads of two major European corridors – E-10 and 
E-7 – that are sustainable only with Serbia within European processes;  
4. With annual GNP amounting to some 3,700 Euros per capita Vojvodina is 
by far more developed than the rest of Serbia and, in that context, the structure of 
its needs is much closer to European standards and habits than that of other parts 
of Serbia. Therefore, any form of Serbia’s isolation from Europe would mostly 
affect Vojvodina;  
5. Vojvodina’s agricultural production on over 1.6 million hectares of arable 
land (35 percent of Serbia’s total farmland) by far exceeds the needs of its 
population of 2 million. On the other hand, Serbia’s market totaling 7.5 million 
consumers is too small for Vojvodina’s potential. That means that Vojvodina’s 
agriculture must have an access to European markets;  
6. Serbia’s overall capital is insufficient for an active agrarian policy, the one 
the farmers in Vojvodina need. On the other hand, one half of the EU’s budget is 
still set aside for premiums and back pays of member-states’ agriculture 
(regardless of the fact that the EU has been discussing reduction of subsidies in 
this domain over the past years);  
7. After the widespread process of primary privatization that included 
major foreign investors (in the financial sector, in construction materials, beer, 
milk, oil, chemical industries, etc.) the issue of European integration became the 
one of bigger profitability of the Province’s entire economy and the growth in the 
value of real estate and farmland. Why shouldn’t Vojvodina profit more from the 
“second round” of privatization than it did from the first?  
8. Generally speaking, Vojvodina’s economic infrastructure is a logical 
follow-up to the European Union’s economic infrastructure. Therefore, 
Vojvodina’s economic infrastructure would greatly profit from Serbia’s 
membership in the EU, as it would have access to huge funds for further 
development;  
9. Vojvodina’s anyway considerable energy potential would become even 
more profitable should the Province become a transit area for the exchange of 
energy raw materials and semi-products. In this context, the projects of 
construction of a big storage for natural gas in Banatski Dvori and of the 
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Constance-Trieste pipeline would greatly benefit Vojvodina – and those projects 
considerably depend on Serbia’s accession to the European Union;  
10. For the time being, Vojvodina is an underdeveloped tourist region 
despite its many similarities – i.e. potentials for riverbank, hunting, museum and 
excursion tourism - with one of Europe’s tourist superpowers, Hungary. In this 
context, membership in the EU would be a powerful impetus to Vojvodina’s 
tourism.  
11. Regardless of by far bigger competition Vojvodina’s economy would 
have to cope with in the EU, it would sustain and modernize as it has all 
prerequisites for success in this domain – it has its “European tradition” and the 
highest degree of enlightenment in Serbia. 
 
 
Aleksandar POPOV 
THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS  
IN THE PROCESSES OF REGIONAL COOPERATION  
 
Vojvodina’s regional cooperation depends, above all, on Serbia’s 
decentralization. To be able to develop full cooperation at regional level 
Vojvodina has to be invested with more authority in the process of making deals 
with the partners from neighboring regions. However, the case of the famous 
tender called for the construction of the highway corridor – the one with 
provisions still kept far from the public eye – testify that Vojvodina has almost no 
say in the matter. And the same tender is also illustrative of the character of the 
state we live in and in which Vojvodina endeavors to exercise its autonomy and 
regional cooperation. 
Two categories of regions are the most interesting of all from Vojvodina’s 
angle: the regions of ex-Yugoslavia such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and 
the regions in Rumania and Hungary. Renewal of communication and mutual ties 
is the alphabet of any normalization of relations in post-conflict societies – and 
we, from the NGO sector, are well-aware of that. If people do not communicate 
states in a region can never fully normalize their relations. The example of car 
plates in Bosnia-Herzegovina probably best illustrates the significance of 
communication. When the federal authorities introduced car plates unrelated 
with actual towns people in Bosnia begun to travel from one entity to another, left 
their vicious circles of hatred and gradually overcome the painful legacy of the 
war.  
When it comes to regional cooperation non-governmental organizations are 
by far more flexible then states and have more possibilities for establishing and 
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maintaining regional ties. States are restricted. Firstly, they are restricted by the 
lack of political will for the renewal of regional cooperation. Secondly, their 
procedures for realizing ideas are too long – in the meantime the problems that 
were to be settled through regional cooperation have been already solved or 
become more complex. Unlike state, NGOs have no strict procedures, all they 
have are their mission they want to pursue and for that purpose they establish 
cooperation with other actors. That’s also NGOs’ alphabet – for they are only 
logically oriented towards cooperation at both national and regional levels.  
International cooperation notably contributes to the renewal of broken ties 
as it influences the overall normalization of relations and reestablishes mutual 
trust among states and nations that have been at war. More than eleven years 
after the Dayton Accords we witness a variety of turbulence in our region. Not so 
long ago, we had turbulence over the verdict the International Court of Justice 
passed in the Bosnia-Herzegovina vs. FR Yugoslavia case. Last year’s elections in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Serbia were followed by all sorts of manipulation and 
speculations over referendums on the union /with Serbia/, secession of the 
territory, etc. – and such developments do impair regional relations. One thing is 
certain in these areas: we shall be witnessing for long the policies shaped by the 
“hot and cold” principle.  
Overcoming barriers in people’s minds is crucial for the renewal of regional 
cooperation – weighted by wars, atrocities, destruction and crimes – both at 
governmental and NGO levels. All other barriers will be overcome one fine day at 
some negotiating table or under the pressure from the international community, 
but psychological barriers are the hardest nut to crack.  
In a way, non-governmental organizations are sweepers of minefields – 
they sweep all the dirt left behind by politicians, generals and journalists. By 
sweeping contaminated terrain they prepare the terrain for politicians. To 
overcome the past the non-governmental organizations represented at this session 
– and some that are not with us today – are putting forth initiatives and 
recommendations. A major segment of their activity targets the government and 
pressurizes it to start facing up the past. As long as the government is unwilling to 
genuinely confront the recent past we shall be hostages to it.  
At the times of war, non-governmental organizations in the region have not 
broken their relations but continued to act jointly. Some other categories of people 
such as criminals, war profiteers, etc. have not broken their cooperation as well. 
But non-governmental organizations are those one can be proud of – in the hard 
times of wars and nationalistic and chauvinistic madness they were the voice of 
reason here, in Vojvodina, in Serbia, in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They 
really had to risk much to arrange meetings during the war. And that’s their 
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enormous moral capital, the credibility that opens the door to future joint actions. 
The Igman Initiative – co-founded by the Center of Regionalism – is one of 
regional networks forged during the war.  
The regional cooperation developed by non-governmental organizations is 
a kind of alternative diplomacy. At the time of Milosevic’s regime non-
governmental organizations were putting forth various initiatives for the 
consideration of governmental bodies despite the fact that they hardly had any 
ties with them. Democratic changes in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
widely opened the door to regional cooperation. Our Igman Initiative then 
formed expert groups included representatives of different ministries – and that 
made it easier for us to carry out some initiatives. For instance, together with 
relevant ministries we have promoted a series of six bilateral agreements between 
the signatory-states of the Dayton Accords and have acted towards suspension of 
the visa regime between Croatia and the then FR Yugoslavia. Or, we have 
cooperated successfully with the Foreign Ministry at the time Mr. Goran 
Svilanovic held the office of the foreign minister.  
The most illustrative example of regional cooperation in these areas is the 
Tuzla-Osijek-Novi Sad cooperation. The three towns share the same geographic, 
cultural and economic space and have had exceptional cooperation at the time of 
ex-Yugoslavia. Vojvodina and Slavonia have cooperated in the domain of stock 
breeding, Vojvodina has exported quality foodstuff and construction materials to 
the Tuzla basin and imported from it chemicals, coal, etc. Unfortunately, when the 
war broke out all ties between the three towns were broken – especially with 
Tuzla where the canons of the Novi Sad corps have echoed for long. Three non-
governmental organizations – the Center for Regionalism, the Tuzla Citizens’ 
Forum and the Osijek Center for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights – were 
fortunate enough because mayors of the three towns had an ear for our joint 
initiatives and suggestions and were ready to orient city administrations towards 
renewal of cooperation. In January 2002, the three towns signed the Agreement on 
Interethnic Cooperation and the respective city administrations took upon 
themselves to foster mutual cooperation in the domains of culture, economy, 
education, sports and interethnic tolerance. In five years since then the Agreement 
produced excellent effects and, in a way, became a model of cooperation. Three 
regional chambers of commerce have come together as well and signed 
agreements on cooperation. Cultural institutions and media outlets also started 
cooperating. We have also organized a Novi Sad–Osijek–Tuzla marathon that 
symbolically tied the three towns together. When the Serbian Radical Party came 
to power in Novi Sad we suffered an “engine failure.” So the then and incumbent 
mayor of Tuzla, Jasmin Imanovic, sent a letter to Mayor of Novi Sad Maja 
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Gojkovic. Actually, he replied to her letter that expressed the readiness to 
establish cooperation between the two towns as if there had been no such 
cooperation at all. He said the Radicals’ administration in Novi Sad was 
unacceptable as a partner to Tuzla, which would, therefore, continue to cooperate 
with the Center for Regionalism as a partner organization. This testifies of the 
benefits of partnership between non-governmental organizations and city 
administrations. For, city administration come and go, while non-governmental 
organizations remain to safeguard “the flame,” maintain existing relations and 
develop new ones.  
Encouraged by this model of good practice we have campaigned for new 
“triangles” of cooperation in the region of South Eastern Europe. The two-year 
campaign gave birth to FILIA, the association of multiethnic towns in South 
Eastern Europe bringing together the towns in the once warring zone. The 
association thus contributes to overcoming the legacy of the recent past and 
reestablishing broken ties.  
Of course, there are other examples of same or similar cooperation. In 
Vojvodina, the Green Network and the Open Lyceum are mostly focused on the 
cooperation with the towns in Croatia and Hungary, and that cooperation 
produced remarkable effects. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia 
and the great majority of NGOs in Serbia can also provide good examples of 
cooperation with regional NGOs.  
Cooperation with Hungary and Rumania – Mita Boarov referred to – is 
most important to Vojvodina due to the multiethnic composition of its 
population, historical and other ties. Such cooperation is ongoing within the 
DKMT Euro-region. At the time of Milosevic’s rule Vojvodina was nothing but a 
dummy in this Euro-region. After his ouster, it became an active player and, as far 
as I know, realized several educational, infrastructural, etc., projects in 
partnership with counterparts from Rumania and Hungary.  
However, what I simply must underline is that the Schengen regime could 
easily “kill” Euro-regionalism in this area. Instead of open borders and the 
possibility to travel with your ID card only, we have to cope with an extremely 
strict visa regime. Obtaining a Hungarian visa is a real triumph! And this is what 
the European Union should take into consideration when it comes to these areas.  
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Alpár LOSONCZ 
EUROPEAN TRAITS OF VOJVODINA’S IDENTITY  
 
Had it not been hinted that this session should broach European aspects of 
Vojvodina’s identity too, I would have rather addressed institutional aspects of 
Vojvodina’s joining European integration processes. Be it as it may, I will just 
mark out some major issues.  
In my view we should not perceive European identity and tradition on the 
one hand and the European Union on the other as one and the same thing. The 
European Union is, in the first place, an economic superpower, a kind of geo-
economic and geopolitical entity. This geo-economic entity can compete with 
other similar geo-economic entities in the world such as the United States, 
particularly in terms of economic potential. In spite of that many Europeans 
lament over Europe’s lagging behind globalization processes. But when it comes 
to “European identity” things become by far more complex. Piles of books have 
been written about European identity, and libraries are brimming with such titles. 
Therefore, we can only touch on the subject at this session. The problem is that we 
are all aware that the search for Vojvodina’s European identity exceeds mere 
insistence on integration into Europe.  
I’ll tackle just some aspects I take important as some normative criteria for 
Vojvodina’s European identity. Regardless of its history – which is, of course, 
contradictory, complex and has its dark sides – Europe does have an 
extraordinary tradition of criticism and self-criticism. An answer to the somewhat 
pathetical question “What a good European implies?” would be that we are, 
above all, ready to accept criticism and self-criticism. So, what could be European 
about Vojvodina? It is its loyalty to criticism and self-criticism, of course. The next 
aspect I take most significant when it comes to European identity is something 
Umberto Eco calls “translation or translating.” He refers not to literal translation 
of some signs from one language into another but to a much “stronger” notion. 
Simply, to understand someone who shows up in your life you must “translate” 
that someone into your terrain. That happens in everyday life but at other levels 
as well. For Eco, translation in this sense is Europe’s common language. So, this is 
about translation in a practical but extremely important sense: that’s the reality of 
certain social practices of translating and a level on which all other levels depend. 
Once you understand this you can understand other meanings too – you can 
understand that Europe is a kind of geopolitics of translation.  
Someone might say – and would be right to a certain extent – that there is 
no gap between the European Union and European tradition, which are rather 
intertwined. Indeed, today the European Union is the key interpreter of the 
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European tradition. However, the European Union cannot appropriate the 
European identity as a whole, since individual, collective, national, transnational 
and even regional identities are not, so to speak, metaphysically stable. They are 
not made once forever, but are changeable and permanently call for new 
interpretations. Our lives are, therefore, determined by changeable identities that 
certainly do not imply a chaos. And we would miss the point should we dream of 
some stable, predetermined identity. We would thus either reify identity patterns 
or slip in the terrain of politicians and intellectuals – both in Serbia and Vojvodina 
– eager to dumb down identity so as to be able to appropriate, control and 
manipulate it. Vojvodina’s identity has to be constantly reinterpreted since the 
reality we live in constantly changes.  
It is common knowledge that Serbia’s movement towards Europe is snail-
paced. However, the benefit of such movement is that it can learn from the 
mistakes the others have made. Of course, to be able to discern the mistakes other 
countries have made in their movement towards the European Union you must 
firstly engage in a serious, comprehensive and comparative analysis. As far as I 
know, no one in Serbia in engaged in such an endeavor. And there is another 
important aspect, too. And as far as I know, there has been no consequent and 
relevant debate on why one should join the European Union in any post-socialist 
country. This has been taken for granted everywhere, more or less. Of course, 
every country has had different interpretation and dreamed about the European 
Union in a different way.  
Take, for instance, Hungary. The fact that it has not had an all-inclusive 
debate on the European Union now gives rise to certain problems. Why is that so? 
When you are not certain about the whys of joining something, the reasons for 
integrating into a superpower such as the European Union but rather treat it as 
sailing into a blueprinted harbor, you will be coping with democratic deficits later 
on. No doubt that some countries such as Hungary, Rumania, etc., have made 
significant economic progress. But their overall economic order is not exactly 
well-arranged. And in terms of democratic potential they are faced with some 
misunderstandings, ambiguities, disappointment with unmet expectations, return 
of old and unsettled problems, and, so to speak, with a kind of revenge from the 
past. The European Union’s potential provides a frame for a different life but does 
not provide it automatically.  
When people over here speak of the European Union they usually refer to a 
materialistic Eden, which it is not. All the European Union offers are strict rules 
that make correction of the existing situation possible. Disappointments are usual 
in social sphere but some failed realizations might cost dear.  
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European identity and European values cannot be mechanically implanted 
or transmitted. You can take over some rules automatically or forge some other – 
and that’s what Serbia does when it comes to its movement towards the European 
Union. However, there are things we can now simply label culture or cultural 
patterns. The processes of mondialization and adoption of Euro-Atlantic values 
have begun back in early 1990s and all international organizations involved in 
those processes faced the same problem. The World Bank, say, believed till 1996 
and 1997 that some ideological patterns could be simply transmitted regardless of 
context and actual state of affairs. It believed that appropriate political will and 
readiness to adopt the same principles suffice. However, analyses showed that 
things cannot function that way. For, unless there is, so to speak, a social capital 
for accepting something you cannot adjust the realities to some desirable 
readiness. In my opinion, this is crucial for the manner in which we are adopting 
European values. Adoption of some guidelines necessitates clear-cut measures by 
politicians, bureaucracy, integration technicians, etc. But chances to succeed are 
meager without self-transformation and transformation of top administration. 
Domestic politicians are prone to spreading delusion that we can adopt the said 
guidelines without undergoing any transformation whatsoever – or, probably, 
they naively believe that’s possible.  
In my theses about Vojvodina I wrote down a most critical remark. I wrote 
that there is a tendency of reducing Vojvodina to a consociation of ethnic elites 
that would generate ethnic agreements.  
I believe there is such a tendency and that is had to do with the rule of 
political parties. The great bulk of Serbia’s political elite, this way or other, lives 
on the state. The fact itself generates the phenomenon I’ve been referring to – the 
phenomenon of reducing Vojvodina’s identity to pragmatic deals between ethnic 
elites. To be more precise, I have nothing against pragmatic deals as such. But if 
Vojvodina’s identity boils down to them it becomes nothing but some virtual and 
simulated identity. All our odes to Vojvodina are in vain if we have such dirty 
reality and practice.  
Bearing in mind its traditional capacities and other traits, Vojvodina could 
be a driving force of Serbia’s modernization, which preconditions joining 
European integration processes. But if in the role of such a driving force 
Vojvodina sees itself as victim it will lose the ability of self-criticism that really 
makes it European. That happens to minority communities when they too often 
freeze on to the victim role. Actually, such fixation closes the door to serious self-
reflection. And this leads to the danger I call Vojvodina’s self-provincialization. 
Centralists are not the only ones generating negative trends – we are often a 
problem to ourselves.  
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Therefore, Vojvodina should be conceptualized in a different, more flexible 
and modern way, without relapses into the past. Some ongoing debates in 
Vojvodina (I am not referring to this meeting, of course) leave me under the 
impression that we willy-nilly relapse into the past as some ideal category. This 
reminds me of our popular verse saying, “How fine our dishes used to be once” – 
and when using it to refer to some better past people seem to neglect that those 
dishes must be stale for long. We need to give up such reasoning if we want a 
new beginning. Lamenting over the 1997 Constitution when Vojvodina was a 
constituent element of the federation are of no avail. The overall situation was 
different at the time – everything relied on the ideology of socialism. Boasting 
about ex-socialist distribution of power or some other periods in the past is 
simply unnecessary and leads nowhere. If Vojvodina wants to demonstrate its 
specificity, it must say, clearly and precisely, what its specificity is about. 
Otherwise, we shall not be able to differentiate Vojvodina’s identity from its 
regional scope. Otherwise, we shall have the same situation as that in the entire 
Serbia – we shall have Novi Sad as the focal point of distribution of power. This is 
why we need to find a pattern of collective identity made up of all differences – 
and that would only be the beginning for the adventure called multiculturalism.  
Vojvodina will be able to manifest its identity and creatively join European 
regions only if it changes the patterns of its behavior. We should always bear in 
mind that for the center-province relationship there must be the province that 
recognizes itself as such vis-à-vis the center. Vojvodina must undergo a deep self-
transformation if it wants to make a progress.  
I share the view of previous speakers – economic and political dimensions 
alone cannot fully express Vojvodina’s specificity. Indeed, multiculturalism is its 
specificity. In this sense, Vojvodina is a unique European region or, at least, 
among unique ones in the “old” continent. To simplify things, I’ll say there is 
something we call multiculturalism and something we refer to as inter-
culturalism. Multiculturalism relates to the arrangements in public life, to political 
rights, minorities’ participation in the public sphere, etc. Inter-culturalism is a 
different story – that’s micro-communication in everyday life and the interest the 
members of one culture show for the impact the members of other culture make. 
Vojvodina and Serbia alike face the problems of multiculturalism and inter-
culturalism. When it comes to multiculturalism, let’s take the much criticized Law 
on National Minorities for an example. I’ve criticized the law myself primarily 
because it undermines democratic potential of minority communities and boils 
down Vojvodina to an aggregation of pragmatic, ethnic agreements.  
As for inter-culturalism, I’ll try to place it into a larger context. The problem 
is in indifference to other cultures – not only the majority’s indifference to 
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minority cultures but also the other way round. Take, for instance, Switzerland 
that is being too much idealized – and, indeed, does posses some elements that 
should be idealized. Some studies on Switzerland I’ve recently read show that the 
effects of inter-culturalism are poor. You see, the problem of inter-culturalism is 
too much complex to be deliberated from one aspect only. The causes of the said 
indifference are often of economic nature. In today’s world marked by intensive 
economic competition this type of indifference is to be expected.  
As someone who has often been engaged in translating from different 
languages I perceive a problem that sticks like a sore thumb. In Novi Sad and in 
Vojvodina we don’t have enough “translators” to contribute, in crucial moments, 
to a la Eco model of translation. How come that Vojvodina has such a problem 
and what the state can do to solve it? Democratic rules of the game to not allow 
the once practice of the Communist Party – the practice of bringing closer 
different ethnic groups at any cost. Some time ago, I suggested something I’ll 
repeat here – the state could give scholarships to everyone eager to learn other 
minority languages, meaning to everyone willing to contribute to 
multiculturalism. Learning English is not a big deal, English is being taught in 
elementary schools. But learning Rumanian, Slovak or some other minority 
language is not that pragmatic as learning the lingua franca. You need courage for 
that. But if the state and Vojvodina administrations want to maintain 
multiculturalism or inter-culturalism this is what they need to do. The state must 
create preconditions for overcoming indifference, though it cannot force anyone 
into not being indifferent.  
We shall never solve the problem of Vojvodina’s European identity by 
reiterating dead metaphors. European identity is not something material. 
Therefore, the real question is the question of how Vojvodina could contribute to 
the permanently changeable European identity.  
 
 
Mirko DJORDJEVIC  
VOJVODINA’S CULTURAL MATRIX  
 
Indeed, this is the right time to discuss this topic. The term model – 
Vojvodina’s cultural model – is not used just colloquially here, the more so since 
doctorial theses are being written about this sustainable cultural model, even by 
some Germans and Frenchmen. Firstly, the term itself has an authentic tradition 
in Europe. Secondly, it has not been destroyed in the cycle of Milosevic’s Balkan 
wars, though considerably impaired and jeopardized. Having emerged from the 
cultural milieu we call “Mittel Europe” this term has persisted to this very day 
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and still has to be developed and fine-tuned. The term itself testifies of the 
principle formulated by early Marxists – the principle that culture is universal by 
its nature and national by its form and language. Actually, Marxists have not been 
those who have invented that principle. Even Goethe was referring to it in all his 
observations about European culture and it concretely relates to European 
identity.  
Vojvodina’s multicultural model is not a finished cultural matrix, monistic 
and grounded on a single idea or assumption. In his essay on cultural pattern – 
one of the best essays on culture we have – Slobodan Jovanovic speaks of Serbia’s 
unfinished cultural pattern. No wonder, therefore, says Jovanovic, that even 
Njegos has not bequeathed to us “cultural but national pattern.” Actually, we have 
never had a cultural patter or tried to develop one. Slobodan Jovanovic ascribes 
this to a deficient intellectual potential among those who are mistakenly called 
elite to this very day. We have never had intellectual but semi-intellectual elite. 
Jovanovic is quite positive about it in his brilliant essay. People who share his 
view – including myself – are strongly opposed today.  
Vuk /Karadzic/ and Dositej /Obradovic/, along with the entire era of 
Serbia’s Enlightenment, are placed in the frame of Vojvodina’s cultural model.  
Allow me to make a personal and somewhat sentimental diversion. I was in 
visit in France when their authorities decided to bury Alexandre Dumas’ ashes in 
the Pantheon. So, Dumas entered the Pantheon two centuries after his death. Not 
everyone is buried in the Pantheon for the French are not the nation apt to 
changing the names of their street and squares overnight. This has to do with 
their identity. The French President himself was present at the ceremony, calling 
Dumas “a constructor of our national, republican identity.”  
Let me remind you that Alexandre Dumas was a grandson of a slave and 
son of a mulatto. He wasn’t an ethnic Frenchman at all. Nevertheless, the French 
recognized him and his artistic expression as a major determinant of their cultural 
and national identity. Many years ago Victor Hugo said, “Alexandre Dumas’ 
name is more than French, he is an European and he is even more than an 
European because he is universal – his very name determines writers who are 
disseminators of civilization.”  
In today’s Serb culture there is no identity of this type – republican and 
universal. You would be stigmatized should you try to place Serb identity on the 
scale of those values rather than on that of ethnic origin. Serb identity is 
nowadays searched for and found only on the map of ethnocentrism and banal 
nationalism – the map characteristic of small town reasoning that is alien to 
Vojvodina and the world.  
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Let me give you some examples that cost us dearly. Today, Dositej is being 
denied in a variety of “cultural programs” and documents. One of such 
documents is titled “St. George’s Day Declaration” and the other – quite movingly 
– “The Second Serb Letter to Haralampi.” Apart from other “wise” signatories, 
both documents bear signatures of two bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
And what is this all about? This is about imposing on us a Middle Age, Byzantine 
and archaic pattern that is typically monistic and useless today. A modern, 
pluralist pattern is absolutely rejected.  
Take, for instance, the term or the phrase that sticks like a sore thumb – 
“teachings of St. Sava.”  
The term itself emerged in our culture in 1935-36. It was Vojvodina rather 
than Serbia that initiated the cultural cult of St. Sava in 1835 – St. Sava’s 
personality and work were taken for a cultural idea supposed to encompass the 
entire Serb cultural space. That was the time when that fine hymn, “Let’s sing 
with love,” was composed. Verses of this hymn have been forged 46 times since. 
In the Milosevic era all sorts of verses were inserted into it. “Warriors” riding 
tanks were singing “Bosnia-Herzegovina, St. Sava’s legacy.”  
Serb “teachings of St. Sava” are meant to mobilize the masses for a warring-
patriotic ideology, and have nothing to do real teachings of St. Sava. In other 
words, everything was reduced to a nationalistic pattern.  
Or, take another example that is totally neglected over here and relates to 
Vojvodina. In all world encyclopedia and art books you will find the entry Serb 
Eastern Orthodox Baroque. This baroque is being destroyed for more than twenty 
years in Vojvodina. Churches in the Byzantine style are being built in Vojvodina! 
That’s the same absurdity as constructing baroque churches in Sumadija. Baroque 
marks an era in European culture! What I want to underline here is that 
development of a cultural pattern is being obstructed by waves of enforced 
clericalism – and churches are not that much to blame for this as regimes are, 
including Kostunica’s regime. It forces clericalism upon the society as a substitute 
for all of its failed ideologies.  
Byzantium is given the upper had over Europe. So, typical ideas of state-
building are forced upon the society as a cultural model in the situation when the 
state itself shrinks while the very ideas monumentally grow out of proportion in 
some virtual space.  
Is there a difference between Eastern Orthodoxy in Vojvodina and in Serbia 
proper? A German got his doctoral degree on the thesis dealing with this issue, 
and his thesis was translated into Serbian. Nevertheless, the topic is still a taboo 
over here.  
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One should be precise when referring to Eastern Orthodoxy – Serb, 
Russian, Bulgarian or Vojvodinian. Eastern Orthodoxy is based on dogmas. 
However, there are differences within Eastern Orthodox churches. In Vojvodina, 
Eastern Orthodoxy is a cultural idea and we should insist on it as such. But as you 
know, every insistence on this idea still brings about incidents. This is probably 
best illustrated by the fact that small religious communities, Christian religious 
communities, are stigmatized as dangerous sects.  
We were witnesses of something the media kept calling incidents. But 
when incidents reoccur day in day out, and keep reoccurring for months, then 
they are not just incidents but a threatening tendency – the tendency marked not 
only by intolerance but also by physical assaults against members of a different 
religious community. I am referring to Adventists, a small religious community, 
which has become a target of violent assaults without any reason whatsoever. 
Anyone just familiar with religion has to know that we, adherents of the Serb 
Orthodox Church, are actually Adventists since we believe in the second coming 
of Christ! 
I was referring to all those developments to draw your attention to the 
ongoing practice of renaming streets and squares. This practice is far from being 
naïve – actually, that’s an attack against foundations of identity. Go to Vichy and 
you’ll see that not a single street, boulevard or square is named after Petain. But 
now we have streets and squares named after Dimitrije Ljotic and other Nazi 
collaborators. You see, those reactionary and dark forces – the Radicals in the first 
place – they know their business. They smelled out some guilt in Jovan Jovanovic 
Zmaj – from their point of view – and would not forgive him. Zmaj wrote two 
anthological poems in 1872 reacting to Prussians’ bestial terror in Paris, when they 
tied half-dead people to cannons and so dragged them to the pits close to today’s 
the Wall of Communards. Identity is being undermined everywhere – in the 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, in the streets, in the politics…To conclude with, I 
want to underline that Vojvodina’s identity exists though not as a ready-made 
pattern. It exists as a principle that still has to be developed, but the principle 
based on multiculturalism and multi-religiousness. Ethnically homogeneous 
states are almost non-existent.  
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Gordana PERUNOVIC FIJAT 
UNEXPECTED ANSWERS  
Or, Why Vojvodinians Foot the Bill  
 
“The Vojvodina of shovels, razors, prayers and slaps,  
Overgrown with desire, lies, struggle, betrayal and love.” 
M. Antic, “Vojvodina”  
 
Whatever research of Vojvodina’s identity you might conduct you will al-
ways stumble into unexpected findings. And most surprised by such findings are 
those who perceive the entire region as a tame valley where people eat goulash 
and drink icy cold spritzer, and are so docile and good that would not say a word 
of protest should everything be taken away from them. That’s why recognizing 
Vojvodina’s identity as an European region has always been a real challenge. 
A phenomenon you would not detect on sight but the phenomenon that 
largely influences the functioning of the entire state is a major or probably the 
main trait of Vojvodina’s European identity. I am referring here to Vojvodinians’ 
habit to duly pay their taxes and bills – the habit the population south of Zemun 
see almost as weird. Not paying your electricity, gas and other bills is a shame for 
a citizen of Vojvodina. Though prices exceeded people’s pensions and salaries 
long ago, they, especially the elderly, are genuinely in pain when they cannot 
afford to pay their bills. Take, for example, the 70-year-old Katica Djordjevic 
whose pension check totals 6,972 dinars. Last winter – a very mild one by the way 
– she had to pay 4,000-5,000 dinars for gas supply. This, plus other utility bills 
indicates that her bills only by far exceeded her monthly income. “I have to pay,” 
she says. And she does pay. As old as she is, she has to work to earn some extra 
money to pay her dues. She complains not about not being able to afford 
medicaments, let alone other things. She pays her bills and pays them duly. And 
the great majority of Vojvodinians are like Katica – despite the series of wars, 
inflation, rationed goods and delayed pensions. Nothing would prevent them 
from paying their bills.  
According to some assessments I read long ago, in 1990s Milosevic’s regime 
actually lived on Vojvodinians, who were duly and persistently paying their dues. 
Had they, by some fortunate coincidence, deprived the state of their moneys there 
is no telling what course the history would take. But no, not Vojvodinians – they 
were paying as they always have. Some say such financial discipline is the legacy 
of the Austro-Hungarian rule. However, one cannot but wonder how come that 
this discipline survived Austro-Hungary and many different states with different 
taxing. How come that people have this conditioned reflex – to pay the state their 
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dues first and live on what is left? This needs not be about the fear of the state 
only – on the contrary, people do want to pay their liabilities and thus show that 
they are solvent. Decent people owing nothing to anyone are the trait of 
Vojvodina’s European identity. They are relieved, happy and proud of themselves 
when they are capable of paying, and sad and anxious when they cannot afford it 
despite the fact that this is not their fault.  
Another trait of Vojvodina’s European identity is its multi-ethnicity, 
multiculturalism that is often referred to but has never been thoroughly 
researched and defined. These are the values that should be promoted anew 
nowadays, unlike in the times when they were taken for granted. Those were the 
times when it went without saying that people were congratulating religious 
holidays to their neighbors, colleagues and friends of religions other than theirs. 
My grandmother Radinka Nincic, born Pakaski, was telling me stories about it. 
“We were socializing with Catholics and Jews, and were familiar with their 
holidays. We were paying them visits to wish them good, and they did the same 
at the times of our holidays,” my grandmother was telling me. Even today most 
Vojvodinians are familiar with customs and tradition of the people of different 
ethnic origin. And the great majority of citizens of Vojvodina are at least bilingual 
– speaking their mother tongue and the official one. Hilda Banski, my once 
kindergarten teacher and now the president of the German Association in 
Kikinda, is addressing various ceremonies and meetings in Hungarian, German 
and Serbian. She speaks and writes fluently all the three languages. Only some 
sixty years ago about 80 percent of Vojvodina Serbs spoke at least one language 
other than theirs – not because they were notably educated people who have 
traveled all over the world, but because that was the necessity of everyday life. 
People simply had to speak several languages. My grand-grandfather Radivoj 
Pakaski, say, spoke and wrote in Hungarian and German, and mastered Russian 
well enough as a prisoner of war that he listened to Radio Moscow till the end of 
his life. My grandfather, Sava Nincic, also spoke and wrote in Hungarian and 
German, and learned to speak Slovakian while working in Kovacica. Nowadays, 
before they start learning English in school, young people learn one from another 
and are familiar with some other language that is spoken in Vojvodina.  
Literacy is yet another major aspect of Vojvodina’s European identity. In 
1773 the village of Ostojicevo – Tisasentmiklosh in the Coka municipality had 
elementary schools with classes in Serbian, Hungarian, German and Polish – for a 
group of Polish immigrants, who were later on assimilated – and special classes 
for Jewish children. Though most population were illiterate at the time, it was 
obvious that the regime and national leaders – enthusiasts of the time – wanted to 
enlighten the people. The books published throughout the 19th century some 
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families have kept for generations testify to this intention. People were buying 
books to read them – why should they buy them otherwise costly as they were? 
So, those people, Vojvodinians, knew how to read at the time the people living 
south of the Sava and Danube rivers were illiterate – for, they didn’t have schools 
at all. Today, despite general belief that illiteracy was uprooted after the WWII, 
the surveys conducted by the Novi Sad Faculty of Philosophy show that some 30 
percent of citizens of Vojvodina are functionally illiterate – meaning they know 
how to read but do not understand what they read – and that more than 80 
percent of people over 30 years of age are computer illiterate. No similar surveys 
have been conducted in other parts of Serbia. Had they been, the findings would 
have been rather disappointing, I am afraid.  
Further, real estate records, established during the rein of Maria Theresa, 
are also illustrative of Vojvodina’s European identity. After the fall of Austro-
Hungary there were attempts to establish the same records in other parts of 
Yugoslavia that had not been under Austro-Hungarian rule. All those attempts 
failed, and they failed in all the three ex-Yugoslavias. What is characteristic of us, 
Vojvodinians, is our need to have all information tidily recorded and traceable. 
We are proud of our records the same as other Europeans are proud of their 
castles, museum and well-kept registers.  
All this hardly exhausts the list of the traits of Vojvodina’s European 
identity. Much information is still to be collected and processed. Today’s situation 
in Vojvodina is far from what its citizens would like it to be. Some recent 
developments indicate that we are further away from Europe than we were one or 
two centuries ago. This trend should be stopped immediately or else there would 
be no place for Vojvodina in Europe.  
 
 
Gojko MISKOVIC 
THE MISSING LINK  
How others perceive us? A personal experience  
 
Dear friends, allow me to share with you – here and now – some of my 
personal experience over the past several years. From the very beginning of a big 
adventure – which, later on, turned into a unique, international project on the 
controversies of ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration – I’ve have had the privilege to 
meet tens of internationally recognized scholars dealing with our recent past. 
Some of them have become my close friends since. And ever since, I’ve been 
receiving their newly published studies and books. Most of those works are 
focused on interpretation of the developments in Central Europe and the 
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Habsburg Empire, and its final legal form – Austro-Hungary. At the beginning I 
was astonished at how basically their interpretations of same developments and 
their causes differ from “official versions” advocated by official authors of text-
books in Serbia. I was so surprised that I wondered whether our interpreters have 
ever heard that there were opinions and stands different from theirs and whether 
our national libraries have those valuable, referential books on stock at all.  
When I sent a list of some of those “must-have-books” (including the epochal 
study on Hungarian revolution in 1848-49 and Lajos Kossuth) to a competent 
professional in the National Library of Serbia he wrote back that they didn’t have 
a single title on their stock – and, that those book were not to be found in any 
library whatsoever in Serbia. However, I stubbornly continued my investigation. I 
found out that the national library does not even have a copy of the thesis on 
political stands among Vojvodina Serbs in late 19th century the young scholar who 
earned his doctorate in history at the Vienna University in 1970 brought to the 
library in person. According to the general register, the library has only two must-
have-books on the Habsburg Empire out of many written by the undeniable 
authority in the field, Robert A. Kann. I found no trace whatsoever indicating that 
the library is subscribed to the referential Annual Review of Austrian History.  
Combined with the a priori political stand about anti-Serb sentiments of the 
peoples and states of Central Europe and the monochromatic picture of “the dungeon of 
nations” (Voelkerkerker), this carefully fostered absence of facts does open the 
floodgates to endless intimidation and befooling of Serbs. With so created 
simulacrum “national saviors” can at ease promote opscurants such as St. Nikolaj 
from Lelic, the Bishop of “the Machine Gun,” Nedic, Ljotic, Limonov, Karadzic, 
Mladic…  
 
Post scriptum: Several days after the session I found out that the Sombor 
City Library had a modest collection of books in English. Having inspected them 
in detail I was surprised to see that the collection included the said study on the 
Hungarian revolution and Lajos Kossuth!  
 
 
Marija GAJICKI 
LIFE IN A GHETTO  
 
Judging by national diversity of its population Vojvodina is a kind of ethnic 
phenomenon: 29 nations live here but there are neither ethnic enclaves nor is the 
population ethnically mixed in urban areas only. Actually, 95 percent of all 
settlements in Vojvodina are ethnically mixed. The surveys conducted from 2000 
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onwards usually show a high degree of ethnic distance – and that’s about an 
upward trend. People coming from different ethnic communities communicate 
less and less, their knowledge of languages other than theirs is on the downward 
curve, and their interest in one another constantly grows smaller. The public 
opinion polls dealing with fears show that one-half of Vojvodinians are afraid of 
being expelled and that this fear is equally distributed in all ethnic communities in 
Vojvodina. Even Serbs are mostly afraid of expulsion, despite the fact that they 
are in the majority.  
In 2004, Vojvodina was challenged by outbursts of ethnically motivated 
violence. Many analysts explain that by the growth of radically nationalistic 
sentiments not only among the people from the ethnic majority but also from 
ethnic minorities. In 2006, the number of ethnically motivated incidents in 
Vojvodina decreased. However, relations among people are still burdened with 
high ethnic distance. In the past years most assaults reported to the police were 
targeting Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, Albanians and Roma. The year 2005 was 
marked by fewer physical assaults but by more nationalistic, slandering graffiti, 
damaged tombstones, verbal assaults and threats to members of minority 
communities.  
Similar surveys conducted in ethnically mixed communities in West Balkan 
countries also show a high degree of ethnic distance, the growing number of 
nationalistic graffiti and of damaged tombstones. The growth in nationalistic 
incidents and hate speech is most characteristic of ethnically mixed communities. 
Perpetrators of ethnically motivated incidents are usually young people who have 
grown up in isolation and at the time of warring propaganda and social 
insecurity. 
The wars wagged in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia are among main causes 
of all forms of hatred and intolerance, including nationalism, xenophobia and 
neo-Nazism. Nowadays we are faced with the fact that most people have got used 
to various forms of hate speech, nationalistic and fascist incidents, verbal assault 
and even physical conflicts. 
As an activist of the non-governmental organization “The Vojvodina 
Woman: Regional Women Initiative” and one of the founders of the Human 
Rights Festival – VIVISECT-Fest, I would like to share with you some of our 
experience in presenting the festival programs in different communities. Those 
programs were focusing the topics “The War in the Former Yugoslavia: Perceived 
from the Inside and from the Outside” and “My Enemies: Nationalism and 
Xenophobia.” Those programs were realized in many towns in Serbia, as well as 
in the ex-Yugoslav republics and Germany (Indjija, Belgrade, Kikinda, Sombor, 
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Backa Palanka, Novi Becej, Novi Pazar, Ruma, Stara Pazova, Kula, Tuzla, 
Sarajevo, Mostar, Skoplje and Berlin). 
What rather surprised me when it came to Vojvodina was that I 
experienced it as “living in a ghetto.” This feeling was the strongest at the time we 
were preparing the publication “Hate Speech and Nationalism: Causes and 
Consequences.” With this publication we wanted to explain the causes of 
ethnically motivated violence not only in Vojvodina but also in Kosovo and other 
regions in Serbia. What drew our attention was the fact that in the past ten-odd 
years all national communities – those of majority and those of minority 
population alike – have been entrenching themselves in their communities and 
have been hardly communicating one with another. As we discuss Vojvodina’s 
identity we cannot ignore this characteristic of the life in it, this life in a ghetto and 
this parallel existence of different ethnic communities that do not communicate 
and mix. One of keynote speakers has already said it was hard to find a translator 
from one language into another. We were also faced with this problem while 
looking for a translator for Hungarian and Albanian languages. It was with great 
difficulty that we managed to have the publication translated in those two 
languages. And that’s the problem we have to cope with here in Vojvodina.  
Speaking of Novi Sad and Vojvodina we have two brands – the EXIT music 
festival, assembling people from all ethnic communities, who left their ghettos for 
the occasion; and, the festival of folklore and ethno-cuisine aimed at promoting 
Vojvodina’s and Serbia’s multiculturalism, which is realized with the assistance of 
the US government. The plentitude of Vojvodina’s multiculturalism is being 
demonstrated through different cuisines and folklore. In my opinion, this is not 
enough. 
Speaking of Serbia, another music festival, the one in Guca, is being 
promoted as its brand. This festival, too, assembles people from different ethnic 
communities, including those from the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. It is sad that the 
state of Serbia has only two mass music events, one of which is totally folkloric – 
meaning that it cannot manifest the entirety of Serbia’s identity. 
The biggest problem – as I see it – is that we do not know what the entirety 
of Serbia’s identity might be. And against such backdrop we cannot tell what 
Serbia and Vojvodina have in common and what makes them different, what is 
our common advantage and what mutual handicap. What concerns me the most 
is this life in a ghetto we are experiencing while organizing various programs – 
the lives of all those closed communities with no wish whatsoever to get to know 
better others, those speaking languages other than theirs, professing other 
religions and keeping up different cultural matrixes. As long as the state does not 
get genuinely involved in Serbia’s “branding” – and that of other regions, 
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including Vojvodina – and does not set aside considerable funds for, say, 
translations, as it does for EXIT and Guca, we shall not be able to remove causes 
and heal consequences, and cope with indolence and small town mentality.  
Here is an illustrative example of how little we know about one another. 
Within the VIVISECT festival program we organized a photo exhibition in 
December 2006 in Novi Pazar. The photos displayed were showing graffiti in 
Vojvodina in the period 2000-2006. The hate speech and intolerance of the great 
majority of the graffiti were targeting the Hungarian community. “Why are there 
so many graffiti against Hungarians when Hungarians live in Hungary rather 
than in Vojvodina?” was the first question most residents of Novi Pazar asked us 
upon entering the exhibition hall. 
 What are the realities in today’s Vojvodina and Serbia? What has changed 
in our everyday lives since October 2000 and the so-called democratic revolution, 
except for the ruling elites? Except for the fact that one political option came to 
power and the other became opposition nothing has changed. We still have hate 
speech and witness verbal assaults and even physical assaults against political 
opponents particularly in the periods of election campaigns. Opening of “a new 
chapter” has brought us nothing good – we are witnesses of the same atmosphere 
of belligerency and chaos.  
 Instead of coexistence we have people living side by side. 
Multiculturalism in Vojvodina or Sandzak, or Kosovo is nothing but a trope. 
People are living in their own ghettos surrounded by barbed wire, baring the 
fangs at others and occasionally assaulting them. After such incidents tensions 
lower, people return to their fenced areas to wait for new conflicts as usual.  
 
 
Aleksandra VUJIC 
VOJVODINIANS’ PASSIVITY 
 
In my opinion the participants have provided most interesting insights so 
far. There is an aspect, however, no one has addressed, the aspect I would call 
“Vojvodinians’ passivity.” I refer here to Vojvodinians’ lethargic character and 
slowness when it comes to adequate responses to various situations vis-à-vis 
citizens of Serbia and other regions.  
To illustrate what I’ve said I’ll give you the example of the National Report 
on the Implementation of the Charter on Regional or Minority Languages Serbia 
submitted to the Council of Europe in June 2007. Though over 50 percent of the 
information in the report have been provided by provincial secretariats of 
Vojvodina – and our provincial secretariats handle minority related 
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administration quite differently than those in Central Serbia, which was more 
than obvious whenever we were drafting alternative reports5 - national reports 
are, as a rule, presented to international conferences by officials of the Belgrade-
seated Department for Human and Minority Rights even when the authors of 
sections on Vojvodina attend such meetings.6 In other words, despite the fact that 
the said report would have been incomplete without the information on the 
position on minority communities provided by Vojvodina – and not because there 
are not minorities in Serbia but because information about them are insufficient – 
Vojvodinians take it quite “normal” when others represent them and speak on 
their behalf.  
Though Vojvodinians are conscientious and meticulous in everything they 
do, their overall attitude reveals a kind of submissiveness to any authority. This is 
why they react passively, actually do not react at all, whenever in the company 
with the people from the capital. Vojvodinians should consider this characteristic 
of theirs with self-criticism.  
  
 
Vladimir VALENTIK 
DANGER OF SELF-PROVINCIALIZATION  
 
I would like to add something to the categories Mr. Losonc tackled in his 
address since I take them crucial for the attainment of the goals referred to by Ms. 
Biserko. As a member of a minority community I am fully aware of what Mr. 
Losonc hand in mind when he spoke about indifference as synonymous for 
cultural disinterestedness. If such disinterestedness is so evident in Vojvodina’s 
cultural life it must affect, in a way, the Province’s multiethnic identity. In my 
view, Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity should be grounded on civil values. What I 
hope is that most of us rely on those values to strengthen such identity.  
Cultural disinterestedness leads to self-provincialization, which is 
particularly dangerous to smaller ethnic communities in Vojvodina. Self-
provincialization undermines civilization criteria and cultural values and thus the 
                                                 
5 Unlike the plenitude of information about education for minority communities in 
the Province, the information about the education of Bulgarian, Albanians and Bosniaks 
are more than meagre: Serbia’s administration does not compile the information about the 
number of classes providing education in minority languages, about the number of 
students being taught in their mother tongues, about the number of teachers lecturing in 
minority languages, etc.  
6 “The role of territorial units, national councils and civil society organizations in 
securing stability in settlements – communities,“ June 12-13, 2007, Palic.  
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very identity of a minority community as it boils it down to the knowledge of 
language on the one hand, and to folklore - festivals of folk dances, songs and 
costumes - on the other.  
As I follow cultural events in other minority communities in Vojvodina I 
can tell you with certainty that Serbia can only be proud of the results of minority 
culture and arts. However, due to the aforementioned indifference those values 
hardly ever reach the majority population. Here is an illustrative example: after 
almost 140 years of their rich theater tradition, Slovaks managed to set up the 
Slovak Vojvodina Theater in 2003. Only one year later a play staged by the theater 
troupe was short-listed for BITEF, the most renowned international theater 
festival in Serbia. Apart from this play, only another one, performed by the 
Yugoslav Drama Theater troupe represented Serbia at the festival that year. Last 
year, the play won the Grand Prix of the Asian Theater Festival in Iran. However, 
the general public in Serbia learned almost nothing about this success. This is just 
one example. There must be more such examples in the Hungarian community, 
large as it is.  
We from the Slovak minority community try to communicate with general 
public through the universal language of painting. And yet, we do have to cope 
with cultural indifference of the media, which threatens with the said self-
provincialization. Energy of minority communities has its limits. It manifests itself 
to certain extent and then, under certain circumstances, starts to decline and to 
gradually vanish into thin air. Standards of excellence become lower and lower, 
and finally everything boils down to folk dances and national costumes. I strongly 
believe that a variety of national costumes, national dishes, etc. could hardly make 
up Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity. Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity is much 
more than that.  
 
 
Tomislav ZIGMANOV 
IN THE POSITION OF EARLY CHRISTIANS  
 
Rather than speaking about Vojvodina’s identity and its determining 
elements, I would like to place on the agenda the topic that has not been broached 
and elaborated enough at this session. I am referring to the power – to the 
efficiency – of Vojvodina’s identity. Speaking of the contents of Vojvodina’s 
identity, one can always enumerate its determining elements, its legal frame, and 
its popular determinants. However, apart from this, identity implies the 
components of its own pulsation. Take a look at today’s public scene, take a look 
at cultural patterns or take a look at the educational system – you will find just 
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traces of Vojvodina’s identity – or, for that matter of local identities - in those 
structures. See, in the era of socialism we did have plural identities. As an 
elementary school student I was taught the history of Subotica’s industry, we had 
competitions in this subject matter and did have deep insights into the history of 
our region. But you’ll learn nothing about the history of your hometown from 
today’s textbooks. Today, they teach you all the benchmarks of national history 
but not a single fact about local developments.  
Local history is most important, in Vojvodina at least. For, when you are 
familiar with local history you are familiar with its pluralistic culture. Probably 
the most tragic consequence of the Milosevic regime was the suspension of 
everything plural and the identity mostly boiled down to ethnicity – and not 
ethnicity in cultural sense but rather in belligerent and military one focused on 
national history. Actually, we are, so to speak, handicapped: for, in the area in 
which an identity pulsates, in the area of culture and education, we are mostly 
deprived. Dealing with things that did not fit into the aforementioned concept of 
national history was considered suspicious. And this refers to any study of local 
or regional histories. 
A table of this size or probably a bit larger would accommodate us all who 
advocate Vojvodina’s autonomy. And mostly the same people have been sitting at 
that table for the past ten-odd years. So, where are the political elites that 
advocate Vojvodina’s identity? In what way do they implement their programs? 
Would they give Vojvodina not a single thought the moment they satisfy their 
petty political needs? Analyzing the attitude towards Vojvodina from 1990s 
onwards you’ll see there has never been a coherently articulated policy.  
The question is what is to be done to strengthen Vojvodina’s identity. This 
session has not assembled representatives of Vojvodina’s Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, of Radio and Television of Vojvodina, etc. Therefore, is has not provided 
institutional elements necessary for the dissemination of the very idea of 
Vojvodina’s identity, let alone for something more serious. This is why we, trying 
to cope with the topics like this one, seem to be in the same position as early 
Christians who lived in catacombs looking forward to the day their peaceful and 
humane concept would prevail.  
To conclude with, I’ll make a suggestion – the idea of Vojvodina should be 
dislocated from Novi Sad to Kikinda, Vrsac, Mitrovica or Sid. Meetings like this 
one should be organized in those towns and should assemble younger 
generations.  
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Pavel DOMONJI 
A STONE HURLED AT A MYTH  
 
Alpar Losonc has noted the tendency of reducing Vojvodina to a 
consociation of ethnic elites. I take his observation deserves to be considered at 
this table. In my opinion, this is about the tendency that plays into the hands of 
ethnic elites, who manipulate the ethnic question in order to maintain their 
positions and partake in the distribution of public goods.  
In this impoverished country, burdened with the experience of ethnic 
conflicts and primitive political culture any ethnically motivated manipulation is 
a risky business. Only certain factions can profit from such practice, not ordinary 
people from minority communities. The latest illustrative example has to do with 
electoral rules in Vojvodina. To start with, the electoral rules were defined at 
meetings with representatives of national councils despite the fact that national 
councils are not authorized at all to deal with the issue and have no legitimacy 
since mandates of some have expired. 
There is no issue whatsoever that cannot be perceived from the angle of 
ethno-cultural differentiation. Unemployment, social inequality, educational 
deficits, positions in the state administration or in privatization processes, etc. – 
all those issues can be interpreted from ethno-cultural standpoints and on all of 
them one can build the rhetoric of ethnically motivated deprivation and 
discrimination. 
Interestingly, national elites advocate pluralism at the level of global society 
but not within their own ethnic communities. In my view, pluralism is crucial for 
members of national minorities and they are the ones who mostly benefit from it. 
The strongest opponents of pluralism are to be found in the ranks of national 
elites. By emphasizing cultural differences and specificities they aim at 
establishing vertical communication with their counterparts from other ethnic 
communities unlike ordinary people creating comprehensive, horizontal 
networks of communication.  
Minorities are complex communities. Contrary to nationalistic bias different 
outlooks, orientations, values and interests do exist among minority communities. 
I believe there are forces in Vojvodina that are capable to politically articulate 
those different orientations and put an end to Vojvodina’s reduction to ethnic 
Bantustans. As it seems to me, the Democratic Party has not developed a clear-cut 
minority strategy. Instead it uses cheap political improvisation and demagogically 
flatters ethnic entrepreneurs. Its statement about minorities as constituent people 
of Vojvodina exemplifies this flattery.  
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I would say that the only efficient strategy is the one that insists on 
multiplication of identities and focuses an individual rather than a group. Such a 
strategy would be completely in the spirit of the maxim Jovan Komsic recalled – 
“live and let live.” However, ethno-nationalistic mobilizations and the advocacy 
of ethnic identities have scarred the self-perception of citizens of Vojvodina. As if 
Vojvodina’s regional identity has died out. Today, it is almost impossible to 
determine the number of people declaring themselves as Vojvodinians.  
To end with, let me remind you of an incident that took place in Vojvodina 
in the aftermath of Kosovo riots in 2004. Namely, on March 18, 2004, the graffiti 
“Long live Serb-Albanian friendship!” appeared on the wall of the Pancevo 
municipal assembly. The author of the said graffiti, as you know, used the 
pseudonym “Vojvodinians.” 
So, what’s the problem with this graffiti? The problem is not in its author’s 
belief in the situation when masses, mad with rage, cry out in the streets, “Kill 
and slaughter all Schiptars!” The problem is not in the author’s belief that 
relations between Serbs and Albanians have not irrevocably regressed to hatred. 
The problem is in the author’s delusion that Vojvodinians – whom he signed 
under the graffiti – could counteract the masses thirsting for revenge and stand 
up for a handful of their townspeople of Albanian origin.  
A stone hurled at the window of an Albanian sweetshop in downtown 
Novi Sad has actually smashed the myth the Vojvodinians themselves have 
created – the myth about them as nice, polite and civilized Central Europeans, the 
people whose identity rests on the principles of multiculturalism, civil society, 
human rights, non-violence and tolerance. All of a sudden all those negative traits 
that have been ascribed to others – through a cultural-racist construction of their 
own identity – emerged as a suppressed but a component part of Vojvodinians’ 
identity. In Vojvodina, people generally accept the stereotype about Vojvodinians 
being superior to the rest of Serbia. According to the stereotype, Belgrade is, say, 
presumptuous, colonially arrogant, centralistic, aggressive and primitively 
imperial, while the rest of Serbia is plunged into Oriental obscurity. All those 
futile fantasies about ourselves being subtle Central Europeans are, in my view, 
deplorable compensation meant to hide the embarrassing fact that political 
struggle for civil identity has never been brought to an end over here.  
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MINORITIES’ POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
AND SAFEGUARD OF VOJVODINA’S 
MULTIETHNIC IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 
 
Sonja BISERKO 
A NEW BEGINNING  
 
For more than ten years the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in 
Serbia has been concerned with the minority issue. The Committee is probably the 
only organization in the country that has been documenting the minority 
situation since early 1990s and published a number of book throwing light not 
only on the developments in Serbia but also providing insights into future 
minority-majority relationship. Now that the Serb national project has suffered 
defeat it is obvious that Serbia has no alternative option but Europe. Therefore, 
discussions as this one are most welcome from the angle of a new majority-
minority modus vivendi in Serbia.  
Serb radical nationalism has considerably impaired the country’s social 
tissue, disturbed interethnic relations, brought about segregation of the minority 
population and excluded it from the larger political, economic and cultural 
community. In this sense we are, in a way, starting from scratch when shaping 
those relations for the future.  
Polish sociologist Sigmund Baumann says that societies without a common 
culture and a common normative foundation split into enclaves, refuges, and 
particularistic cultures concerned with their own interests only, which distance 
themselves from social, political and cultural togetherness. In such societies any 
togetherness disappears while many micro-societies emerge. Human rights, as a 
universal principle, should make up the normative foundation of a new model of 
social relations. By this universal principle all people enjoy equal rights regardless 
of their ethnic origins, and all legal acts are subjugated to it. Only then a human 
being can live a dignified and free life rather than remain imprisoned in his or her 
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enclave. Specificities of each and every group must be respected in the process of 
establishing this new model that relates to the majority and the minority alike. 
This is the only way to establish a society of mutual respect.  
Serbia needs to solve the problem of minorities’ political representation if it 
wants to become a well-arranged, stable and democratic society. This major and 
complex problem has to be considered from various angles – legal, political, 
cultural and institutional. This is also a major moral problem since members of 
minority communities, outnumbered by the people from the ethnic majority, are a 
priori in a back seat. On the other hand, parliamentary seats for minority 
representatives are most important both for the society’s political cohesion and 
stability. Minorities’ representation not only meets their need for recognition but 
also testifies of legitimacy of the state’s representational bodies. Last but not least, 
the problem is significant from the standpoint of integration into the EU, which, 
among other things, implies minority representation at all levels of governance.  
This complex problem calls for a systematic and well-thought-out approach 
– it necessitates a coherent state policy and strategy. And this is exactly what 
Serbia has failed to develop so far. The minority issue and the issue of minorities’ 
political representation are often manipulated in the absence of a political will to 
have those problems solved more efficiently than they are settled now. Criticism 
of the government in this regard is fully justified but so is the criticism of minority 
representatives. Their efforts have not been energetic enough to effectuate 
changes for the better and more adequate solutions to the problem. 
Minorities’ political representation is usually placed on the public agenda 
on the eve of elections. Even we are now discussing the issue while awaiting local, 
provincial and presidential elections. Apart from testifying of the absence of 
systematic and well-thought-out efforts, this fact indicates that, under the 
pressure of political dynamics, a complex problem is often simplified and boiled 
down to the problem of a natural threshold – i.e. to guaranteed mandates – while 
scores of other, major issues are being neglected.  
Finally, for a region such as Vojvodina – proud of its multiculturalism with 
good reason – minorities’ representation is among the questions that cannot be 
separated from its identity. The more minority representatives in the parliament, 
the better prospects for the safeguard of Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity. 
However, the standards of positive discrimination should not be the same for all 
minority communities. For, one should always bear in mind the huge asymmetry 
between minority communities themselves, and not only the one between 
majority and minority populations. 
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Slaven BACIC 
MINORITIES’ POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND SAFEGUARD  
OF VOJVODINA’S MULTIETHNIC IDENTITY7 
 
1. The region nowadays called Vojvodina makes a part of the once larger 
area of South Hungary that has been, ever since 18th century, more or less marked 
by multiethnic identity – private and public coexistence of different ethnic 
communities. Despite strong nation-state policies and geopolitical overturns in 
the past 150 years, this multiethnic identity managed to survive though in a 
considerably reduced form. Whereas in the late 19th century the present-day 
territory of Vojvodina was inhabited by three big ethnic groups – and all the three 
almost equal in size – Hungarian, German and Slavic (including Serbs, Croats, 
Slovaks and Ruthenians) and some smaller ethnic communities such as Jewish 
(small in size but economically powerful) and Rumanian, in early 20th century 
two-thirds of overall population were Serbs. The historical multi-ethnicity was 
kept in the one-third of the population.  
The last in the series of state-national projects that determined today’s 
situation of Vojvodina’s multi-ethnicity was publicly founded at the 8th session of 
the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1987. Under the 
pretext of counteracting “autonomists” – i.e. Vojvodina’s political nomenklatura 
headed by ethnic Serbs, so-called native people, and some members of Slovak, 
Rumanian and Ruthenian minorities – the publicly inaugurated centralistic Serb 
national concept of the Belgrade nomenklatura with Slobodan Milosevic at its 
helm, after months of fierce political propaganda, firstly toppled Vojvodina 
leadership in the fall of 1988. One of the components of the propaganda matrix 
was ethnic – ethnicity, a basic element of Vojvodina’s autonomy (apart from 
                                                 
7 The keynote address for the session “Fostering Vojvodina’s Multiethnic Identity” 
was written in the Croatian language to remind that ever since 2002 when the Assembly of 
the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina put forward the amendment to its Statute of 1991, 
whereby Croatian would be an official language in Vojvodina, the National Assembly of 
the Republic of Serbia has not placed that proposal on its agenda. Despite the fact that 
provincial authorities nevertheless implement the said proposal (the Department for 
Assertion of Authenticity of Provincial Regulations in Languages in Official Use 
determines whether texts, regulations, decisions and bylaws the Assembly adopts in the 
languages the official use of which is provided under the Statute are authentically 
interpreted from Serbian; the Department for Translations has an interpreter for Croatian, 
who prepares all documents in Croatian for Croatian deputies, etc.) the absence of consent 
by republican authorities only testify of non-existent provincial autonomy and Belgrade’s 
actual attitude towards minority rights.  
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historical, economic and cultural), was negated, while Vojvodina’s autonomy was 
emphasized as being, as a university professor phrased it, “the Serb concern.” 
Though not legally formalized, particularly since 1970s, Vojvodina’s multi-
ethnicity has been implemented through the Party chain of command and its 
transmission, governmental bodies. Informally, attention was mostly paid to the 
so-called national key apart from other public elements of multi-ethnicity (that 
nowadays make up minority rights: information in minority languages, official 
use of minority languages, etc.) Since the aforementioned developments annulled 
this communist concept of minorities’ political representation, multi-ethnicity was 
drastically devastated in 1990s, which in itself was a side effect of Belgrade 
regime’s strategy for Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: occupation and 
ethnic cleansing of occupied territories. At that time the situation of minority 
rights in Vojvodina and Serbia – the same as other dimensions of social life – 
irresistibly associated the situation of human rights and freedoms in the 
communist bloc: constitutional milk and honey derogated by ethnic 
discrimination; caricatured ministries for minority rights meant to win over like-
minded people; overt state support to fragmentation of the minority corps, etc.  
Milosevic’s ouster in October 2000 gave rise to the hope that Serbia – 
including Vojvodina he was holding in a bear hug – would put an end to its 
civilization downfall. Though we are now speaking with good reason of 
disappointments and unmet promises of October 5, we cannot deny that some 
progress has been made in many domains – and in the domain of Vojvodina’s 
multi-ethnicity. And yet, the reason for Vojvodina’s dissatisfaction with the 
progress made in the past seven years is to be tracked down in the fact that the 
formation of the Serb national state in the 20th century completely relies on 
Milosevic’s national project – and that includes safeguard of the outcomes of the 
“anti-bureaucratic revolution” of 1998. 
A handful of authentic representatives of national minorities in the 
parliaments of Serbia and Vojvodina, from 1988 to 2000, were officials of minority 
parties participating in elections under the same conditions as other parties. A 
member of a minority community elected MP due to membership of one of the 
ruling parties – Socialist Party of Serbia, Yugoslav left /JUL/ or Serbian Radical 
Party – could have hardly been considered a genuine representative of his or her 
minority community. 
The same as in other domains, the rule of DOS /Democratic Opposition of 
Serbia/ opened a new chapter in the sphere of minority rights. Adequate political 
representation of minorities is a key element of today’s concept of minority rights. 
And such adequate political representation must be based on the principles of 
positive discrimination and affirmative action. 
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2. The same as most minority rights – efficiently developed in the past 
twenty-odd years only – the right to political representation is a rather fresh right. 
Major international documents do not yet provide electoral legislation and 
minorities’ political representation (for instance, Article 15 of the Framework 
Convention on the Protection of National Minorities provides that signatory-
states “shall create necessary conditions for effective participation of members of 
national minorities in cultural, social and economic lives, and in public affairs, 
particularly those that directly concern them;” the Article 22, the Instruments of 
Central European Initiative for the Protection of Minority Rights, which Serbia 
has not ratified yet, provides about the same). However, all this is undergoing 
step-by-step changes.  
The 1999 Lund Recommendations for Minorities’ Efficient Participation in 
Public Life envisage various possibilities such as special representation of national 
minorities through guaranteed seats in a parliament and parliamentary 
committees, nomination of public servants in charge of minority issues, etc. As for 
the electoral process, the Recommendations offer several possibilities such as 
territorial concentration of minority communities, proportional electoral system, 
some forms of preferential voting (whereby voters range candidates by their free 
choice) and lower parliamentary threshold.  
Allow me just to outline the ways in which minorities’ political 
representation has been solved in some neighboring countries.  
In Croatia, the 2003 Law on the Election of MPs explicitly guarantees 8 
parliamentary seats to minority representatives (the Croatian parliament, with 
100-160 MPs, presently has 152 parliamentarians). Out of the said 8 seats, 3 are set 
aside for Serbs, Hungarians and Germans have one seat each, Slovaks and Czechs 
have one mutual representative, while other minority communities – divided in 
two groups – elect the remaining two. Voters decide whether they will exercise 
their election right as members of minority communities of just citizens of Croatia.  
Under the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in 
Kosovo, the Kosovo Assembly, with totals 120 seats, sets aside 20 seats for non-
Albanian communities. Ten seats are allocated to the Serb community, and 10 to 
the rest (Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptians have 4 seats, Bosniaks 3, Turks 2 and 
Goranci 1).  
In Slovenia, one parliamentary seat is reserved for the Italian community 
and one for the Hungarian. The Slovenian parliament has 90 MPs. Slovenia 
recognizes just those two minority communities. In Slovenia, numbers of people 
of South Slav origin – who have settled there at the time of ex-Yugoslavia – are 
not considered minorities under the pretext that they are not autochthonous but 
just immigrant communities.  
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3. What about minorities’ political representation in Serbia and Vojvodina 
in the past five years?  
After Milosevic’s barbarian legislation (for instance, the 1991 Law on 
Official Use of Language and Alphabet, which is still in power, provides that 
“geographical names shall not be replaced by some other names, and shall be 
written in the language of a national minority and by the rule of its grammar;” 
this means prohibition of the public use of the names Ujvidék or Szabaka, which 
can only be written as Novi Szad or Szubotica!) a new chapter in minority rights 
began with the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedom of National 
Minorities passed in 2002. However, since the law relies on the Framework 
Convention it touches not on minorities’ political representation. Later 
developments will show that this shortcoming was not just a mere coincidence… 
Namely, in 2003 the law was followed by the Charter of Human and 
Minority Rights and Civil Liberties of the /former/ State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, the first document ever that explicitly provided the right of minority 
communities “to a certain number of mandates in assemblies of the member-
states and in the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro” (Article 52). However, the 
right has never been effectuated. The state took another course – the one of 
“hushing up” minorities’ political representation!  
In 2004, the republican Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Law 
on the Election of National Deputies annulled the parliamentary threshold of 5 
percent of the total of votes for minority parties (Article 81, paragraph 2) and 
introduced the so-called natural threshold for republican parliament instead.  
The Decision on the Election of Deputies for the Assembly of the 
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina in 2004 confirmed the annulment of the 5 
percent threshold for minority parties and introduced a novelty for minority 
participation in elections – instead of 6,000 signatures on electoral lists necessary 
for their candidacy in the election, the decision laid down 3,000 signatures 
(paragraph 53).  
In 2005, Serbia-Montenegro and the Republic of Croatia ratified the 
Agreement on the Protection of the Rights of Serb and Montenegrin Minorities in 
Croatia and of the Croatian Minority in Serbia-Montenegro. Article 9 of the 
Agreement provided that the signatory-states “shall enable participation of 
members of minority communities in decision-making that relates to their rights 
and position at local, regional and national levels, establishment of minority 
political parties and their participation in legislative and executive branches…and 
shall pass laws securing representation of national minorities in local assemblies 
and governments.”  
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The same as the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities, the 2006 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia – notorious 
for being declared under questionable circumstances – took over the entire section 
of minority rights from the Article 52 of the 2003 Charter of Human and Minority 
Rights and Civil Liberties. However, it made one exception – it omitted the 
paragraph regulating minorities’ right to “a certain number of mandates in 
assemblies of the member-states and in the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro!” 
By the model of the aforementioned decision of provincial authorities, the 
Republican Electoral Commission, on November 15, 2006, adopted the Guidelines 
that illegally changed the election law for the republican elections in 2007. The 
Guidelines reduced the number of signatures on minority voting lists from 10,000 
to 3,000, explaining that enforcement of the election law “would be contrary to 
international standards.” Actually, that was true. However, the only proper way 
would have been to change the election law itself. Therefore, the only logical 
whys for the Guidelines were that lawmakers wanted a priori to secure a 
parliamentary majority. 
In the spring of 2007, the Democratic Party and the Alliance of Vojvodina 
Hungarians publicized their proposal for the amendment of the Decision on the 
Election of Provincial Deputies in the upcoming provincial elections. According to 
the proposal, instead of 60, 48 deputies were to be elected by the proportional 
system, and 12 mandates were to be set aside for eight minority communities the 
representatives of which were to be elected by majority systems and from special 
electoral lists (which makes up 10 percent of total number of the 120-member 
provincial parliament). The minority quota would be applied to eight minority 
communities that have formed their national councils and have at least 10,000 
members. By the quota, the Hungarian community would obtain 3 seats, Slovak 
and Croatian two each, while Rumanians, Ruthenians, Macedonians, Roma and 
Bunjevci one each. Representatives of minority national councils and top officials 
of the Provincial Executive Council agreed on the proposal. The agreement was 
disputed for three months within the ruling coalition and eventually turned 
down. Instead, the Democratic Party offered national minorities a certain number 
of guaranteed mandates on its electoral lists.  
That was the only attempt at effectuating guaranteed seats for national 
minority representatives in Vojvodina and Serbia. Republican authorities are not 
ready to offer guaranteed seats to minority communities. At meetings with 
representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the Democratic Alliance of Croats 
in Vojvodina, the republican officials even claimed that by lowering electoral 
threshold for minorities Serbia has met its obligation vis-à-vis guaranteed 
representation of the Croatian minority, as provided under Article 6 of the 
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bilateral agreement. Moreover, the Director of the Department for Human and 
Minority Rights repeatedly underlined that guaranteed mandates for minorities 
were unacceptable for the government of the Republic of Serbia!  
4. Apart from minorities’ representation in the parliaments of a larger 
community, the principle of representation has yet another meaning – the one of 
political representation within a minority community embodied in minority 
national councils. The issue is regulated under the Law on the Protection of the 
Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities and the Statute on the Functioning of 
Electoral Assemblies in the Process of Election of Councils of National Minorities. 
Despite the fact that even adequately regulated process of election of political 
representatives of minority communities can run into some technical difficulties, 
the brief practice so far has indicated several shortcomings related to functioning 
of those councils, which, as it seems, result from conceptual vagueness.  
a) Direct elections for minority councils are theoretically 
unsustainable from the angle of modern democracy. Though there is no need to 
speak here of positive and negative aspects of direct and indirect elections, and 
remind of seemingly insurmountable obstacles related to direct elections for 
minority councils (including possible political repercussions against members of 
minority communities in undemocratic political orders), what strikes one’s eye is 
that electoral assemblies – deriving from a minority institution or a list singed by 
100 supporters – associate more feudal curiae or “delegations of delegates” of the 
era of socialist self-government than a truly democratic process;  
b) Political pluralism of electoral assemblies is there in principle 
only. What we have in everyday life is an imitation of a two-party system in all 
councils (except in the case of a politically homogeneous ethnic group the 
Milosevic regime has created by artificially dividing the Croatian minority 
community). Thus, poor democratic tradition – partially a legacy of the 
communist era – and quasi-parliamentarianism brought about the one-party 
decision-making by a victorious current within each and every minority 
community;  
c) Instead of being parliaments of minority communities – though 
nowhere defined as such – national councils meet just on rare occasions in real 
life. Thus they usually boil down to yet another electoral curia – yet another 
indirectly elected body – that wastes its energy and purpose on providing support 
to the ruling current that will germinate another, new body to make decision on 
behalf of a national council and derive its legitimacy from it;  
d) The anyway highly generalized and blurred competencies of 
national councils are conferred onto their executive bodies, thus establishing 
obscure, bureaucratized and quasi-governmental governance within a minority 
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community. Such governance does not imply “the government’s” accountability 
to its “parliament.” Instead, decisions are mostly made by small circles of 
minority political elites that have control over the so-called executive bodies;  
e) National councils’ proclaimed participation in decision-making or 
at least their advisory role in the issues of importance for a minority community 
(the use of mother tongue and alphabet, education, information and culture under 
the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedom of National Minorities) 
remained a dead letter. The cases when minority councils provided counseling or 
participated in decision-making hardly produced any visible effects – the more so 
since they tackled minor issues and relied on meager funds, and the more so since 
the very decision-making related to provincial bodies of Vojvodina, the authority 
of which is anyway limited by the province’s constitutional position and funds it 
gets from the real center of political power – Belgrade;  
f) Only as of lately a more stable inflow of funds for functioning of national 
councils and their executive bodies has been secured. This at least removed 
financial obstacles to political representation within minority communities – 
obstacles to the work of national councils. However, new problems emerged 
instead. The state has failed to clearly define responsibilities of elected minority 
officials and – under the pretext of autonomous rights, left minority councils to 
cope with the problematic. Thus national councils, i.e. their executive bodies, are 
solely responsible for distribution of funds. In doing this, national councils are 
hardly subject to any control and even less to accountability.  
Therefore, many have been advocating the reform of the minority legal 
order – the reform of the electoral process for minority councils in the first place - 
for some time now. Out of several informal draft laws publicized so far, two are of 
major importance. One, drafted by the Center for the Research of Ethnicity, 
envisages two crucial novelties in minority self-governance: indirect election 
system and decentralization of minority self-government (i.e. municipal self-
governments rather than a centralized one). The other, outlined by the Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians, basically retains the existing system and provides 
optional possibilities for direct elections and decentralized self-governance. The 
existing regulation on the election of minority self-government bodies calls for 
reform, the same as the entire system of minority rights. Lawmakers will have to 
decide whether to reform the entire system of minority rights or just amend the 
provisions regulating the election of minority self-governments. The manner in 
which this dilemma will be solved primarily depends on the readiness of the 
republican parliament to tackle the minority issue in good earnest.  
6. Laws, bylaws and other regulations on minorities are characteristic of 
most post-communist countries, including ex-Yugoslav republics with pro-
57 
European political agendas. By passing these laws post-communist countries – 
essentially ethno-centric – demonstrate that they have distanced themselves from 
policies of discrimination against minority nations and generally accept 
interethnic tolerance. After Milosevic’s ouster Serbia was lagging behind others in 
this domain too. Regulations meant to breathe life into proclaimed principles 
were not adopted at republican level. Therefore, some minority issues are 
regulated sporadically and ad hoc, minorities’ political representation included. 
On the other hand, minority elites can neither be amnestied for the 
situation in the domain of their political representation. Political representatives 
of bigger minority communities tend toward separate solutions that are favorable 
to members of their communities or, more precisely, their biggest political parties. 
Further, elites of the great majority of minority communities are preoccupied with 
internal conflicts and therefore – despite their surrounding that generates rapid 
assimilation – pay inadequate attention to real-life minority problems such as 
political representation. 
Non-existent minority strategy both at republican and provincial levels is 
the main stumbling bloc in the way of implementation of minorities’ political 
representation supposed to safeguard Vojvodina’s multi-ethnicity in the domain 
of politics. The problem of minorities’ political representation is usually placed on 
the agenda on the eve of elections. Minority representatives are either not 
consulted or consultations include just representatives of the biggest minorities 
and their strongest parties concerned with their partisan interests only.  
The exercise of minorities’ right to adequate political representation 
depends on the majority political elites’ clear-cut break with nationalistic past of 
Milosevic’s or any other provenience. In other words, general preconditions for 
minorities’ full political representation, as well as for the implementation of 
minority rights are as follows: 
a) Instead of its constitutional tradition of centralism Serbia should 
endorse decentralization and restitute Vojvodina’s full autonomy;  
b) A comprehensive minority policy and strategy for realization of 
minority rights and protection of minorities should be clearly defined;  
c) Minority related discourse should not insist on proofs of loyalty but 
the other way round – by the principle of positive discrimination it should 
demonstrate that minorities are equal with all citizens but need special protection 
nevertheless.  
The practice of comparative law offers several possibilities for the 
improvement of minorities’ political representation. Most important of those 
possibilities for the implementation and guaranteeing genuine political 
representation of minority communities are the following:  
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a) Guaranteed representation of minorities in parliaments – the 
number of minority representatives is explicitly determined by the percentage of a 
minority’s population in total population at a certain level (republic, province, 
etc.). Technically, this is the most practical solution and most appropriate for 
regions.  
b) Two groupings of minorities should be differentiated – larger and 
smaller – since their interests are not always identical. So, members of the larger 
minority communities (Hungarians and Bosniaks) should have representatives of 
their own, while smaller minority communities should be represented by one or 
even two representatives. Two common representatives would be a better 
solution since some smaller communities that are territorially concentrated (e.g. 
Croats in Northern Backa or Albanians in South Serbia) can also have interests 
different from those of minorities living in smaller oases (e.g. Slovaks in 
Vojvodina or Rumanians in Banat and East Serbia).  
c) Special care should be taken about active participation of minority 
representatives in the process of passing laws, regulations and bylaws significant 
for the realization of minority rights. This active participation should not be of 
advisory type only. They may be given, say, the right of veto to prevent the 
majority to have a final say in minority legislation.  
Speaking of political representation in minority councils, basic democratic 
postulates are as follows:  
a) Direct election of members of national councils;  
b) Stable inflow of funds necessary for smooth functioning of minority 
councils;  
c) Clearly defined competences of minority councils vis-à-vis state 
authorities. This necessities amendment or supplement of relevant legislation 
such as those in the domain of education, culture, etc.;  
d) Clearly differentiated competences of national councils and their 
executive bodies;  
e) Legislation that provides transparent functioning of minority bodies 
and their accountability.  
In any case, as long as the state bodies do not implement minority rights 
automatically but leave everything to the initiative of minorities that insist on 
their constitutional and legal rights, minorities’ will have to get organized in 
conventional political parties. (For instance, this year the Croatian community had 
to cope with serious problems related to secondary school education in the 
Croatian language in Subotica. At the time students were admitted to secondary 
schools educational authorities failed to inform them about the possibility to 
decide for themselves whether or not to attend classes in Croatian. Later on when 
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sufficient number of students opted for the classes taught in Croatian, the 
authorities posed almost fantastic obstacles to the realization of that right – 
principles of positive discrimination and affirmative action were mere 
abstractions when compared with the problems the educational authorities 
challenged the relatively new Croatian minority with.) The effects of an even ideal 
legislation dealing with minorities’ political representation in minority councils or 
parliaments are contingent on a larger context: the society’s clear break with the 
Milosevic era. And the other way round – as long as minority rights are perceived 
as a window dressing for the “outside” world rather than as a natural outcome of 
a clean break with the policy of discrimination, the best arrangements possible for 
minorities’ political representation will be nothing but a sophisticated simulation 
meant to impress the international community.  
 
 
Miroslav SAMARDZIC  
LOCAL ELECTIONS AND MINORITY PROTECTION  
 
Thank you for the opportunity to speak my mind about a possible solution 
to minority representation, particularly in the region I come from.  
To begin with, I will try to define some criteria the electoral systems in 
multiethnic societies have to meet.  
The first criterion is general and applies to all electoral systems. An 
electoral system must reflect, as much as possible, voters’ will. As you know, 
some electoral systems applied in the world – such as the Anglo-Saxon majority 
system – lead to the establishment of stable governments, despite the fact that a 
party that has not won the majority vote at national level may have the majority 
of MPs in a parliament. If we disregard rigged elections in Florida, that’s what 
actually happened in the United States in 2000 – a candidate that won less votes 
than his rival won the election. That’s why an electoral system needs to be as true 
as possible reflection of voters’ preferences. But there is simply no magic formula 
to attain this. Small political parties – the parties with little influence on 
electorates – often decisively influence formation of government, while parties 
with large electorates are permanently in the back seat. The Italian political 
system may be taken as a typical example in this context. Italian communists used 
to win over 30 percent of votes but have never been included in a government. 
Small political parties in Italy and Germany are major factors due to the manner 
in which governments are formed. As I said, there is no magic formula – the 
problem is theoretically unsolvable and adequate solutions need to be found for 
each and every specific case.  
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The second rule is that an electoral system must be as simple as possible. 
Recommendations for the solutions favorable to minorities can be found in the 
literature on the subject. I my opinion, they are much too complicated and, 
therefore, should be ruled out. Famous politicologist Giovanni Sartori speaks of 
cumulative or limited voting as a model that might suit minorities. Namely, in 
electoral units entitled to several mandates a voter has the right to cast more 
ballots he or she can either cumulate on one candidate or disperse on more 
candidates. Theoretically, this might suit minorities since a minority voter can 
give all his votes to a candidate from his minority community. However, the 
system itself is much too complicated and should not be applied under the 
conditions over here. Neither Sartori nor other authors offer an analysis of 
practical implementation of those solutions. Another variant that might be 
favorable to minorities is preferential voting. That’s about alternative voting 
recommended for the units with one mandate only, where a voter has more than 
one preference. For instance, a voter invests one candidate with an “A” 
preference, another with a “B,” and so on. Referential literature stresses that in 
some Asian countries such system produced stabilizing effects on interethnic 
relations but in other countries failed in this regard. This system is also too 
complicated and inapplicable to our country since political culture is not yet 
stable enough to make it effective. 
There are, say, proportional electoral systems with open lists – a voter votes 
both for a list and for a candidate on it. As it seems, such systems function 
smoothly in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. But those are the societies that 
are mostly not ethnically complex. There is a very good website at 
www.aceproject.org that provides comparative information about electoral 
systems. According to its authors, the said system was applied in Kosovo and 
resulted in victories of more extreme candidates. Therefore, one should think 
twice when it comes to the most appropriate electoral system.  
The third criterion is that an electoral system must produce a stabilizing 
effect on interethnic relations. A formula that perfectly suits minorities but 
destabilizes interethnic relations is of no avail.  
In my view, it’s better for our situation to apply the proportional system 
with natural threshold than, say, with guaranteed seats. Why? The provincial 
authorities have put forth a solution by which members of minority communities 
are entitled to more votes than members of the majority nation. That would not be 
questionable under our Constitution and some international standards since 
minorities are in unequal position and, therefore, can be invested with more 
votes. However, the solution’s shortcoming is that it has a destabilizing effect on 
interethnic relations – the majority population would perceive it as discriminatory 
61 
against them. And that’s the worst possible scenario with unforeseeable 
consequences. What we need, therefore, is a solution that would meet minorities’ 
justified demands for political representation on the one hand, and avoid the said 
negative effects on the other. This is why I advocate the proportional system with 
natural threshold. The proposal offered by the provincial authorities is, in my 
view, a legal-political catastrophe to which our public, particularly its liberal part, 
has not reacted at all. Why hasn’t it is a matter for further discussion. 
Finally, the fourth criterion I’ve managed to define runs as follows: an 
electoral system must enable establishment of stable political institutions. An 
ideal solution for a fair transference of votes to mandates is of no avail unless it 
secures formation of an efficient government. By the criteria some authors quote, 
our system could be defined as fragmentized or even extremely fragmentized. So, 
what we already have is a deeply divided political culture, a system that favors 
big parties and yet results not in a stable political situation. Therefore, this 
criterion must be met too.  
Referential literature provides some more possible solutions for minorities’ 
political representation. For instance, minorities could be better represented 
through “tailored” electoral districts. In majority systems with one candidate only 
– such as the one of the United States – that’s the only viable solution. But, allow 
me to quote Giovanni Sartori once more. Sartori says, “Bad means should serve 
noble goals.” We know from experience that there is too much manipulation in 
such cases. And this also refers to the provincial proposal, which, under the veil of 
minority protection, actually ruthlessly favors the majority. There are similar 
examples in the United States, though, as far as I know, determination of electoral 
districts is subjected to judiciary control. The referential literature gives the 
example of an electoral district so tailored that it run some 160 miles along a 
highway. The purpose of such tailoring was to concentrate black Americans into 
one electoral district and thus provide them with the opportunity to fairly 
manifest their will. I found this example in a book by V. Kimlika. Many years 
later, I realized what was all that about. Simply, the said highway was running 
through three electoral districts in which the Democrats’ candidates are usually 
winning the elections. So, under the veil of minority protection, the Republicans 
tailored four electoral districts out of the previous three, and concentrated all 
black Americans in a single district. The outcome was that the Republicans scored 
3:1 against the Democrats instead of the Democrats scoring 3:0 against them. This 
was how an electoral variant was “packed” to suit one of the two big parties…  
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Jovan KOMSIC: Who would be the Republicans over here?  
 
Miroslav SAMARDZIC: Well, I think that all our political parties, 
regardless of their ideological orientations, would try to tailor electoral districts to 
their heart’s content under the pretext of minority protection.  
 
Antal BOZOKI: That has already been done! 
 
Miroslav SAMARDZIC: Sure, we had such cases. That’s what Professor 
Pajvancic calls a “bunker” system. For instance, in 1990 when we had the majority 
system, the Croats’ party had its deputy. It didn’t later on, when the proportional 
system was applied, because of the manner in which their electoral district was 
tailored. 
 In early 1990s when the proportional system was introduced Vojvodina 
was partitioned into two electoral districts, and later on into seven that were 
brutally gerrymandered. One electoral district spread from Vrbas to Titel dividing 
the Hungarian minority community – 65 percent voters of Hungarian origin were 
concentrated in two electoral districts, while the remaining 35 percent were 
dispersed in five districts. They stood no chance of having their candidate elected. 
Therefore, in the situation as we have, I am afraid that having more electoral 
districts would not lead to a favorable outcome for minority communities but 
rather to manipulation of minority protection by big political parties with an eye 
to obtaining inasmuch votes as possible.  
Today we have entire Serbia as a single electoral district and we have 
D’Hondt’s system that transfers votes to mandates. Of all the formulas for 
distribution of mandates, D’Hondt’s system suits big parties the most. In 
Vojvodina, we have a weird system by which one-half of total 120 deputies are 
elected by the proportional system, and the other half by the majority system in 
one-mandate electoral districts and in two rounds of elections. Such a mixed 
system exists in other countries too. However, in Germany it functions differently 
and that’s quite another story. Why did I call this system weird? Firstly, there is a 
huge disproportion between the numbers of voters in some electoral districts. The 
provincial Statute’s provision that every municipality shall have one deputy 
secures one deputy even for the smallest municipality. That’s not a good solution 
in my opinion. The majority systems with one candidate take care that electoral 
districts are approximately equal in size. Secondly, 60 deputies are elected by the 
proportional system with a parliamentary threshold of 5 percent of votes and a 
natural threshold for minorities. At first glance this solution seems to be favorable 
to minorities but it is not. Why? Because a relatively small number of deputies, 60, 
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are elected from the proportional list while Vojvodina has 1.7 million registered 
voters. Besides, mandates are distributed by D’Hondte’s rule. Had the provincial 
administration really cared about minority protection it would have taken 
Niemeyer’s formula that is more advantageous to smaller parties. The paradox is 
that a political party has to win the same number of votes by the proportional list 
to be represented in the provincial parliament as it has to obtain for the 
republican. How come? Well, 250 MPs are elected for the republican parliament 
by the proportional lists and here only 60. The republic has by far more voters and 
by far more parliamentary seats as well. That is why I consider this solution a bad 
one and disadvantageous to minorities. Thirdly, we have actual results that are far 
from being satisfactory. Elections were called on August 10, 2004 and held in 
September. That’s scandalous. Do they really create conditions for better minority 
representation when they set election rules a month before actual elections? That’s 
not a fair play in politics.  
Speaking of the so-called protected seats, I would say a solution as such is 
possible and legitimate, though, in my view, not appropriate to our situation for 
several reasons. In Croatia such solution is applied at national level but in Croatia 
a voter cannot cast ballot twice but has to choose between giving his vote to a 
protected minority seat or to a basic list. That’s how elections for MPs in the 
House of Representatives are held. At local level, however, they have a most 
complicated electoral system that may eventually result in protected seats in the 
event the electoral system does not provide satisfactory solutions. But what’s the 
shortcoming of this system? It is deficient since it necessitates “ethnic” voting 
lists. In Croatia, a voter shows up at the polls and says, “I am a member of this or 
that minority,” which is entitled to protected seats under the election law, and 
then gets registered in a special voting list. Composing special voting lists is a 
complex and time-consuming job that would take us several years to accomplish. 
Besides, such lists are not provided under the existing legislation. Last but not 
least, such a solution would have a destabilizing effect on interethnic relations 
and would further ethnicize social relations. And there is yet another major 
consideration when it comes to protected seats. Namely, the rule is relatively 
smoothly applied to the situations marked by a small number of minority 
communities. But when you have so many minority communities it is really hard 
to decide which minorities are entitled to representation and how to regulate the 
matter. Besides, it is most important that every mandate is adequately backed by 
voters. Theoretically, it is possible to obtain protected seats with a small number 
of voters. And such could be the outcome of this provincial proposal. But, let’s 
consider negative consequences. For instance, the parliamentary majority could be 
formed thanks to the MPs whose mandates are backed by a small number of 
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votes, and an election loser could be then campaigning against minorities and 
blaming them for the fact that they have been deprived of the possibility to form a 
parliamentary majority. So, in my view, the proportional system with a natural 
threshold for minorities is a by far more applicable solution at all levels of 
governance. Should 120 Vojvodina’s MPs be elected by the proportional system 
applied to a single electoral district, bigger minority communities would stand a 
better chance for representation. I do not advocate that every small community 
should have a parliamentary representative of its own, on the contrary. That 
would be a bad solution for me. Small minority communities can protected in 
some other way. For instance, in municipal elections we use the proportional 
system with the 3 percent threshold and Niemeyer’s formula – theoretically, that’s 
not disadvantageous for minorities. Let me remind you that the Article 180 of 
Serbia’s new Constitution provides, “In autonomous provinces and units of local self-
government with ethnically mixed population a proportional representation of national 
minorities in assemblies shall be possible.” The Constitution provides that something 
shall be possible! To my understanding this is about equal opportunities rather 
than about equal results. The proportional system with natural threshold provides 
members of minority communities with the opportunity to vote for their own 
national parties if they want to or to cast ballot for the parties from larger society 
if that suits them better. So, each member of a minority community holds an 
individual right to vote. On the other hand, people from the majority community 
can vote for minority parties, nothing prevents them from doing so. I would vote, 
say, for Roma parties because I am eager to back their wish to have a 
parliamentarian of their own.  
The Minister for Local Self-Government is now announcing the majority 
system for the upcoming local elections. That means that he would have to 
envisage protected seats for minority representatives. What formula will they use 
for 160 municipalities, each with a specific situation of its own? Most probably the 
Minister doesn’t know at all what he talks about! In my opinion we should stick 
to the proportional system, which is fully justified for, say, Novi Sad. 
Another important issue is the election of executive bodies. Mayors are now 
elected in direct elections. It goes without saying that such election is not 
adequate for complex societies. Why? Because, as a rule, a mayor comes from the 
majority community. In other words, in my hometown, Zrenjanin, a Hungarian 
can never be elected a mayor, the same as a Serb can never be the major of Senta 
or Kanjiza. I take that the previous system was better – there was a weak mayor 
voted in by a municipal assembly and such mayor needed not always come from 
the majority nation. Further, we had an executive committee as a collective body 
with the membership of ten or more people, which made it possible to apply 
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some conciliatory techniques. That was often the case after 2000 as the authorities 
were mindful of having minority representatives in executive committees. The 
solution was better for members of the majority community too, since it secured 
more transparent functioning of executive bodies at municipal levels. As an 
opposition activist I’ve been supplied, till 2000, with all the documents to be 
discussed at sessions of the executive committee. Those sessions were open to 
public and you could have monitored budget expenditures. In the present-day 
system with a major in control of a budget, I am in the dark about the 
expenditures, which are never even publicized.  
So, to make a long story short, I take that the proportional system with the 
natural threshold for minorities should be applied at all levels, the same as the 
formulas for distribution of mandates that are advantageous for minorities. 
According to mathematicians, Niemeyer’s formula is more adequate than 
D’Hondt’s. A minority community that is too small to pass the natural threshold 
cannot, unfortunately, have its representative in governance. Otherwise, we 
would have the same situation as we had in Kosovo during Milosevic’s era. 
Thanks to a small number of votes of Kosovo Serbs Milosevic’s Socialist Party of 
Serbia obtained a considerable number of mandates, which influenced forming of 
parliamentary majority. In plain words, we must take care about attaining several 
mutually competing goals – the basic one being minority protection, though other 
objects are also important.  
I took trouble to go through several reports by the Venetian Commission 
that relate to the problematic we are discussing here. The report for 2005 captured 
my attention. It emphasizes that members of minority communities should be 
entitled to freely set up their political parties and non-governmental 
organizations. That’s the case over here – one can register a political party by 
attaching the list with 100 signatures only. However, under paragraph “c” the 
report underlines that in the election process candidates and voters alike need not 
identify themselves as members of minority communities – which is mandatory in 
the system with protected seats. 
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Marijana PAJVANCIC* 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THE RIGHT  
OF NATIONAL MINORITIES TO REPRESENTATION8 
 
 
Key words: electoral system, national minorities, representation, 
parliament, Constitution and law.  
 
Summary: By using comparative sources, this paper analyzes the factors of 
an electoral system that determine national minorities’ parliamentary 
representation either by encouraging such representation or by reducing it. The 
factors this paper focuses in particular as the following: the rules of electoral 
mathematics, the rules of electoral geometry, candidacy, voting techniques, 
electoral threshold and measures of affirmative action. The paper also examines 
the possibility of a joint action by several factors and the influence they have one 
on another, which may produce a synergic effect. Finally, the paper analyses the 
factors beyond an electoral system, including the number of members of a 
national minority and the territory (territorial distribution) they inhabit 
(concentration or dispersion).  
 
The right of national minorities to be represented in directly elected repre-
senttational bodies is one in the series of rights securing their participation in pu-
blic administrations and decision-making in the matters that are in the competen-
ce of public administrations. Apart from the right to representation, national 
minorities’ right to participation in public administration includes all political 
rights such as voting rights and the right to political organization, the right to 
participation in public and administrative services and the right to civil initiative. 
National minorities’ right to participation in public administration is 
guaranteed by international documents on the rights of national minorities.9 This 
right is also guaranteed and specified under domestic regulations, the 
Constitution and laws such as anti-discrimination laws (either general or 
particular providing the manner in which rights of national minorities are 
exercised), electoral legislation, etc. 
                                                 
* Due to her busy schedule, Professor Marijana Pajvancic could not attend the 
session. However, her written contribution was distributed to all the participants.  
8 The basic paper was published in the Bar Gazette of Vojvodina, No. 3 – 4 /2007, pp. 
71 – 84. It was adapted and revised to this session.  
9 See, Lund Recommendations.  
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This paper analyzes the factors of an electoral system that determine 
national minorities’ representation in representational bodies either by 
encouraging such representation or hindering it. The analysis relies on 
comparative sources and domestic legislation.10 
An overview of comparative law indicates that electoral legislations of most 
countries do not specifically provide national minorities’ representation. Also, 
they often lack special measures meant to secure equal opportunities for national 
minorities in representational bodies. The exception to this general rule are the 
countries11 the legislations of which do include special rules on national 
minorities’ representation but those legislations also differ – they either provide 
strong guarantees for representation (warranted results) or just facilitate 
realization of this rights (equal opportunities).  
 
Factors influencing representation of national minorities in a parliament  
  
The factors influencing parliamentary representation of national minorities 
are many and different by nature. They can be divided into two groups, 
depending on whether they directly relate to an electoral system and parameters 
determining its character and nature or are beyond the electoral system but, 
nevertheless, influence implementation of national minorities’ right to 
representation in a parliament.  
Many factors of an electoral system influence minority representation. The 
most important of those factors relate to the rules of electoral mathematics and 
electoral geometry, candidacy, voting techniques, electoral threshold and measu-
res of affirmative action. It should be noted that different combinations of the said 
factors may appear in an electoral system resulting in more different varieties the 
electoral system’s influence on minority representation in the parliament.  
National minorities’ representation in the parliament also depends on the 
factors beyond an electoral system that relate to a national minority itself. Three 
groups of those factors are significant. The first relates to political parties, the 
second to the number of members of a minority community, and the third to the 
territory inhabited by members of a national minority.  
The national minorities that have formed political parties (one or more) 
stand better chances of being represented in a parliament than those that are not 
                                                 
10 See, Election Law and National Minorities, CeSID, Belgrade, 2002. 
11 E.g., Rumania, Croatia, Slovena, Belgium, Denmark (by the territorial principle for 
the population of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Finland (by the territorial principle for 
the population of Aaland Islands), etc.  
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politically organized and have no political parties of their own. Two factors 
influence the establishment of minority parties: legislation that allows (or 
prohibits) political parties organized on ethnic grounds on the one hand, and a 
national minority’s readiness to get politically organized and set up a political 
party on the other. Chances for minority representation in a parliament are better 
in the countries allowing establishment of parties on ethnic grounds. Many 
countries do allow establishment of minority parties. In comparative law, there 
are examples of the countries the legislation of which explicitly prohibits 
organization of parties on ethnic grounds.12 
The size of a national minority’s population also influences its 
representation in a parliament. The national minorities that make bigger 
percentage in total population have better prospects for parliamentary 
representation than those with smaller percentage. 
A national minority’s representation is also influenced by the territory it 
inhabits (territorial distribution). Generally speaking, the national minorities that 
are concentrated on a certain area stand better chances of being represented in a 
parliament than those that are dispersed throughout a country. This factor is 
always closely related to the types of electoral systems and electoral districts – for, 
depending of the latter and in interaction with them it can considerably determine 
actual possibilities for minorities’ parliamentary representation.  
The majority system – under the condition that borders of electoral districts 
do not split a minority electorate into several electoral districts so as to neutralize 
the voters supporting national minorities – suits better national minorities. And 
the other way round – the proportional system suits better the national minorities 
that are dispersed at a larger area. Applied to one electoral district this system 
makes it possible for a national minority to agglomerate its entire voting potential 
in that district and thus maximally profit from minority votes. 
The example referred to in the paragraph above indicates that opting for 
electoral rules favorable to minorities’ parliamentary representation is not that 
easy since the choice itself depends on the factors beyond an electoral system that 
often produce contrary effects on individual minority communities.  
 
Electoral geometry and minorities’ parliamentary representation  
 
Electoral geometry stands for a major factor of an electoral system that 
influences minorities’ parliamentary representation. Determining shapes of 
electoral districts – the districts inhabited by a certain number of voters - is called 
                                                 
12 E.g., Albania, Bulgaria, Georgia and Turkey.  
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electoral geometry. Electoral districts13 are formed as uninominal (individual) and 
multi-nominal (with more mandates). The type of an electoral district depends on 
the type of an electoral system. Majority systems are characterized by uninominal 
districts, while proportional systems by multi-nominal ones.  
The manner is which electoral units are shaped and, in particular, divided 
crucially determines minorities’ representation as it directly or indirectly 
contributes to the election of a minority representative to the parliament. This is 
possible when members of a minority community are concentrated on a certain 
territory, while electoral districts are so divided to encompass the voters coming 
for that minority community. Such electoral districts are called bunkers. They can 
be formed in both proportional and majority systems but are more favorable to 
minority communities in majority systems. 
Bunkers do not suit the minority communities with members dispersed 
throughout a country. Division of the electorate characteristic for the majority 
system does not suit such minority communities. In their case, division of the 
electorate into more electoral districts results in dispersion of ballots cast by voters 
living in different electoral districts. This reduces a minority’s voting potential 
and negatively affects its chances of having its representative elected to a 
parliament. In the election theory division of an electorate into several electoral 
districts that reduces the prospects for electoral success is called “border effect.” 
Establishment of a single electoral district for the entire territory of a 
country suits better the national minorities the members of which are dispersed 
throughout it. A single electoral district is possible only under the system relying 
of the proportional principle. With all voters assembled into one electoral district 
votes are not dispersed on different political options and candidates.  
Last but not least, it should be noted that uninominal electoral districts 
necessitate relatively frequent change in their borders. Borders need to be 
changed because the size of a population of an electoral district is a changeable 
category. Otherwise, population growth in one electoral district and decrease in 
another would result in a “covert” inequality in the exercise of the voting right. A 
ballot cast in the electoral district with population growth would be less worth 
that that in the electoral district where population growth has been lowered. The 
principle of equal rights for all calls for correction of such a disproportion. 
However, every change of borders opens the door to gerrymandering. The more 
frequent the changes in borders, the better opportunities for gerrymandering.  
                                                 
13 See, Dr. Marijana Pajvancic, Izbori – pravila i proračuni (Elections: Rules and 
Calculations), Novi Sad, 1997, pp. 17 – 35, as well as Uvod u izborne sisteme (Introduction into 
Electoral Systems), the second revised edition, Nis, 2003, pp. 15 – 25. 
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Speaking of electoral districts as factors of an electoral system advanta-
geous to minorities’ representation, it is always possible to take a special measure 
and form a special electoral district for members of national minorities. Such 
single electoral district maximally encompasses minority voters and efficiently 
profits from every ballot cast for a list (or candidates) of national minorities.  
All this leads to the conclusion that the type of an electoral district 
determines minorities’ parliamentary representation depending on whether 
members of a national minority are concentrated on a territory or dispersed 
throughout a country. Division into electoral districts suits the former as it enables 
a bunker to accumulate voting potential and contribute to electoral success. The 
interest of the latter – dispersed minorities – is quite the opposite. Division into 
electoral districts is disadvantageous to them. Their voting potential is at peak 
only when an entire country stands for a single electoral district. The examples 
quoted in the paragraphs above indicate that a same electoral factor can produce 
different effects on members of different national minorities, which makes it really 
hard to opt for the type of an electoral district that optimally secures minority 
representation in a parliament. There are no simple answers to this question.  
 
Electoral mathematics and minorities’ parliamentary representation  
  
The type of an electoral system is also a factor influencing minorities’ 
parliamentary representation. How is that influence manifested? One can answer 
that question only if bearing in mind not only other factors of an electoral system 
but also the factors beyond it – territorial distribution of members of a minority 
community in the first place. The type of an electoral system that provides better 
chances for minority representation depends on a minority’s territorial 
distribution – i.e. whether its members are concentrated at a certain part of a 
territory or are equally distributed throughout the territory.  
Generally speaking, the majority electoral system suits better the national 
minorities the members of which are concentrated in an area. The proportional 
system is more advantageous to the minorities that are dispersed under the 
condition that the entire territory makes up one electoral district or, in countries 
divided into more electoral districts, that the Badensky system of accumulation of 
votes is applied.14 This system for calculation of votes enables subsequent 
distribution of undistributed mandates from electoral districts (the mandates that 
have not been assigned by a round number) on the grounds of total balance of 
                                                 
14 See, Dr. Marijana Pajvancic, Rečnik osnovnih pojmova i termina o izborima (Glossary of 
Basic Electoral Terms and Notions), CeSID, Belgrade, 2001, pp. 10 – 11. 
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undistributed votes from electoral districts (votes that were insufficient for an 
electoral district to obtain a mandate). 
Apart from two basic types of electoral systems (majority or proportional), 
minorities’ parliamentary representation is also determined by the type of the 
electoral formula. The electoral formula is a mathematical formula for calculating 
votes into mandates. The influence of this factor on national minorities’ 
representation is closely connected with the factors beyond an electoral system. 
The size of the population of a minority community inhabiting a specific 
area is a major factor of the electoral systems based on the majority principle. In 
such a case even a relative majority of voters15 - members of national minorities – 
can be sufficient for obtaining mandates. This is especially characteristic of the 
situations when more candidates aspire to one parliamentary mandate in the 
electoral district in which voters from a minority community are in relative 
majority.  
In proportional systems16 some formulas for turning votes into mandates 
give the upper hand to bigger political parties (D’Hondt’s rule). Those formulas 
undermine the prospects for minority lists to win a parliamentary mandate and 
are, therefore, disadvantageous to them. And the other way round – there are 
formulas for distribution of mandates that favor smaller political parties (such as 
Neumayer’s formula). Those are the formulas that give better chances to minority 
lists to win mandates.  
 
Types of candidacy lists, voting technique  
and minorities’ parliamentary representation  
 
In proportional systems, the type of a candidacy list17 can be the factor that 
either contributes to minorities’ representation or undermines it.  
A minority candidacy list can be submitted either as the list of a single 
national minority or as a joint list of candidates coming from several national 
                                                 
15 More on paradoxes of relative majority, see, Dr. Marijana Pajvancic, Relativna 
većina i njeni paradoksi (Relative Majority and its Paradoxes), the Bar Gazette of Vojvodina, No. 
5/1996, pp. 155 - 162. 
16 For more on proportional electoral systems, see, Dr. Marijana Pajvancic, Uvod u 
izborne sisteme (Introduction to Electoral Systems, Nis, OGI, 2003, pp. 51 – 62, as well as Izbori 
– pravila i proračuni (Elections: Rules and Calculations) by the same author, Novi Sad, 1997, pp. 
88 – 125. 
17 For more on the types of candidacy lists, see, Dr. Marijana Pajvancic, Kandidatske 
liste i uticaj birača na popunu poslaničkih mandata, The Collection of Papers of the Novi Sad 
Law School, No. 1 – 3/1996, pp. 147 – 157. 
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minorities. In the countries that allow organization of minority political parties, 
those parties can also put forth lists of their candidates.  
It goes without saying that a list of candidates submitted by a single 
minority party stands better chances for the minority’s parliamentary 
representation. 
A list submitted by a coalition of two or more minority parties also opens 
the door to national minorities’ parliamentary representation. Such lists stand 
better chances for winning parliamentary seats if candidates are clearly ranged 
and the criterion for allocation of a mandate rests on the sequence by which 
candidates are listed. 
Representatives of a national minority can also figure as candidates on the 
lists that are not minority. In that case the closed lists stand better chances for 
having a minority representative win a parliamentary seat. The sequence of 
candidates on such lists is determined in advance. Voters cast ballots for the entire 
list and each is entitled to one vote only. The mandates the list wins on the 
grounds of obtained votes are allocated to the candidates by the order in which 
their names have been listed. 
A minority candidate placed high on the list stands a chance for getting a 
mandate. 
Free (untied) or weakly structured lists of candidates also have influence on 
national minorities’ representation in a parliament. When included in such lists 
minority candidates will hardly be elected to a parliament. The sequence in which 
candidates’ names are arranged on the list is not a crucial criterion for obtaining 
mandates but the number of votes the candidates nominated for the parliament 
win. 
The above-mentioned candidacy lists call for one of the special voting 
techniques (such as preferential voting, cumulative votes or personal vote)18 that 
might, to a certain extent, strengthen the prospects for a minority candidate to be 
elected on the grounds of personal votes he or she has obtained.  
Voting techniques applied to candidacy lists can either strengthen the 
prospects for the election of minority candidates or undermine them. 
Generally speaking, the technique that is the least favorable to minorities is 
voting with one vote for a closed candidacy list. That’s the situation when neither 
the type of the candidacy list nor the voting techniques give minority 
representatives better chances for election to a parliament. A candidate’s position 
on a list decisively determines his or her chances for obtaining a mandate.  
                                                 
18 See, Dr. Marijana Pajvancic, Rečnik osnovnih pojmova i termina o izborimai, CeSID, 
Belgrade, 2001, pp. 37; 47; 50 – 54.  
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Besides, voting techniques that offer voters the possibility of influencing the 
election of a person nominated on a list strengthen the prospects for minority 
representation in a parliament19, but are not always a reliable and efficient 
instrument. Preferential (giving of points), cumulative (accumulation of votes), 
combined (voting for candidates on more different lists) and personal voting 
(voting for a specific person) are surely the voting techniques that can facilitate 
minorities’ parliamentary representation.  
 
Electoral threshold and minorities’ parliamentary representation  
 
Electoral threshold is among electoral system factors that influence national 
minorities’ parliamentary representation. The same as other factors referred to in 
the paragraphs above, this one may either strengthen or undermine the prospects 
for minorities to be represented in a parliament. What will be the case depends on 
the manner in which electoral threshold is defined by electoral legislation. 
The electoral threshold appears in the form of a natural threshold and 
legally defined electoral threshold. The natural threshold is the number of votes 
necessary for obtaining one parliamentary mandate expressed in percentage. The 
natural threshold is always lower that the legally defined one and, therefore, 
provides better chances for the minority communities to be represented in a 
parliament. 
Being higher than the natural threshold, the legally defined threshold can 
act as a factor that diminishes the prospects for national minorities’ 
representation. This particularly refers to the electoral systems in which the 
electoral threshold is the same for all candidacy lists. This factor is less decisive 
for minority representation if legislation provides a lower legally defined 
threshold for the minority candidacy lists.  
However, there are some questions that cannot be easily answered. First, 
what candidacy lists are considered the lists of national minorities? Are minority 
lists only those nominated by minority political parties or also those that include 
candidates from minority communities? Second, who decides and by what criteria 
that a candidacy list stands for a minority list? 
The natural threshold suits better national minorities as it enables their 
candidacy list (or candidate) to obtain a parliamentary mandate with smaller 
                                                 
19 Voting techniques favorable to minority representation are incorporated in the 
legislations of Czech Republic, Slovakia (in the form of four preferentials), Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden (in the form of one preferential), Letonia, Latvia, Norway 
(cummulative vote), Switzerland, etc.  
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number of votes. For its part, the legally defined threshold stands in the way of 
minorities’ parliamentary representation. Minority lists (or candidates) can hardly 
win the number of votes that preconditions a mandate, even in the event when 
lawmakers set lower threshold for minority lists to meet the need for minorities’ 
parliamentary representation. 
 
Special measures and national minorities’ right  
to parliamentary representation  
 
Special measures that often make part of electoral systems are aimed at 
creating not only formally but also factually equal opportunities for minorities to 
be represented in a parliament. 
Special measures are also provided by international documents and 
domestic legislation, which explicitly lay down three major properties special 
measures must possess. First, their character, under the Constitution or law, must 
not be discriminatory. Second, the reasons that justify introduction of special 
measures are unequal opportunities for the exercise of a constitutionally and 
legally guaranteed right – in this specific case, the right to representation. Third, 
special measures are temporary. How long they will be effective depends on the 
attainment of the goal meant to be realized via special measures.  
All the factors that have been analyzed can themselves become one of the 
instruments within which special measures can be introduced. 
Candidacy lists provide more opportunities for taking special measures such 
as the right to nomination of minority candidacy lists; special conditions for 
nomination of minority candidacy lists (e.g. a smaller number of signatures of the 
voters supporting the list); a reserved, safe position at the candidacy lists that are 
not nominated by minorities (e.g. a closed list, distribution of mandates by the 
order in which candidates’ names are listed, replacement of a vacant position at a 
candidacy lists, etc.).20 
Special voting techniques (i.e. personal vote, preferential voting, cumulative 
vote, etc.)21 can be instrumental in taking special measures that contribute to the 
realization of minorities’ right to parliamentary representation. For, voters are 
given the possibility of casting ballot for a candidate under the proportional 
electoral system marked by candidacy lists.  
                                                 
20 For more on the types of candidacy lists, see, Dr. Marijana Pajvancic, Kandidatske 
liste i uticaj birača na popunu poslaničkih mandata, the Collection of Papers of the Novi Sad 
Law Schools, No. 1 – 3/1996, pp. 147 – 157. 
21 See, Dr. Marijana Pajvancic, Izborno pravo, Novi Sad, Academica Graphica, 1999, 
pp. 110 – 125. 
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Electoral districts can be instrumental in introducing special measures, 
including a major measure for the establishment of a separate electoral district for 
the election of minority representatives.22 In such case only one electoral district is 
formed so as to secure equal opportunities to representatives of all minority 
communities – those concentrated in a certain area and those dispersed 
throughout a country. A single electoral district for all minority voters prevents 
dissipation of votes and division of minority electorates, particularly when it 
comes to the minorities that are dispersed in the entire territory of a country.  
Electoral threshold can also be instrumental in taking special measures meant 
to contribute to efficient implementation of minorities’ right to parliamentary 
representation. Special measure are taken if the electoral threshold is at the level 
of natural threshold or if the legally defined electoral threshold for minority lists 
is lower than the threshold other candidacy lists need to pass so as to be entitled 
to distribution of mandates. 
A special measure that definitely secures minority representation is the 
number of parliamentary seats set aside for national minorities. However, this 
measure is hardly applicable in a country with more minority communities, 
particularly if they considerably differ by the sizes of their populations. In such 
case the reserved seats are usually guaranteed to bigger national minorities, while 
the smaller ones get one seat for a common representative.  
Funds for election campaign can also be instrumental in encouraging minority 
representation in directly elected representational bodies and, in this context, they 
make part of special measures aimed at securing equal opportunities for minority 
representation. The budget set aside for an election campaign can include special 
benefits for minority candidacy lists, as well as for the candidacy lists nominating 
representatives of national minorities as well.  
 
Minority representation and Serbian electoral legislation  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, the Law on the Protection of the 
Rights of National Minorities, the Law on the Election of MPs, the Law on the 
Election of Councilmen/Councilwomen and the Decision on the Election of 
Deputies in the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina make a legal 
frame with relevant provisions on the right national minorities’ representation in 
the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.  
                                                 
22 See, Dr. Marijana Pajvancic, Izbori – pravila i proračuni, Nasa Borba, Novi Sad, 1997, 
pp. 19 – 35. 
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Serbia’s new Constitution provides novel guarantees for minorities’ 
representation in representational bodies. Those novelties relate to the general 
frame in which minorities exercise their rights, the ban on discrimination and the 
possibility for taking special measures on the one hand and explicit guarantees for 
minorities’ right to participate in public administration and to representation in 
the National Assembly on the other.  
The Serbian Constitution prohibits any form of direct or indirect 
discrimination arising from a person’s ethnic origin or some other individual 
characteristic.23 It provides the possibility of taking special measures the purpose 
of which is to secure full equality of persons or groups of persons that are 
basically in unequal position vis-à-vis others. 24 The Constitution also defines the 
nature of special measures and underlines that they shall not be considered 
discriminatory.25 
Further, the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia explicitly guarantees 
national minorities’ right to representation in the National Assembly. The 
Constitution invests lawmakers with the authority to specify the rules that shall 
secure the implementation of minorities’ right to be “equal and represented”26 in 
the National Assembly.27 The Constitution does not detail national minorities’ 
right to equality and representation in the National Assembly but only generally 
guarantees this right. However, even those general guarantees provided under 
the Constitution as the highest legal act at least mirror policymakers’ intention to 
regulate this minority right.  
The Law on the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities does not 
explicitly guarantee national minorities’ right to representation in representational 
bodies, but only generally provides their right to participation in public life.28 
Since this was about a framework law only29 it was logically to expect that 
legislations of federal units would elaborate its general provisions in more detail. 
However, the two federal units failed to pass the laws on minority rights but 
regulated them under several different laws. So, national minorities’ right to 
representation in representational bodies is regulated under the Law on the 
                                                 
23 Article 21, para 3, of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 
24 Article 21, para 4, of the Contitution of the Republic of Serbia  
25 Ibid.  
26 The said term are used by constitutionmakers. In the context of parliamentary 
composition, the meaning of the principle of equality remains blurred.  
27 Article 100 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.  
28 Article 21 of the Law on the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities.  
29 The law was passed at federal level at the time the FR of Yugoslavia was a 
federation.  
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Election of MPs, the Las on Local Elections and the Decision on the Election of 
Deputies in the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. It should be 
noted that minorities’ right to participation in public administration cannot be 
reduced just to the right to parliamentary representation – for, the former right 
implies representation in all other bodies of public governance, which is 
something Serbia’s legal system has failed to regulate.  
The Law on the Election of MPs is among the laws regulating the issues 
significant for realization of minorities’ right to representation. The Law includes 
special measures meant to secure equal opportunities for minorities’ 
parliamentary representation. One of those measures relate to the electoral 
threshold. According to the Law, the electoral threshold at the level of natural 
threshold is set for candidacy lists nominated by national minorities, while the 5 
percent threshold out of the total number of voters participating in elections is 
laid down for all other candidacy lists.30  
The Law provides some general criteria by which the body authorized for 
the elections (Republican Electoral Commission) shall decide whether a candidacy 
list has the status of the candidacy list nominated by a minority party for which 
provisions on natural threshold are laid down. The Law provides too generalized 
and blurred criteria by which a political party that has nominated a list shall be 
subject to the 5 percent threshold as a precondition for candidates’ right to 
partake in the distribution of mandates. According to lawmakers, the term 
political party of a minority community indicates “all those parties the main 
object of which is to represent the interests of a national minority and protect the 
rights of members of national minorities in accordance with international 
standards.”31  
Finally, in the process of amending the Law, lawmakers were not 
consequent. The special measure that relates to the natural threshold can hardly 
be applied along with the rule on the minimal number of voters’ signatures under 
a candidacy list. All the lists, without exception, shall be considered legitimate if 
signed by at least 10,000 registered voters. Besides, bearing in mind that the 
natural threshold of votes (depending on the number of registered voters showing 
up at the polls) ranges between 10,000 and 15,000 votes, it is obvious that the 
support to a candidacy list nominated by a minority community actually replaces 
the voting for that list – for, the natural threshold that results in mandates for a 
                                                 
30 Article 81 of the Law on the Election of MPs, amendments publicized in the 
Official Gazette No. 18/2004. 
31 Article 81, para 3, of the Law on the Election of MPs.  
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minority list necessitates the same number of votes as that necessary for any 
candidacy list. The criticism of this solution is fully justified. 
In the last parliamentary elections32 the Republican Electoral Commission 
decided to change the rule on the minimal number of voters’ signatures under a 
minority candidacy lists. The Commission decided that the validity of a list 
depends on at least 3,000 signatures. The Commission has thus changed the clear-
cut legal provision according to which a list shall be supported by at least 10,000 
registered voters. This is why the legality of the decision was brought before the 
Constitution Court. The Constitutional Court decided that the Republican 
Commission’s decision was not contrary to law.  
The Law on the Election of Councilmen/Councilwomen does not provide 
special measures that would enhance national minorities’ prospects for 
representation in local and city assemblies. 
The Decision on the Election of Deputies in the Assembly of the 
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina includes special measures that contribute to 
the realization of minorities’ right to representation in the provincial parliament. 
One of those special measures relates to the minimal number of voters 
whose signatures under a candidacy list make it valid. The number of signatures 
for minority lists is set at 3,000, while for all other lists at 6,000.33 
Besides, the Decision provides a natural threshold for minority lists as a 
precondition for the distribution of mandates, while other lists need to win at 
least 5 percent of total ballots by registered voters who went to the polls.34 
The conclusion drawn from an overview of comparative electoral rules and 
the provisions of domestic legislation dealing with minorities’ parliamentary 
representation indicates that, in this domain, some general or universal rules, i.e. 
guidelines for the factors of electoral system enhancing the prospects for 
minorities’ parliamentary representation are hard to determine. The analysis 
given above shows that electoral system factors are not the only ones on which 
minority representation depends in a directly elected representational body. 
Apart from the listed factors, those beyond an electoral system are most 
influential.  
In the search for an optimal legal frame for national minorities’ 
parliamentary representation one should take into account institutional 
arrangements in the context of electoral system that, in principle, enhance the 
prospects for the election of a minority representative to a parliament (such as the 
                                                 
32 The elections were held on January 21, 2007. ` 
33 Article 53, para 2, of the Decision.  
34 Article 74, paras 3 and 4, of the Decision.  
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right to establishment of minority parties, the proportional system, one electoral 
district, natural threshold, preferential voting, reserved parliamentary seats) along 
with other factors beyond an electoral system that influence national minorities’ 
parliamentary representation.  
 
 
Antal BOZÓKI 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES  
 
The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, the Assembly of the 
Republic of Montenegro and the Federal Assembly adopted the Charter on 
Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties (publicized in the Official Gazette 
of Serbia-Montenegro, No. 6/2003). The Charter seems to be clean forgotten as if it 
had never existed, while the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities (publicized in the Official Gazette of the FR of Yugoslavia, 
No. 11/2002) is claimed to be still in power.  
Jurists’ opinions about the issue differ. I am among those who hold that the 
Law has not been in power since the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 
ceased to exist, the more so since Serbia failed to incorporate it into its legal 
system. However, whenever it suits them governmental bodies claim that the Law 
is in power or that it is not when it suits them not. What we need is a unique 
stand: if the Law is in power, the Charter is in power too.  
True, the Constitution has incorporated many provisions of the Charter. 
However, it omitted a major one – the provision regulating minorities’ right to 
direct representation in decision-making. The Article 180, paragraph 4, of the 
Constitution provides, “In autonomous provinces and units of local self-
government with ethnically mixed population a proportional representation of 
national minorities in assemblies shall be secured in accordance with law.” This 
does not meet minorities’ needs. For, the phrase “in accordance with law” reduces 
the constitutional guarantee to some blurred promise of what a law shall provide 
and what it shall not.  
Minorities, that is, at least three out of four parties of Vojvodina 
Hungarians demand proportional representation at all levels of decision-making, 
as well as in governmental bodies, public enterprises, etc. The right of national 
minorities to efficiently – or effectively – participate in public life is one of 
fundamental human rights the minorities should be guaranteed. 
The entire context is marked by political games. When it suits a political 
party to have minorities at its side it secures some kind of their representation in 
decision-making. And the other way round – when a political party holds that 
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having minorities at its side does not play into its hands, it does everything in its 
power to undermine that right – it manipulates, interprets laws as it suits it, etc. 
Besides, some claim that minorities “will jeopardize the majority in the 
parliament.” That’s notoriously misguiding as it is simply impossible even with 
guaranteed seats for minority representatives in the parliament.  
Minorities’ participation in public life can be interpreted strictly or loosely. 
The strict interpretation implies minorities’ representation in the parliament and 
parliamentary committees, while the loose one implies their employment and 
proportional participation in administrative bodies, judiciary, public and other 
enterprises engaged in public works. 
Usually, no one touches on a major problem in Vojvodina and Serbia. 
Namely, the Hungarian community participates in administrative bodies of the 
province with some 5-6 percent of total number of employees, whereas 
Hungarians make up 14.28 percent of total population in Vojvodina. Proportional 
representation in administrative bodies is simply not secured and there has been 
no progress in this domain for years. All we have are some general promises that 
have not yet produced any results. 
On May 11, 2006, the Serbian government publicized its Conclusion on the 
Measures for Enhancing Minorities’ Participation in Governmental Bodies 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 40/2006). However no improvement 
in the ethnic composition of the employees in the governmental bodies has been 
made so far. The government has not even conducted comparative researches that 
would have indicated whether the situation gets for the worse of better. The 
Serbian government adopts some general decrees, conclusions, etc. probably 
under the pressure from the international community. But those decrees and 
conclusions change nothing. For instance, Hungarians make 40 percent of total 
population of Subotica but there are not even 20 percent of Hungarian judges. The 
ratio in Backa Topola is 60:25 percent, etc. In brief, no real progress has been 
made, not even after October 5, 2000. 
Participants in the discussion have referred to the Lund Recommendation 
of September 1990. These are just recommendations and are, therefore, not 
mandatory. However, states should take them into consideration while 
developing relevant legislation. 
So, what about the Lund Recommendations?  
According to the recommendations, “States should take care that 
minorities’ voice is efficiently heard at the level of central governance, which, if 
necessary, can be secured by special measures.” Those measures, say the 
recommendations, can include “securing special representation for minorities by 
providing them with an appropriate number of parliamentary seats in one or in 
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both houses of parliament and by other guaranteed forms of participation in the 
process of decision-making,” This is what we have in Kosovo, Croatia and 
Slovenia but not in Vojvodina. 
Another measure, by the Lund Recommendations, could be “formal or 
informal agreements on a certain number of seats set aside for minorities in the 
government, supreme or constitutional court, and in the process of appointing 
advisory and other bodies.” This suggested measure gives some people from the 
majority nation creeps. So they wonder in panic, “Why do we need minority 
representatives in the Supreme Court?” But what slips their mind is that adequate 
ethnic composition of all governmental bodies is a composite part of minority 
rights and needs to be taken seriously. 
Presently, with the exception of the public enterprise “Vojvodina Sume” 
there is not a single Hungarian representative in the Serbian government, 
governmental body and even in the governmental Department of Human and 
Minority Rights. I doubt that a single official of the Department speaks a minority 
language. So, how possibly could they follow culture, publishing, arts or 
newspapers in minority languages? The question is how they could possibly 
monitor the implementation of minority rights! 
But the fundamental question is, “What’s Serbia’s attitude towards 
minorities?” Minorities make up some 30 percent of Serbia’s population including 
Kosovo, and 17.14 without Kosovo. Despite that, Serbia is not concerned with the 
minority issue. This conclusion derives from the fact that today’s Serbia does not 
have a law on the protection of the rights of national minorities, does not have a 
ministry of human and minority rights but just a relevant department that is 
under direct control of the Premier and is not accountable to the Serbian 
parliament. 
Since 2002 when it passed the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Free-
doms of National Minorities Serbia hasn’t bothered to pass a law on the election 
of national councils. This September it’s been a year since the mandate of the Na-
tional Council of Vojvodina Hungarians expired. The President of the Council ne-
vertheless behaves as if he were a legitimate and legal representative of Vojvodina 
Hungarians. And despite the fact that he has not been an efficient president for 
years, he even coordinates other national councils at the provincial level. 
Problems are many. But they have not been inventoried so as to be solved 
one by one. Serbia’s predominant policy is obviously the one of postponement 
and sweeping problems under the carpet. The more so will it be difficult to solve 
them later. 
Besides, the problematic of voting lists for the election of minorities’ 
national council is being blurred. Voting lists do exist in municipalities and there 
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is not reason whatsoever not to add yet another list for the election of national 
councils in the upcoming regular local elections.  
As it seems, the Serbian parliament has not potential for deciding whether 
to pass a new law on the protection of national minorities or a law on the election 
of national councils.  
Three draft laws were put forth long ago. The general public knows 
nothing about two of them – the one submitted by the Alliance of Vojvodina 
Hungarians and the other by the government of the Republic of Serbia. The 
Belgrade-seated Center for Research of Ethnicities publicized its draft back in 
March 2006. One cannot but wonder why is it that the Serbian government hasn’t 
drafted a unique text of the law and opened public debate on it. There is 
obviously a small circle of people “of confidence” who have access to all those 
drafts. I would say those are the people close to the government and ruling 
structures and the ones that have a final say.  
The Article 8 of the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities provides that minorities shall be secured, proportionally to 
the size of their populations, an adequate number of parliamentary seats. After 
the World War II there were some 500,000 Hungarians in Vojvodina. Now, 
according to the 2002 census, there are 290,207 Hungarians. Demographers 
estimate that in the past five years the number of Hungarians has decreased for 
some 16,137 people. Therefore, no one needs to be afraid of minorities – minorities 
will vanish on their own anyway if things remain as they are. People will 
emigrate, for there is no economic progress over here and no democratization of 
the society. This may suit some.  
The state will grow stronger if every individual, regardless of his or her 
ethnic origin, exercises human and minority rights, and safeguard his or her 
ethnic and any other identity. Over here, one has always felt bad if in minority. 
Minorities cannot jeopardize the majority population, let alone aimed at having it 
discriminated. The people from the majority nation need not be afraid of 
minorities. A minority is the one that is endangered and the one to be guaranteed 
all its legal rights. 
 
 
Jovan KOMSIC 
ATTAINING CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY 
 
We’ve been sitting around a table for ten years or more discussing minority 
rights. We are fewer and fewer, and almost resemble an undercover group. 
However, the topic we’ve been discussing is getting hotter and hotter. Some 
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people, organizations and institutions are interested in a permanent dialogue on 
minority rights. We have here people from the civil sector that raises the minority 
issue whereas Serbia’s political class – including representatives of minority 
parties involved in the institutions that have control over material and other 
resources of power – manifests no sensibility toward the topic. We are placing 
some topics on the agenda for the sake of progress, for the sake of a democratic, 
prosperous and European Serbia, as Sonja Biserko put it. That’s what we have to 
do in the ashes of all those nation-building and state-building projects that have 
been tested in these areas for the last two decades.  
Last night on the TV Novi Sad channel I was watching and listening to MPs 
in the Serbian parliament – those coming from the G17 Plus, the Democratic 
Party, the Serbian Radical Party and the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians. I 
carefully followed the polemic between the Democrats and the Radicals. That was 
the standard gladiatorial hue and cry. Unlike them, a MP from the Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians spoke reasonably and pinpointed some key topics of 
interest not only to his party colleagues and voters of the Alliance but also to all 
minorities. However, at a certain point a G17 Plus MP retorted that the fact that 
Serbia’s Constitution regulates the minority issue by the highest international 
standards cannot be denied. This is only an illustrative instance of Serbia’s 
political class’s sensibility toward this question.  
However, allow me to place the entire problematic in another context – the 
context of initiatives for supplements and amendments of electoral law, and the 
pressure by the democratic public on policymakers. 
I am referring to two levels – one is institutional and the other cultural, this 
other being about the presence or absence of, so to speak, consensual political 
culture. Serious authors that analyze the possibilities for democratic governance 
in multiethnic, heterogeneous societies often refer to the difficulties such 
governance has to cope with. It’s a fortunate circumstance that from the 
standpoint of some fundamental human and minority rights democracy functions 
against the backdrop of Serbia’s semi-democratic transition and semi-democratic 
institutional and political development. Were it not for democracy, minorities 
would not be entitled to political organization and legitimate participation in 
decision-making. In brief, under present circumstances democracy is somewhat 
functional from the standpoint of manifestation of minority interests.  
However, apart from institutional solutions there is something more – there 
is a network of agreement-making between minorities and the majority nation, 
the network that needs not be laid down in detail by the Constitution or laws. 
Actually that’s a fluid that connects people debating the issues of their 
community. Is there such a network of the exchange of ideas and agreement-
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making between Serbia’s political parties or, for that matter, between its most 
powerful political actors? Are political actors, the ones from the majority political 
community, interested in the establishment of such a network? That’s the problem 
/Danilo/ Kis broached when referring to the possibilities for co-national states – 
the states of Central and Eastern Europe – to move fast towards Europe. 
Unfortunately, warned Kis, representatives of all national communities are never 
simultaneously eye to eye when it comes to the foundations on which a state 
should rest, since the very logic of democratic competition extremely favors a 
winner. But a democratic competition in itself and the power and privileges going 
to the winner do not necessarily lead to the establishment of the network of the 
exchange of ideas and agreement-making, and to the consensus on the division of 
electoral booty. Simply, democracy is a tyranny of the majority, the tyranny of 
numbers! Along with other mechanisms that force political actors to reach 
agreements and cooperate, we need an institutional measure that corrects this 
tyranny of the majority and numbers. 
Well, let’s analyze Serbia. Does Serbia’s political class follow the logic that 
everything goes to a winner, while a loser should be left empty-handed? Should 
that be true, it would grossly violate all constitutional and legal guarantees for 
implementation of minority rights. And such a thesis can simply not be supported 
by valid arguments. So, the problem is not in the presence and functioning of 
some bad political formula depriving minorities of any opportunity and thus 
turning them disinterested in legitimate identification with the state. The problem 
is in the degree of institutionalization that is only formally close to European 
criteria for legal correction of the tyranny of the majority. Here the legal correction 
implies positive discrimination, additional measures of stimulation. See, you have 
Portugal, you have Greece, you have scores of other European countries that 
couldn’t care less when it comes to minorities. 
The question is whether at all or to what degree it suits domestic politicians 
to have such network of exchange of views and cooperation with minorities, 
including various instruments for their protection and proportional 
representation. Judging by comparative analyses, the existence of several 
(relatively) equally represented minorities makes the background that is most 
beneficial for the establishment of such cooperation – and, that is not the case in 
Serbia. Serbia has one predominant national community, a significant and titular 
one, after which the state is named. Representatives of that community are not 
interested in and need not be concerned with such cohabitation with minority 
political representatives. Then, how possibly can one make Serbia’s political class 
adopt consensual political culture?  
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The Serbian national project has resulted in a homogenized territory and a 
homogenized state. Without Kosovo, Serbs make 82.5 percent of total population. 
With Kosovo, the percentage of Serbs falls to some 65. Serbia will have to accept 
the fact that, this way or another, Kosovo has been pulled out from under its 
institutional umbrella. That’s the reality regardless of the form it will take or has 
already taken. This makes Serbia a homogeneous nation-state – nor a plural 
society! But if it still is a plural society, Serbia must seek adequate institutional 
solutions through such networks of agreement-making and cooperation, through 
mechanisms of consensual democracy and through the networks of decentralized 
institutions. Otherwise, the government can only be formed by large coalitions, 
which can hardly be politically efficient, as colleague Samardzic indicated. 
Efficient governance is the main task of any policy. But governance cannot be 
efficient unless it is legitimate from the standpoint of relevant national 
communities. Take, for instance, South Serbia. The problems plaguing South 
Serbia have simply forced policymakers to introduce some elements of consensual 
governance despite the fact that now, when it comes to police forces, those 
elements are being ignored.  
This discussion on minorities’ representation only touches on the problem 
and may channel further discussions to some other levels of the problems of 
minorities’ institutional representation: for instance, to the level we call 
decentralization. Serbia is still a highly centralized country. Just take a look at its 
constitutional provisions and the Constitution’s general orientation. Should Serbia 
be decentralized, Vojvodina would be able to control considerable material 
resources. Moreover, Vojvodina would not have to devise special institutional 
mechanisms for minority representation since minorities – by the very logic of 
Vojvodina’s social tissue – would have been represented in provincial institutions 
and thus have control over material and cultural resources. Only mechanisms of 
consociation lead to a sustainable democracy in the ambience of pluralism.  
The minority problem must be institutionally recognized and solved at the 
level of the entire Serbia. Take, for instance, our electoral system. In a constantly 
polarized society such as the Serbian it is not realistic to expect an electoral system 
to neutralize all those deep divides by itself. However, policymakers can be 
impelled by an electoral system to make agreements and cooperate. We did have 
a network of agreement-making and cooperation till 2000. That was the year 
when we had the majority system and when pro-European, democratic, civic and 
minority parties made coalitions for the second round of the elections so as to 
successfully counter the candidates of the extremely nationalistic Serbian Radical 
Party. That was the year when Vojvodina testified that the policies that are 
beyond tribalism and ethnicity could make politicians cooperative. The 
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proportional system cannot make them cooperative before the elections, and any 
agreement following the elections will depend on the size of the booty to be 
seized and divided. This is why the type of electoral system is that important. 
Speaking of Vojvodina, I do not oppose the majority system at local level but do 
emphasize that, eventually, we must seek the modes of consociation and closer 
cooperation between majority and minority representatives on the common, pro-
European platform.  
 
(The above discussion has not been authorized by Mr. Komsic) 
 
 
Mirko DJORDJEVIC 
THREE MARGINALIA ABOUT VOJVODINA’S IDENTITY  
 
Judging by some essayists loosely dealing with the topic being in minority, 
religious minority included, is an advantage since that’s the position enabling a 
human being to freely determine his or her identity. However, such standpoint 
hardly has any meaning at all against the backdrop of political realities. 
Moreover, a stereotype about minorities indicates quite the opposite. Pronounced 
Serb nationalist, poet Matija Beckovic, whose paradoxes equal ordinary 
nonsensicalities, once said minorities – religious included – are “a patient you 
must constantly please.” And this has become a stereotype with dangerous 
political connotation – minorities are perceived as an alien element, which legally 
and legitimately entitles the majority to dominate. I would rather put it in plain 
words – minorities are everywhere – the matrix of Vojvodina’s identity included – 
a part of a society’s identity. Besides, minorities are a changeable category at 
historical, territorial and legal levels. Religious minorities mirror pluralism that is 
a component part of every democratic society.  
The above remarks may have not been necessary at all. However, the ones 
that follow – similar though not the same – are significant for our discussion. 
I will refer just to some out of many documents and legal provisions, both 
domestic and international, dealing with religious minorities. I will refer to 
Serbia’s Constitution and the Law on Churches and Religious Communities, 
particularly to the crying contradiction between constitutional definition of 
churches and religious communities, and the said law that is nothing but a 
stumbling bloc in the way of solving the entire problematic. For, that law is 
simply inapplicable or, when applied, creates even more complex problems. Of 
course, there is the Framework Convention on the Protection of Minority Rights, 
there is the Central European Initiative, there are the Lund Recommendations and 
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scores of other documents. Instead of invoking them, I would rather pinpoint a 
fact that seems to be unquestionable: namely, laws and legal provisions are 
indispensable but cannot solve the problem. If in the political-cultural context the 
phrase Vojvodina’s identity matters – and I think it does – minorities, religious in 
particular, must be perceived somewhat differently. So far, they have been on the 
agenda only when incidents additionally complicate the situation. There are two 
dimensions of the problem. The first is always taken into consideration and 
relates to the manner in which the state and local self-governments react to 
specific situations. The second that is usually overseen has to do with the reaction 
by religious communities themselves. The state has privileged some churches and 
religious communities by proclaiming them “traditional” and “recognized.” As 
for others, they are discriminated and, in a way, marginalized. Several provisions 
of the Serbian Constitution regulate the problematic in a modern way – they do 
not specify a single church or religious community. The Law is another story. And 
it is the collision between the Constitution and the Law that gives rise to 
problems.  
To understand better the matrix of Vojvodina’s identity we need to 
consider what I’ve called the second dimension of the problem. Speaking of the 
situation in Vojvodina, I’ve been relying on the studies that certainly stand for 
major sources and overviews of the actual state of affairs.35 Speaking of religious 
communities I take we should stick to the term community so as to avoid the term 
“sect,” differentiate various denominations and make distinction between them 
and the Church /the Serbian Orthodox Church/ as a specific notion. Religious 
communities are secluded from the outside world – some have opted for self-
ghettoization, while others have had it imposed on them. Such communities are 
excluded from the cultural and religious matrix or, to put it in plain words, they 
would not accept communication with anyone. The other problem is even more 
complex: small religious communities usually boil down to their ethnic patterns 
and recruit their adepts from the ranks of their own ethnicities. This is why the 
conflicts between them are manifested as ethnic tensions.  
Take, for example, a Christian community in Vojvodina, the Nazarenes. 
You’ll find them in Novi Sad and in other towns in Vojvodina. They have a long 
tradition in this area. The Nazarenes are a typical pietistic – Baptist community 
founded by the Calvinist priest, Henrik Frelich, in 1830 in Switzerland. They 
profess Holy Bible but do not accept the symbol of cross. Of all church rites they 
recognize only baptism and communion by the Calvinist ritual. They reject church 
                                                 
35 Anka Latinovic, „Religious Communities in the Territory of Vojvodina,|“ Novi 
Sad, 2001.  
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hierarchy, icons and saints, avoid feasts and pomp, they refrain from alcohol and 
smoking, they are conscientious objectors, they renounce nationalism and 
advocate internationalism. Though not obliged under domestic law to register 
their teaching, they do it duly and publicly. Christian churches – the Eastern 
Orthodox in particular – do not recognize them and label them “sectarians.” 
Faced with overt animosity, the Nazarenes form individual identities of their 
believers. However, they are not a cultural factor of the public life since they are 
simply invisible in it. So, they are both ghettoized and self-ghettoized. In the sum 
of cultural differences and imperative religious pluralism that crucially 
determines Vojvodina’s “model” such and similar religious communities could 
mean a lot but, unfortunately, they do not. Though seriously undermined and 
impaired in 1988 by the wave of Milosevic’s aggressive nationalism and political 
populism, Vojvodina’s model still holds on and is interpreted as a value in 
Europe. However, conflicts persisted at the level of religious communities. 
It is common knowledge that present-day graffiti “Stop to sects!” are not 
being inscribed at random. A priest from Kraljevo, whose small community was 
attacked by unidentified hawks under the said slogan, said, “I think this the 
outcome of the latest media campaign against sects, in which self-proclaimed 
experts in religious sects blame Protestants, believers in the Holy Scripture, and 
classify them together with Satanists.”36 It is obvious what this is all about and 
what and who intentionally creates the problem. The idea is to impose on small 
religious communities the identity matrix by the principle of ethnicity and 
religious monism, that is, by the principle of some new totalitarianism. If you call 
all religious communities sects with a negative prefix, fatal political consequences 
are unavoidable. At the same time, that’s an assault against Vojvodina’s identity 
that is plural in principle. We should take into consideration two major facts. 
First, according to modern authorities in sociology of religion small religious 
communities are those that will have important place in the future, since big, 
traditional churches have been historically compromised. Second, churches need 
not be the only ones that label “sects” all the communities that are in some way 
different. More often than not, the authors come from political structures resolute 
to remain in power. When the member of Kostunica’s cabinet, Dragan Jocic, in his 
capacity as the police minister, declares war on sects, that’s – among other things 
– overt violation of human freedoms. His refers to all such communities as 
sectarians and Satanists, despite the fact that all, except for Satanists, have been 
duly registered. This is not about ignorance only but about a conscious political 
intention that is manifested as a typical witch hunt.  
                                                 
36 Danas, September 18, 2007. 
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To safeguard Vojvodina’s model of “unity in differences” – not only in 
Vojvodina but also in the entire territory of Serbia – religious communities must 
be differentiated from sects, and the very term sect specified. Members of small 
religious communities – such as Adventists – are treated as if they were second-
rate citizens. They are under constant pressure. No wonder, therefore, that the 
Amnesty International reacted to their position. If the afore-mentioned Law on 
Churches and Religious Communities cannot be significantly amended, it is 
possible to insert in it a provision on small religious communities’ duty to register 
their teachings. Domestic politicians are prone to offhandedly call Freemasons a 
sect. On the other hand, our freemason, Dositej Obradovic, was the one to open a 
European chapter of Serbia’s enlightenment and culture in all domains of national 
life, religious included. For the Serbian Orthodox baroque – that is nowadays 
being destroyed – is the first-class cultural fact.37 
 
 
Dusko RADOSAVLJEVIC 
MINORITIES’ POLITICAL REPRESENTATION  
AND SAFEGUARD OF VOJVODINA’S MULTIETHNIC IDENTITY  
(Theses) 
 
I see a seed of contradictions in the very title of the topic we are discussing 
today. Namely, with the political scene as the one we have it seems impossible to 
create an atmosphere advantageous to the safeguard of the province’s multiethnic 
identity no matter how favorable solutions for minorities’ political representation 
might be offered.   
- Politicians at republican and provincial levels alike lack the political will 
necessary for having minorities’ political representation solved productively and 
in the long run;  
- Minority national councils are not legitimate to pursue policies that would 
effectively suit members of minority communities rather minority political classes 
only; the manner in which national councils are elected is questionable; 
- Vojvodina’s ruling coalition’s proposal for the amendment of electoral 
rules and introduction of guaranteed mandates for representatives of national 
minorities has been subjected to political arbitration – that in itself is most 
problematic in the election year; better chances for political manipulation; 
facultative bodies are in charge of electoral rolls; certain political groupings 
                                                 
37 An excerpt from a study on the position of religious minorities in Vojvodina and 
Serbia.  
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skillfully rig electoral results; the attempt to cement the incumbent political 
grouping regardless of electoral outcome, etc.;  
- Absence of a coherent concept for Vojvodina’s development as a 
multiethnic region; this is why elected officials in the province – but also those 
belonging to some Belgrade-seated political options cannot influence the 
safeguard of Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity; lack of knowledge of lack of will to 
perceive and develop Vojvodina in some other way than “7 percent of Serbia’s 
budget;” 
- Absence of a wider political, cultural, economic and pluralistic platform 
for Serbia as an European and multicultural state and political community; such a 
platform should be developed by all major political groups and elected officials in 
Serbia (in the parliaments and in the government, including the President of the 
Republic) with a view to creating preconditions for the country’s modernization; 
the platform as such implies participation of minority communities in the process 
of building Serbia’s identity and, in particular, fostering Vojvodina’s multi-
ethnicity;  
 - Desperately obsolete concepts of political elites in Serbia and Vojvodina 
meant to secure resources for their long rules and for satisfying interests of party 
memberships – masterly veiled by the so-called state-building topics – also hinder 
development of an adequate policy in this domain;  
 - Serbian/Vojvodina’s political scenes are incapable of proving their 
legitimacy on the grounds of the premise that a full personal autonomy is a 
precondition to the development of a modern political community; that is the 
main stumbling bloc in the way of minority communities’ participation in 
political processes, building of Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity and establishment 
of a modern political community in the Republic of Serbia. 
  
 
Tomislav ZIGMANOV 
ONCE AGAIN ABOUT GENERAL PROBLEMATIC  
 
I would like to broach some issues that, as it seems to me, have been 
omitted so far. The first issue relates to legitimacy of minority representatives in a 
democracy. The predominant principle of democracies is the principle of direct 
legitimacy of the people for whom we vote and who are in power. Any indirect 
elections of minority representatives in power create problems, and such solutions 
are neither democratic nor fair to minorities. Actually, such solutions open the 
door to the problems within minority communities themselves. Likewise, they 
91 
open the door to paternalism and manipulation of minority communities by 
political oligarchies whenever it suits their needs.  
Not long ago, a read a statement by a high official of the Democratic Party. 
“We shall offer minorities a certain number of seats,” he said. That’s humiliating. 
Why should minorities be offered some seats rather than be guaranteed a 
principled and fair participation? Their participation in governance should not be 
something to bargain about or dependable on the good will of the people in 
power. On the other hand, indirect representation deprives minorities of control 
mechanisms. How could they possible control their elected officials when they 
have not elected them in direct elections?  
Further, minorities’ political elites can get alienated forever from citizens 
from a certain minority community for there is not a single mechanism of 
accountability. You have the same situation with minority representatives that 
have now entered the parliament as candidates on the lists of the political parties 
of the majority nation. They have voted against the interests of minorities and 
justified that with the stands taken by the political parties on the lists of which 
they had been elected.  
As you know, the “owner” of a mandate under the new Constitution is not 
an individual but a political party. In it only to be expected that to keep their 
mandates minority representatives will obey party headquarters rather than stand 
for minority interests. And there is nothing you can do to prevent such behavior 
as you have no mechanism for punishing such representatives.  
The control over the officials who hold several indirectly elected positions 
is even more problematic. For instance, a representative of the Hungarian 
National Council is simultaneously the president of the Provincial Council of 
National Councils, the coordinator of national councils and the member of the 
Republican Council for National Minorities. Accumulation of functions is an 
unavoidable consequence of the unsolved minority representation. And what 
about democratization against the backdrop of the public space with almost 
feudal traits when it comes to legitimacy and accumulation of power? 
Then take for instance minority representatives in governmental agencies, 
whose membership is to be ascribed to multiply indirect elections. There is no 
minority representative in the Broadcasting Agency but there are some in the 
National Council of Education. Their legitimacy above all derives from religious 
communities. You cannot control their work for there is no mechanism of control. 
Actually this is how the entire minority space becomes the space of 
authoritarianism and despotism.  
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Pavel DOMONJI 
NATIONAL COUNCILS A LA MARX BROTHERS 
 
Some time ago, a Zagreb-seated magazine ran a story about a global 
triumph of democracy. Even the regimes that can hardly be called democratic 
invoke democracy, said the author. In my opinion, this thesis about the triumph 
of democracy is relative at least when it comes to the situation we have over here 
and at least when it comes to national councils. Last week participants in a 
conference in Novi Sad underlined that the key dilemma about the election of 
national councils had not been solved yet. Opinions on whether national councils 
should be elected democratically through direct elections or indirectly through 
bodies of electors still differ. People from the same minority community could not 
reach agreement about this despite their strong criticism of the existing system of 
electors.  
What’s problematic about such system of the election of national councils? 
Simply, bodies of electors do not secure equal rights to all people from a 
particular minority community but they do secure domination of a political 
structure over a national council. For instance, the regulation on the functioning of 
assemblies of electors has only formalized domination of the Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians in Hungarians’ national council.  
But let’s stop for a moment for a test. Let’s imagine that four years ago 
national councils were elected democratically. Would the Alliance of Vojvodina 
Hungarian manage to win the majority of seats in the national council? Yes, they 
would. To sum up – even in such case the Alliance would win. They would 
probably be less dominating but that’s not so important for my point. My point is 
that their influence would have been legitimate for it would derive from the 
support by the Hungarian electorate.  
There are scores of other problems apart from legitimacy. An electoral 
system greatly determines legitimacy of an authority. Those elected in democratic 
elections are by far more legitimate that those elected indirectly. Let me just 
remind you that legitimacy – and even legality - of the Hungarian National 
Council have been disputed from the very beginning.  
Secondly, the electoral system and legitimacy considerably influence 
relations within a minority community. Those relations in the case of the Bosniak 
community have been so radicalized and brutalized that some non-governmental 
organizations from Novi Pazar called for a ban on some Bosniak political parties. 
Confronting political options within the Bosniak community have played on any 
change in the Bosniak electorate’s public opinion to formalize some change in 
their national council. 
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Thirdly, the national councils of the minorities with established political 
parties are strikingly dependent on those parties. Such situation brings about 
many problems. I’ll just point out the following two:  
a) Since the seats in national councils are set aside for partisan 
cadres the overall competence of those bodies to deal with the matters in their 
jurisdiction can be questionable; and  
b) The threat of manipulation of national councils by some parties is 
quite realistic. Those parties are using the national councils to realize their own 
interests rather than those of a national minority. Take, for instance, the proposal 
submitted to the Vojvodina Assembly by three parties – the Alliance of Vojvodina 
Hungarians, the Democratic Party and the Force of Serbia Movement. The said 
proposal has been agreed on with national councils. The problem is that by 
dealing with the election of MPs national councils have overstepped the bounds 
of their authority. Moreover, the mandates of some national councils had expired 
at the time. The more so they couldn’t have had their say in laying down electoral 
rules.  
Fourthly, though mandates of some national councils have expired the 
latter operate as if everything was normal. Such situation sources a number of 
harmful consequences:  
a) It discredits national councils and boils them down to sinecures;  
b) It compromises their dedication to the rule of law;  
c) It confirms that Serbian politics are not guided by principled, 
universally accepted stands. The obligations laid down in the Constitutional Law 
relate to local, provincial and presidential elections testify that the Serbian 
political elite is incapable of meeting deadlines and duties it has imposed on itself 
by passing the said law.  
I deliberately underline the Serbian political elite as I wish to draw you 
attention to some facts of major political significance.  
First, as Slaven Bacic noted the Serbian politics lacks a well-thought-out 
minority policy and strategy. The minority issue is totally marginalized and 
overshadowed by the Kosovo question;  
Second, the Kosovo question is used to keep nationalism alive. Frustrated 
Serbian nationalists blame minorities as well for their failures. Remember how 
Tomislav Nikolic commented Boris Tadic’s victory in the presidential race? He 
said that Tadic won thanks to minority votes. So he put through the following 
message – had only Serbs voted in the presidential elections the winner would not 
have been Tadic but Nikolic. In other words, minorities rather than the majority 
had a final say in the election of the President of the Republic.  
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Statements such as Nikolic’s are not only Serbia’s specialty. True, people 
said similar things in other countries but in different historical circumstances. For 
instance, Konrad Adenauer was elected thanks to a single vote. Everyone 
dissatisfied with the election pointed a finger at a MP from the ranks for the 
Danish minority. It turned out later on that his vote had not been the decisive one. 
Nevertheless, the man was on the carpet for having decided Germany’s political 
fate. In Slovenia, too, President Janez Drnovsek was elected with the one-vote 
majority. Commenting his election, some Slovenian public figures claimed 
minorities should not be allowed to arbitrate state matters and their voting right 
in the parliament should be limited only to the issues that directly concerned 
them.  
All those illustrative instances indicate that the minority issue is a most 
delicate one. Its successful resolution necessitates support and understanding of 
the majority, its intellectual and political elites in the first place.  
Misa Samaradzic underlined with good reason that the problem of 
minorities’ political representation must not be subjected to arbitrary solutions. 
Likewise, explanations accompanying some proposals must not be offensive to 
minorities. For instance, the explanation of the proposal for amendment of the 
Decision on the Election of Provincial Deputies quotes that only the minority 
communities that have formed their national councils are entitled to elect 
deputies, since by forming those councils they have proved their national 
consciousness and willingness to safeguard specificities of their communities. 
Formulations as this one imply that, say, members of the Montenegrin 
community do not posses national consciousness given that they have not formed 
a national council. And this is hardly acceptable if one takes into account 
Montenegrins’ organizations and associations. We might say that Montenegrins’ 
consciousness is imbued with traditionalism and conservativeness because it 
relies on a church of their own but to imply that their national consciousness is 
underdeveloped is offensive.  
Anyway, the Constitution provides that minorities can form their national 
councils, which means that they need not if they do not want to. However, their 
decision not to form a national council must not be to their disadvantage and 
make them unequal with the communities that have formed national councils. 
To conclude with I would say that the part of the explanation I’ve quoted 
has yet another, hidden meaning. Namely, what the Serbian political elite wants is 
to have citizens organized and differentiated by ethnic principles rather than by 
some other. In plain words – if you want to have your representative and partake 
in the distribution of resources, form a national council of your own. This will not 
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solve your problems but you will at least have your national council, as Marx 
brothers might put it.  
 
 
Gojko MISKOVIC 
ANECDOTAL AND PATHETIC  
 
Figuratively speaking, the inscription on Serbia’s national emblem might 
run – either in Latin or in literal Serbian Cyrillic – “Everything may make sense 
but need not necessarily.” This piece of “wisdom” – that actually reflects the pre-
political spirit of unreliability or, as some German historian put it, Levantine 
business – best illustrates Serbia’s present-day policy. No doubt that in such 
ambience of total relativization of everything that makes human life normal and 
predictable the parts of the Serbian nation that have got used, through centuries, 
to a different value system pay the highest price. Here I refer to myself as a 
member of that corps – the corps that can be only sociologically and 
anthropologically determined rather than subjected to a strict definition of a 
political nation. The Serbs of Vojvodina and the Serbs who used to live in 
Croatian cities are those who paid dear for this pseudo-principle, this profound, 
statesmanlike thought ascribed, as far as I know, to Nikola Pasic.  
Speaking of minorities and even of national minorities I am quite positive 
that the population of Vojvodina’s Serbs is the biggest minority in the territory of 
Serbia. We are in a paradoxical situation: our verified and undisputable family 
histories simply cannot be publicly affirmed because of the hue and cry raised by 
the state-paid “legionaries of Serbian nationalism.”  
And I am referring here to petty thieves that grow into cabinet members or 
false believers, or, for that matter, prime ministers that the moment they come to 
power begin manifesting every possible unchristian trait.  
In my humble opinion, all those negative impulses have been coming, 
throughout history, from the Serbian Orthodox Church – that is, from its alienated 
and self-satisfied hierarchy. Some months ago in Sombor I witnessed what a noble 
idea to have the dilapidated and ruined Evangelistic Church completely 
renovated had to go through. The church is symbolically situated at the town’s 
Theater Square and dates back in the early 20th century. Some missionaries and 
people of good will from the United States were willing to organize fundraising 
for the church. All of a sudden a man introducing himself the primate of the 
Evangelistic Church in Vojvodina showed up. To me, he looked more like some 
small entrepreneur than a pious person. He eventually admitted that he could not 
decide by himself but had to ask a bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
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whether the action was permissible or would strengthen the presence of the 
unwelcome Protestant spirit in the province. I was shocked to learn that he had to 
turn to someone else for his own opinion. But the man said what he said openly 
and unblushingly. 
Thanks to the endeavor of this group of American humanitarians who live 
in Sombor and pursue their mission in the circumstances I would not call ideal the 
Evangelists and their primate in Vojvodina had the roof of their church fixed. The 
roof at least leaks no more due to the moneys they paid from their own pockets. 
Actually, they only had some tiles changes and whitewashed sections that cried 
for thorough reconstruction. All this indicates that the authorities would not allow 
revival of an “alien” and much needed influence on the province. In early 19th 
century in the then multiethnic and multi-religious Austria-Hungary the 
Evangelists were those who contributed to Sombor’s development as an urban 
area. Sombor has not been developed as such since. 
I hope this example of mixed emotions – the examples that makes me laugh 
and cry at the same time – illustrates the full complexity of today’s situation 
calling for a rational strategy of modernization. 
 
 
Josip IVANOVIC 
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN MINORITIES’ DECLARATIVE RIGHTS  
AND THEIR DEMOCRATIC CAPACITIES  
FOR EXERCISE OF THOSE RIGHTS  
 
I feel privileged to partake in this meeting and would like to thank the 
organizers, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, for having 
invited me. I take the topic of religious information broached by Mr. Mirko 
Djordjevic most interesting. I’ve been myself studying religious issues for long. 
There are many questions he could not have tackled in so short time, which also 
relate to Vojvodina’s identity since they are about religious minorities and their 
position and role in Vojvodina’s complex multiethnic structure. For instance, 
recognition of the Rumanian Orthodox Church is still an open question. Or, there 
are problems sourcing from the new Law on Religious Rights and Freedoms that 
need to be solved. In my view, we could trigger off resolution of at least some 
problems by organizing sessions as this one. 
Minorities’ political representation is also important for the right to 
information in minority languages. In this context, we must pay due attention to 
the election of national councils. Some participants in the discussion have 
underlined the fact that legal, four-year mandates of several national councils had 
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expired and that election of those councils had not been regulated by a law yet. 
That’s paradoxical.  
I would also like to question the very purpose of national councils 
primarily from the angle of the lawmakers that have passed the Law on the 
Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities. I was myself 
elected the first president of the Croatian National Council. The form I had to fill 
in the process of the Council’s registration did not have an appropriate 
classification box for national councils. I was facing the same problem throughout 
my office as the president – there was no telling what type of institutions national 
councils were. As you might be aware, Hungarians were those who broke the ice 
– they were the first to form their national council. Croats came after.  
I discussed the problem with Slaven Bacic, who told me that in his view 
national councils of national minorities were consultative bodies the state had 
devised and incorporated in its system so as to have some, say, Roma of its own 
to consult whenever challenged by problems plaguing the Roma community. I 
had the same feeling all the time though I saw that in real life some national 
councils were behaving not only like parliaments – i.e. representational bodies – 
but also like governments. They became executive powers, which I hold more than 
problematic. 
Some minority representatives heartily welcomed the decision by the 
Executive Council of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina to hand over 
ownership rights of the print media to national councils. “Finally, we shall be 
exercising some power, we shall be distributing some fund and thus at least 
become a part of collective consciousness of our members,” said some national 
councils at the time. But someone from the state leadership figured this out soon 
and the inflow of funds became sporadic. As I said, I was the first president of the 
Croatian council and members of my community were expecting me to do 
something. I was chairing the council for two and a half years at my own expense. 
I had meeting with all sorts of officials, I participated in conferences like this one, 
but what was the bottom line? None at all.  
When the state realized that things can function that way too, the question 
Pavel Domonji has just broached opened. We cannot just weep and wail, and 
blame the state for our unrealized rights. Unfortunately, some mechanisms inhibit 
us and we ourselves hinder our activism. In other words, members of minority 
communities are incapable of coping with some problems to their own detriment.  
But, to tell the truth, some national councils are infiltrated with a special 
species of people, incompetent people, who cunningly seized the opportunity to 
get in possession of some funds and start running the so-called ethno-business. In 
other words, they reason, “I shall be a Croat and will be paid as such. I need not 
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be qualified for the job, I need not have any insight into the situation, but I will be 
authorized to make decisions, give counsel, etc. on behalf of my community.” 
Drawing from my experience I must say that the then minister of human 
and minority rights was not exactly concerned with minority issues. It was often 
hard even to arrange a meeting with him. He once told us, “Feel free to behead 
me, to spit on me, to do whatever you want to me, but I simply cannot do 
anything for you.” That’s hardly an approach appropriate to a member of the 
cabinet. Further, a federal council for national minorities has never been set up at 
all despite the fact that its establishment is laid down by the afore-mentioned law. 
Later on, the Republic has taken some obligations upon itself but that was only 
when everything started going downhill. 
There is yet another principled issue when it comes to minorities’ 
representation – the issue of minorities’ political parties that can also influence the 
nature and scope of information in minority languages. In this context I am prone 
to reduce everything to absurdity and conclude that the two issues are 
contradictory. What’s the purpose of a political party? To seize power? But what 
are the chances for a minority party to come to power? None. A minority party 
may gain power at local level only, though this is also problematic. The Croatian 
community that is, apart from the Roma, the most dispersed community in the 
territory of the Republic of Serbia has no chance at all, dispersed as it is, to come 
to power even at local level. The same refers to some other, much bigger minority 
communities. On the other hand, one should not overlook the ideological 
affiliation of a minority party. 
In principle, the same as members of the majority nation, members of 
minority communities should be entitled to freely occupy their position at the 
large scale of political options, platforms and programs. I used to reason that 
members of minority communities should be free to join whatever political party 
they wish and as party members compete for offices in representational and 
governmental bodies. Then I realized that they could accomplish that via national 
councils but differently devised councils – like those, say, in Hungary that has 
developed minority self-governments. 
Yet, this is about qualitatively different arrangements. The nature of 
national councils in Serbia is consultative. But, had the authorities strictly 
followed the provisions of the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms 
of National Minorities they would have consulted the people in national councils 
in charge of education in the process of passing the Law on Higher Education. But 
one bothered to consult them. Anyone concerned with the minority problematic is 
under the impression that national councils are there for their own sake and for 
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the sake of the people who are being paid for membership in those councils. In 
brief, the very concept of those bodies should be thoroughly reconsidered.  
To conclude with, I would like to underline what really matters. See, since 
minority representatives can occupy any part of the political spectrum national 
councils – under the condition that they enjoy indisputable legitimacy and legality 
– could be, mathematically expressed, common denominator of politically 
differently dispersed members of minority communities. Should that be the case 
and bearing in mind a variety of political options, it would be easier for national 
councils to find common grounds and respond to political parties’ offers. Party 
programs would be competing for minorities’ support. In my opinion, various 
models should be considered, discussed and studied, but also some concrete 
proposals should be made. Those proposals might fall on deaf ears, the authorities 
might ignore them, but we must do everything in our power, nevertheless.  
 
 
Vladimir VALENTIK 
BETWEEN RESIGNATION AND SIMULATION  
 
We have discussed national councils as forms of minorities’ representation. 
I do share a dose of skepticism Mr. Bacic voiced in his keynote address. However, 
one should take into account a certain asymmetry of national communities in 
Vojvodina. Critical remarks about functioning of national councils cannot apply to 
all national councils without exception. Each council is specific. At the time 
national councils were being established – and we have discussed the manner in 
which they are elected and formed – I’ve been skeptical about such organizational 
arrangements as I expected them to be nothing but a façade. Nevertheless, the 
Slovak National Council has managed to attain some results that would have 
been hardly possible otherwise. In other words, the Slovak National Council has 
seized the opportunity of a more or less legitimate form of representation to 
articulate some needs and constraints of the Slovak community in Vojvodina. Of 
course, I take the functioning of national councils with some reserve, particularly 
when it comes to minorities’ political representation. Moreover, I am not only 
skeptical but also resigned. For, whatever model we might advocate and it 
eventually takes root we shall surely detect so many shortcomings in its 
functioning to conclude that the bottom line is simulation of a multiethnic 
political life rather than a true one.  
Here is an illustrative example from historical experience. Back in mid-19th 
century the Slovak minority community tried to get politically organized and was 
participating in elections along with the Serbian community, which was also in 
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the minority at the time. The Slovak community succeeded in elections twice – in 
1869 when William Pavljini - Tot from the Kulpin electoral district won a 
parliamentary seat in Budapest and in 1905 when Milan Hodza managed the 
same. The Slovak People’s Party was revived after the World War I but its effects 
could hardly be called successful. In the first post-war elections Slovaks got their 
parliamentary representative, Igor Stafanik of Backa Palanka, brother of the well-
known Slovak general Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Several years later, after fierce 
inter-party disputes, the party decided to change its name into the Slovak People’s 
Farmer Party. Despite partaking in elections as the only Slovak party, it usually 
did not obtain Slovak votes. Slovaks preferred to vote for, say, Farmers Party of 
Stjepan Radic. We can draw lessons from this historical experience in minorities’ 
political organization and representation, particularly when it comes to smaller 
minority communities. 
We also had 40 years of “brotherhood and unity” and a multiethnic policy 
that was nothing but a simulation. Therefore, no matter what model of minority 
representation we choose either at national or regional level, I am afraid the 
results would not meet our expectations.  
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Annex  
 
Miroslav SAMARDZIC 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND PROTECTION  
OF NATIONAL MINORITIES38 
 
The Draft Decision on the Amendments and Supplements to the Decision 
on the Election of Deputies in the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of 
Vojvodina caused a fierce dispute within the ruling coalition early this summer. 
The proposal had been submitted by the Democratic Party, the Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians and Karic’s Force of Serbia Movement. 
According to the electoral rules adopted in 2004, 60 out of 120 deputies in 
the Assembly of Vojvodina are elected by the majority system and the rest by the 
proportional. The entire territory of Vojvodina is one electoral district, the 
parliamentary threshold is 5 percent of total vote, while natural threshold is 
applied to minority parties and coalitions. The three above-mentioned parties take 
that this system should be so amended that 60 deputies are elected by the majority 
system in the same number of electoral districts, 48 by the proportional system (5-
percent threshold and natural threshold for minorities) and 12 seats are reserved 
for minority representatives. 
The parties demand such amendment on the grounds of Article 180 of the 
Constitution providing proportional representation of minorities in the assemblies 
of autonomous provinces and units of local self-government with ethnically 
mixed population. It is obvious that the parties submitting the proposal hold that 
the Constitution insists that minorities should be represented in assemblies as 
communities. Besides, the Constitution introduces the institute of positive 
discrimination. According to Article 21, special measures the Republic of Serbia 
may take so as to secure full equality of persons or groups of persons whose 
position is fundamentally not equal with that of other citizens shall not be 
considered discrimination.  
According to the proposal, national communities that have already set up 
their national councils and, by the last census, have at least 10,000 members in the 
territory of the Autonomous Province have the right to reserved representatives. 
Hungarians would obtain three protected parliamentary seats, Slovaks and Croats 
two each, while Roma, Rumanians, Bunjevci, Ruthenians and Macedonians one 
each. 
                                                 
38 The article has been publicized at the website of the Serbian New Political 
Thought. 
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The criteria for determining the number of protected seats have been set 
arbitrarily. Under the Constitution, national councils are facultative institutions 
that may be established with a view of exercising the right to self-government in 
the domains of culture, education, information and official use of a minority 
language and alphabet. Likewise, the Law on the Protection of the Rights and 
Freedoms of National Minorities the Assembly of the FR of Yugoslavia adopted in 
2002 does not provide that a national council is a precondition for a community to 
be considered a national minority and enjoy minority protection. According to the 
proposal, members of minority communities would be entitled to cast three 
ballots in the next provincial elections, while the majority Serbs only two. This 
solution could be defined as positive discrimination but would apply only to the 
national minorities that are most disadvantaged in the electoral procedure and are 
too small to have their representatives elected. Special measures would not apply 
to the Hungarians that make up some 14 percent of total population of Vojvodina 
since, under existing regulations, they could win a considerable number of seats. 
Yet, it should be noted that only the Republic is authorized to take measures of 
positive discrimination.  
Further, the protected deputies would be elected by the majority system in 
the first round only and in Vojvodina as a single electoral district. The candidate 
who receives more votes than his/her opponents would be elected a 
representative of a minority community. If more deputies are to be elected those 
with highest scores would take seats. 
The adverse consequence is that the protected deputies could be elected by 
gaining by far fewer votes than the rest, which may lead to a political crisis. 
Namely, bearing in mind the present-day rather equalized balance of power in the 
provincial parliament (the so-called patriotic bloc on the one side and the so-
called pro-European on the other) the “protected” minority deputies could turn 
the scales for a parliamentary majority. 
According to the proposal, only members of a minority community would 
be allowed to cast ballot for their deputies. Holding of such elections would 
necessitate separate minority voting lists, which could give rise to many legal and 
political problems. National councils would be in charge of making minority 
voting lists. Elections for deputies would be held only under the condition that 
the voting list of an individual minority community has 50 percent plus one name 
out of total adult population of that community as registered in the last census. 
Otherwise, the seat belonging to that minority would be added to the number of 
deputies elected by the proportional system. Every adult citizen, member of a 
minority community, with voting right, who lives in the territory of the province 
and is registered in a separate voting list has the right to vote and to be elected.  
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In order to be registered in separate voting lists, members of national 
minorities of voting age should submit claims to their respective national 
councils. National councils should subsequently decide on a voter’s registration 
and inform the claimant about its decision. A national council could turn down a 
request if it finds out that the claimant has falsely identified himself or herself as a 
member of a national community. In that case, the claimant could appeal to the 
provincial administration authority.  
According to the proposal, local self-government bodies in charge of a 
general electoral roll would be obliged to help functioning of national councils 
and to enable inspection of the general electoral roll at national councils’ request. 
Further, on the grounds of a separate electoral list municipalities would insert a 
mark indicating a voter’s ethnic origin in the general electoral roll.  
The above-mentioned solutions are utterly problematic. Under both the 
Constitution and the Law on the Rights and Freedom of National Minorities the 
scope of activity of national councils is restricted to the aforementioned domains. 
Could an autonomous province expand the competence of national councils 
without constitutional and legal authorization? Could national councils operate 
like administrative bodies? Further, could an autonomous province at all manage 
voting lists? The Constitution provides that the exercise and protection of citizens’ 
rights and freedoms are in the jurisdiction of the republic. An autonomous 
province can introduce additional rights for national minorities only if entitled by 
the law. Voting right is one of fundamental human rights. The proposal envisages 
that a national council can turn down a citizen’s claim to be registered in a 
separate voting list if that citizen has falsely introduced himself/herself as a 
member of a national community. By what criteria shall a national council 
determine someone’s ethnic origin? There are no objective criteria for deciding a 
person’s nationality. That fact, therefore, cannot be proved in a legal procedure.  
Article 47 of the Constitution provides that a person shall freely express his 
or her ethnic origin. So, no authority whatsoever is entitled to decide whether or 
not a citizen’s declaration of ethnic origin is valid or not. For instance, a census 
taker is obliged to write a person’s ethnic origin in the form as told by that person 
and the person’s declaration is never checked. Moreover, the declaration can be 
changed. The proposal obviously draws on the conservative stand that one’s 
ethnic origin is inborn and primordial rather than a cultural category. It 
practically suggests that a national community is a community of the blood. To 
make things worse, the proposal includes no efficient legal remedies for the 
protection of the voting right of members of national minorities. Namely, if a 
national council refuses to register a person, that person can appeal to the 
provincial administrative authority. The voting right like any other human right 
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must be efficiently protected by a court of law. However, an autonomous 
province does not have autonomous judiciary and cannot decide on courts’ 
jurisdiction. Therefore, it cannot decide the manner in which voting lists shall be 
managed either.  
How would separate voting lists be managed in real life? Legitimacy of the 
existing national councils is disputable and mandates of some have expired. 
National councils do not have human resources for complex tasks. It is common 
knowledge that the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians has total control over the 
Hungarian National Council. President of the Council Lazlo Josza is a high party 
official at the same time. So, if a Hungarian is denied registration in a separate 
voting list, he can appeal to the Provincial Secretariat for Administration and 
Regulations headed by Tamas Korhec, also an official of the Alliance. It goes 
without saying that the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, a party participating in 
elections, would be controlling the process of forming the Hungarian electoral roll 
instead of some unbiased public authority. Possibilities for manipulating such 
electoral rolls are many since other national councils are also controlled by 
minority political oligarchies. And there is always a risk that persons considered 
nationally unsuitable by the criteria of national councils are denied registration 
and deprived of any efficient legal remedy.  
The general electoral roll is managed by the rules laid down in the Law on 
the Election of People’s Deputies (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 
35/00). The Law provides that a person who is not registered in a voting list may 
lodge a complaint before a court of law, which must rule the case within 24 hours. 
Also, the Law regulates inspection of electoral rolls and the data they must 
contain. I underline that the Law does not provide that electoral rolls should 
include information about ethnic origin (Article 15, para 2). Can an autonomous 
province decide against the law to have the information about ethnic origin added 
to the general electoral roll? 
It is obvious that by many elements the proposal is unconstitutional and 
illegal. The Constitutional Courts would have to decide the matter should anyone 
initiate the procedure for assessment of the proposal’s constitutionality. However, 
the Constitutional Court has not been formed yet and there is no telling when it 
will become functional. 
Minority protection is often manipulated to attain some other political 
goals. In this specific case, the three parties are probably not concerned with 
improvement of the political position of Vojvodina’s minorities but try to tailor 
electoral rules so as to retain power in the province. Namely, those parties 
evidently hold that the protected minority deputies will always come from their 
political groupings and stand against the Radicals, the Socialist Party of Serbia 
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and the Democratic Party of Serbia. The fact that the province’s budget has been 
raised to some 55 billion dinars is the reason behind such fierce struggle for power 
– the parties in power now have a by far bigger booty to distribute among 
themselves. 
Political risks of the proposed electoral system are enormous. The growth 
of interethnic tension could be the worst scenario. Should the proposal be adopted 
the Hungarian nationalistic party, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, would 
be always in power in Vojvodina, while Serbian nationalistic parties would be 
pushed in the position of a hopeless minority, which would trigger off their 
activism outside institutions. No doubt that those parties would be convincing 
Vojvodina Serbs that there are discriminated. 
Is this all about a ruthless struggle for power by selfish and irresponsible 
political elites or the whole story has a larger context? It is common knowledge 
that autonomist circles are dissatisfied with the status of Vojvodina and do 
everything in their power to have the Constitution revised. Since domestic 
population, the Serbs in particular, do not back their endeavor inciting of ethnic 
and political crisis is a way to have the province’s status decided at some 
international conference or by the EU and the US arbitrage. The autonomist bloc 
includes the Democratic Party, political organizations of national minorities and 
the League of Vojvodina Social Democrats. The Democratic Party is the strongest 
and the most influential party in the group. The League, however, does not 
support the proposal for purely pragmatic reasons. Namely, in the provincial 
elections in 2004 the League obtained only one deputy by the majority system and 
six by the proportional. Fewer deputies elected by the proportional system would 
surely diminish the League’s influence in the Assembly of Vojvodina. The G17 
does not support the proposal for the same reasons. 
Backed by the Serbian Radical Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia, 
President of the Assembly of Vojvodina Bojan Kostres suggests that all 120 
deputies should be elected by the proportional system with the natural threshold 
for minority parties and coalitions. The solution he offers for consideration calls 
for the amendment of the Statute of Vojvodina providing that every municipality 
shall have at least one deputy. President of the Executive Council of Vojvodina 
Bojan Pajtic – who advocates the proposal – takes that under the Constitutional 
Law for the Implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia the 
incumbent Assembly is not entitled to change the Statute. Finally, deputy Mirko 
Bajic has proposed that the existing electoral system should only include the 
natural threshold for minority parties. 
A purely proportional system with Vojvodina as a single electoral district 
and the natural threshold for minorities would probably be the best solution of 
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all. Such solution would not necessitate forming of separate electoral rolls that are 
always politically risky. Besides, it would make it possible for every bigger 
national minority to be represented in the Assembly of Vojvodina, and for every 
member of a national minority to freely decide whether to cast ballot for a 
national party or for a party operating in a larger community. The solutions 
offering multiple choices and an individual’s autonomous decision-making are 
the best solutions. It should be noted that every small minority community cannot 
have its own deputy in the provincial parliament. The purpose of positive 
discrimination is not to annul the democratic rule of the majority but to 
compensate its failures and shortcomings. The natural threshold is a lowest 
possible point not to be further lowered. Only a person enjoying appropriate 
democratic support can be a deputy. Last but not lest, the proportional system 
encourages bigger parties to include minority candidates in their lists and thus 
attract minority votes. All this contributes to social integration and bypasses the 
risk of simultaneous ethnic and political divides, which usually leads to serious 
crises with unforeseeable consequences.  
 
107 
 
 
 
MINORITY INFORMATION RESOURCES  
AND PRESERVING VOJVODINA’S 
MULTIETHNIC IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 
 
Sonja BISERKO 
 
Public information in minority languages is very important for the 
preservation of Vojvodina’s multiethnic identity. Arguments based on identity 
considerations are often put forward in support of the exercise of this right. This is 
quite justified, for public information in minority languages goes a long way 
towards contributing to the preservation of the national identity of persons 
belonging to national minorities.  
However, the right to public information in one’s native language is a 
fundamental right which, as such, is of wider effect and significance. The 
provision of information to members of minorities in their mother tongue helps 
their integration into global society. Furthermore, it contributes in large measure 
to the legitimacy of the polity within which the minorities exercise their rights.  
The effects of this right ought not to be underestimated with regard to 
tolerance and reducing ethnic distance either. Otherness originating either within 
a majority or within a minority community will be accepted far more easily if the 
media are more responsive to developments in other national communities than is 
the case today.  
After all, public information in minority languages boosts the competence 
of citizens in the information sphere and makes for greater rationality of political 
life, a consideration of exceptional importance for an unregulated society and 
unconsolidated state like Serbia. Nor should one lose sight of the fact that the 
bilingualism of members of minority groups is a major asset when it comes to 
imparting and receiving information.  
These facts alone lead to the conclusion that peaceful exercise of this right 
must become a strategic interest not only of persons belonging to minority 
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communities, their intellectual, cultural and political elites, but of all political 
actors who look upon themselves as democratically-minded political actors and, 
as such, strive to constitute Serbia as a democratic community.  
As is well known, providing information in minority languages can be 
achieved in two ways: either by setting up separate minority media outlets or 
broadcasting special programmes in minority languages by the existing (ethnic 
majority language) media organizations. The existence of a minority media outlet 
is not essential to providing information in a minority language because a 
minority can receive information in its own language from a public service 
broadcaster in the form of special features, shows or programmes. From the point 
of view of the majorities, the existence of minority media is the most desirable 
option. A minority with no media outlet of its own and no possibility of receiving 
information in its mother tongue would be in the most disadvantageous position.  
The decades-long practice in Vojvodina of public information in minority 
languages should continue to be promoted as a mainstay of Vojvodina's identity. 
A statutory provision under which media (above all local electronic ones) are to 
be privatized by the end of the year (2007) raised concerns within minorities as a 
threat to their rights, given that the minority media market is simply too restricted 
from a commercial point of view.  
A survey conducted by the Fund for an Open Society indicates that 
representatives of minority cultural elites were unanimous in the view that the 
privatization process would greatly affect the quality of public information in 
minority languages. On the other hand, however, they were highly confident that 
the minority-language media outlets had a future.  
 
 
Tomislav ZIGMANOV 
INFORMATION IN NATIONAL MINORITY LANGUAGES  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 
 
The Fund for an Open Society undertook the survey of the situation in the 
field of public information in minority languages to ascertain the facts regarding 
the minorities’ right to receive information in their mother tongue as well as to 
assess the economic, technical-technological and professional capacity for 
transformation of the existing minority media organizations. We also wish in this 
way to draw the attention of the public and of the political decision-makers to the 
possible negative effects of forthcoming transformation and to suggest elements 
for new institutional arrangements with a view to ensuring the continuing and 
adequate exercise of the right to public information in one’s native language.  
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Serbia is home to persons belonging to a great number of minorities, so it is 
essential for every pluralist society to create conditions in which members of 
national minorities can enjoy peacefully both their general civil and their specific 
rights. The way minority rights are regulated and whether they are exercised or 
not is of considerable effect on the extent to which minorities are integrated into 
society, the quality of interethnic relations, the stability as well as democratization 
of society.  
The right to public information in one’s native language, in addition to the 
rights to education, preservation of culture or official use of language and script, 
is a key minority right. At the same time, it is an important identity resource as 
well as being significant from the point of view of civic competence. In Serbia and 
particularly in Vojvodina, where a tradition of information in national minority 
languages has existed for decades, a process of ownership transformation of such 
media and others is under way. 
 
Introduction – Media Sector Transition in Serbia  
 
A good majority of minority-language media are still being financed from 
public sources, that is, from the Serbian or Vojvodina budget, or from the budgets 
of local communities – municipalities. This kind of financing continued after 2003, 
the year the founding rights of the minority-language media outlets established 
by the Republic of Serbia or the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina were 
transferred to the national councils for national minorities. At local level, 
minority-language media organizations broadcasting in minority languages are 
chiefly founded and financed by municipalities. Though financing from public 
sources ensures economic viability, it also means a monopoly on public 
information in minority languages regardless of the quality, editorial policy, 
developmental and professional capacity.  
The present legal framework, adopted in the wake of the democratic 
changes in 2000, has not fully been adjusted. This lack of adjustment is the 
potential source of trouble regarding the minority media transformation currently 
in progress. It is feared for a reason that exposing such media outlets to the 
market could affect the right to public information in one’s native language, 
especially at local level. The absence of a wider debate concerning the strategy of 
development of broadcasting in Serbia, the frequency allocation plan, and the 
process of constitution of broadcasting organizations in Vojvodina and Serbia, is 
an additional source of concern that the quality and extent of exercise of the right 
to public information in one’s native language achieved may suffer.  
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The current media privatization in Serbia, which should be completed by 
the end of 2007 as a result of the adoption and implementation of the ‘European 
standards’, will entail new institutional arrangements and new forms of financing 
or providing subsidies at national and local levels. As a result of privatization, the 
minority-language news media too will become a commodity with a reputation 
for limited marketability and competitiveness in the media market and therefore 
with little prospect of viability and survival.  
In order to ensure in such conditions the exercise of the guaranteed right to 
public information in minority languages, to preserve or improve its quality and 
to render minority media sustainable, it is necessary to consider and establish on 
time new institutional arrangements and new sources and forms of financing. 
Other than calling for intervention in the sphere of public finance, which implies, 
among other things, diversifying the allocation of funds raised through obligatory 
subscription fees for the services of the public service broadcasting organization, 
the obligation to ensure public information in minority languages will also entail 
interventions in the sphere of fiscal policy at national and local levels.  
What matters is that the principle prohibiting the concentration of 
ownership should be implemented also regarding media which provide 
information in minority languages. However, the implementation of this principle 
in this sphere raises certain specific considerations reflected, for instance, in a far 
smaller number of media outlets, different institutional arrangements and lower 
democratic potentials within minorities. This imposes the need to search for 
special solutions as far as regulatory bodies and supervisory institutions are 
concerned. 
It is necessary to explore the potential for use of certain European standards 
in the sphere of information and new possibilities, such as cross-border television, 
community electronic media and so on, as tools for improving the quality of 
information in minority languages. Looked at in the medium term, digitalization, 
the use of blogs as a means of keeping the public informed and so on are also 
potentials that must be taken into consideration in planning the future of public 
information in minority languages, its growth and ways to ensure its viability.  
The state has a duty of providing an adequate legal framework for the 
exercise of the right to public information in minority languages as well as 
adequate financing conditions so that this right could be realized. It has a special 
duty of supervising the implementation of laws and other norms. However, the 
prime responsibility for the development of public information in minority 
languages today rests on the national councils for national minorities.  
One need also frame and implement a new coherent policy of public 
information in minority languages which would take into consideration the new 
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legal, political and economic circumstances which have a bearing on the exercise 
of the right to information in minority languages. This policy must be framed 
with the participation of the parliaments and governments of Serbia, the national 
councils for national minorities, the Council of the Broadcasting Agency, 
nongovernmental organizations and professionals and interested members of the 
public from within both minority and majority ranks. 
 
The Legal Framework,  
 
The right to receive information in one’s native language is guaranteed by 
various international instruments. It is regulated by legislation dealing with the 
sphere of minority rights, legislation regulating the provision of information itself 
and, in Serbia as a state undergoing transition, also by legislation regulating 
privatization. Legislation on information of members of Serbia’s national 
minorities in their respective native languages has changed over the past ten years 
or so. During this dynamic period the quality of information in minority 
languages has varied owing to resulting changes in the policy of financing 
minority language media and their administration, with frequent noticeable 
interference from the sphere of politics.  
The field of protection and exercise of national minority rights is regulated 
by two international instruments in particular, both ratified relatively recently: the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Regarding media 
freedom, the new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia provides in Article 50 that 
everyone may ‘…without obtaining permission, found a newspaper and other 
public media, in the manner envisaged by law.’ The constitutional provisions 
relating to the rights of members of national minorities include those regulating 
information: Article 79, which prescribes the right to the preservation of identity, 
guarantees persons belonging to national minorities the right to ‘full, timely and 
impartial public information in their [respective] languages, including the right to 
express, receive, impart and exchange information and ideas’, as well as the right 
to ‘establish their own public information media, in conformity with law.’ 
The normative provisions on the legal regulation of public information 
have been subject to frequent changes. As many as four laws on public 
information have been enacted in Serbia since 1990. As a result of such a state of 
affairs, a whole field of public information in minority languages in Serbia had 
largely been undeveloped in legal terms, and there was room for all kinds of ad-
hoc solutions, manipulation and checks on the process of exercise of this right. 
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The Law on Public Information is the principal piece of legislation 
regulating this matter. From the point of view of the exercise of national minority 
rights, Article 5 is of significance because it imposes on the Republic, the 
autonomous province and local self-government the duty of providing part of the 
resources or other conditions necessary for the work of public media 
organizations which publish or broadcast in national minority languages. Another 
important provision stipulates that while a public media organization may be 
founded any domestic or foreign legal or natural person, it cannot be founded 
either directly or indirectly by the state or a territorial autonomy, nor by an 
institution, company or other legal person under majority ownership by the state, 
or by one which is wholly or partially financed from public revenue. 
Another piece of legislation of crucial importance is the Law on 
Broadcasting. It provides that the public service broadcasters have the duty of 
‘ensuring satisfaction of the needs of the citizens for programme content reflecting 
the cultural identity both of peoples and of national minorities and/or ethnic 
groups, making it possible for them to follow particular programmes or thematic 
programme groups, in the areas where they live and work, in their native 
language and script.’  
The question of media privatization is also of relevance in the context of the 
exercise of the right of national minorities to public information in their respective 
native languages. The Law on Public Information namely specifies that public 
media must be privatized within three years of the law entering into force, but 
this time limit ran out on 30 April 2006. As to the radio and television stations, 
their privatization must be carried out by the end of 2007, in conformity with the 
Law on Broadcasting. The transfer of the print media founding rights to the 
national councils for national minorities should encourage search for stable 
sources of financing as well as help create prerequisites and institutional 
arrangements for regulatory bodies in order to reduce the influence of certain 
centres of power within minority communities on media editorial policy, 
something yet to be realized. 
 
Media Production in Minority Languages  
 
Persons belonging to national minorities exercise their right to public 
information in their respective native languages through access to various media 
products. Formally viewed, these products may differ according to their status 
(separate or parts of a larger whole in another, mostly Serbian language), scope of 
content (larger or smaller number of items of information in the minority 
language), frequency (daily, on workdays, weekly, fortnightly, monthly, quarterly 
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and even annually) and specific purpose (reporting on events of local, regional or 
broadest social importance; or events from the field of culture and tradition of a 
particular minority; or events of a religious nature; or content intended for a 
narrow target group such as children or youth).  
The data we are presenting in this report pertain to the situation during 
2004, 2006 and 2006. During this period, members of Serbia’s national minorities 
had access to 164 media products in their respective native languages produced 
by 101 media organizations. Of these, media products in electronic form were 
more numerous than those in print form. There are 38 print media in Serbia, of 
which 34 are in Vojvodina and only four in central Serbia. Radio programmes in 
minority languages are broadcast by 86 stations: 74 in Vojvodina and 12 in central 
Serbia. Television programmes are broadcast by 32 channels: 27 in Vojvodina and 
five in central Serbia. Eight cable television channels broadcast programmes in 
two minority languages: seven in Hungarian and one in Slovak. There is only one 
registered news web portal, and it is in Hungarian.  
Nineteen print media, 12 radio stations and three TV stations in Serbia 
produce 34 products only in national minority languages. The majority of 
minority media outlets (nine) operate in the Hungarian language: eight 
newspapers and one radio station. Members of the Rusyn, Croatian, Ukrainian, 
Bulgarian and Bunjevac minorities have one media product in print form each.  
 
Situation in the Sphere of Minority Public Information  
 
Media establishments carrying on these activities are very diverse, ranging 
from religious communities and nongovernmental organizations to private 
institutions to cultural-informative and specialized media. Of course, these 
establishments also differ in terms of size, state of development and capacity. Our 
survey covers only those media organizations which are primarily concerned with 
providing regular (and relatively) comprehensive information of general interest 
in a minority language, that is, 72 media establishments with 112 media products 
in minority languages. The survey was conducted during March, April and May 
2006 and encompassed about 75 per cent of minority-language media products 
throughout Serbia. 
The majority of media establishments have the status of public institutions, 
those in private ownership being the second most numerous. The least numerous 
are those founded by ‘citizens’ associations, that is, by nongovernmental organi-
zations. The survey established that these media are not interlinked, more than 
half are not members of professional and/or business associations, and as many as 
two-thirds have no strategic partnership with any entity in the media sphere. 
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Half of these media establishments operate in rented premises. Their 
technical-technological conditions of work are not very satisfactory either. Media 
production in minority languages depends largely on foreign grants, in this 
particular case on regular subventions by appropriate government bodies and less 
so on market income. Resources in the form of donations do not exceed 10 per 
cent of the income. The most frequent sources of donations are international 
donor organizations (e.g. Fund for an Open Society, European Agency for 
Reconstruction) and Diaspora funds in kin-states.  
Journalists account for most of the staff of Serbia’s minority-language me-
dia. Most of them (just under 48 per cent) are secondary school graduates. The 
next most numerous group (just over 32 per cent) are journalists with university 
quailfications. Two-year post-secondary school qualifications are possessed by 18 
per cent, with the rest having no secondary school qualifications. In terms of age, 
most of the employees (48 per cent) are between 35 and 55 years old. The next 
most numerous group (31 per cent) are those over 55 years, and there are at least 
21 per cent of those under 35 years of age. Such a state of human resources in the 
field of public information in minority languages cannot be described as favo-
urable.  
Cases of advanced professional training of journalists were rarely 
registered. Fewer than half the journalists employed by these media 
establishments (41 per cent) are members of a professional journalist association. 
The fact that most of the media establishments are not prepared for privatization 
gives rise to concern: some 30 per cent of those surveyed have no privatization 
plan whatever.  
The media products in minority languages are monoethnic to a significant 
degree, with 70-80 per cent of the coverage devoted to events from own 
community. Events concerning the majority nation are covered to a greater extent 
(20-25 per cent) than those concerning other minorities (5 per cent).  
 
 
Dubravka VALIC NEDELJKOVIC 
MULTICULTURALITY IN PROGRAMMES OF VOJVODINA’S  
PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE 
 
This paper presents results obtained by quantitative-qualitative analysis of 
broadcasting programmes in six languages (Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak, Roma-
nian, Rusyn and Romany) of the Broadcasting Institution of Vojvodina (RUV) du-
ring three monitoring periods (September 2006 - January 2007), its focus being on 
the presence/absence of multicultural content in the public service provided, gi-
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ven that this media establishment’s mission is precisely to support minority cultu-
res and communities and promote them through majority and minority language 
programmes, as well as to support multiculturality as a model of community 
living in Vojvodina. The analysis includes a number of results obtained by the 
method of in-depth group conversation which relate directly to the 
presence/absence of a multicultural content in Vojvodina's public broadcasting 
service. The chief finding is that such content is lacking both in the majority 
language programme and in those broadcast in the national minority languages. 
The recommendation for good practice is for the RUV to invest serious effort into 
long- and short-term planning of programmes featuring multiculturalism as a 
topic at all levels – informative, educational and entertaining.  
KEY WORDS: Multiculturality, tolerance, hate speech, stereotypes, public 
broadcasting service, media in national minority languages.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Theoretical Framework  
 
In lexicographical literature, multiculturality is defined as ‘interfusion and 
coexistence of several cultures, of several forms of cultural life in an environment 
or state’, and multicultural as a term ‘relating to several cultures which 
encompasses the cultures of several distinct peoples’ (Klajn and Šipka, 2006: 799).  
In professional literature this concept has been interpreted in a number of 
ways and considered from many points of view. Thus, for instance, in his 
afterword to Semprini’s study of multiculturalism on the example of the United 
States as prototypal for testing and contemplating the concept on an ideological 
level as well as the level of everyday politics, Branimir Stojković (1999, 147) writes 
that ‘multiculturalism is an idea or an ideal of the harmonious coexistence of 
diverse ethnic and cultural groups within a pluralist society.’ In the same text, 
Stojković adds that the ‘necessary prerequisite for a multicultural society is a 
common civic culture based on the recognition of the fundamental institutions of 
the legal and economic system, as well as on the right to cultural diversity’ 
(Afterword, Stojković: Semprini, 1999, 147).  
Journalists concerned with this phenomenon in particular may find rele-
vance in the reasoning of Pascal Zachary, who points out in the introduction to his 
work The Diversity Advantage (2003: XXV) that multiculturalism is a concept with 
numerous meanings, implying, in addition to the usual diversity of language and 
culture in relation to the majority community, citizenship as a legitimate status of 
minority communities, as well as identifying the need for special legislation, 
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institutions and social policy in order to overcome the barriers and ensure the full 
participation of minorities in society (2003: XXV). Pascal Zachary also asks a 
number of questions which journalists too may find very stimulating: Which type 
of multiculturalism? In whose name? Which laws support assimilation without 
understanding the identity of minority communities? Which laws are protective 
of minorities or local groups to such an extent as to make their members bitter, 
stigmatized and only reluctantly seen as part of the majority community? What is 
the view of some minority representatives of the disappearance of once-distinct 
inter-ethnic boundaries? Do those who are obliterating these boundaries think 
that they are turning their backs on their own people? Do the guardians of 
multiculturalism strive to preserve the integrity of the different groups, or do they 
defend the freedom of individuals to enter into variegated ethno-racial 
affiliations? The multiculturalists are self-satisfied with the diversity – instead of 
the American melting pot, which is gone, there exists rather an ever-changing 
alliance between individuals and groups, says Pascal Zachary (2003: XXVII). He 
argues that one should adopt new terms in order to define the phenomenon more 
appropriately, namely ‘mongrel’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘cosmopolitan’.  
Ethnoanthropologists will be more inclined to name this phenomenon 
‘aculturation’ and ‘cultural contact’. For example, Redfield, Litton and Herskowitz 
(as cited in Giordano, 2001: 8) say that Aculturation comprises those phenomena 
that occur when groups or individuals that belong to different cultures come into 
direct contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural pattern in one of 
the groups or in both. On the other hand, Fortis (according to the same author) 
argues that cultural contact must be viewed as a continuous process of interaction 
between groups with different cultures (Giordano, 2001: 8).  
Many authors, including those cited previously, share the view that 
misunderstanding in inter-cultural communication is a rule rather than an 
exception, both in distant and very close communication but more so in the 
second. As this is often conditioned by historical events which add to cultural 
differentiation, one may actually conclude that multicultural relations as a rule are 
not harmonic (Giordano, 2001: 39). For this reason the role of the media in such 
communities is exceptionally important: while it can contribute to the 
development of tolerance and community harmonization, it can also deepen the 
gap between the minority and the majority by encouraging stereotypes about 
minority cultures and therefore contribute to ‘meetings of cultures with no 
understanding’. The way the media will operate will depend greatly on the 
politics-media relationship, legislation, rule of law, development and level of 
professional and ethnical standards achieved in the media sector.  
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Although tolerance is a concept which is almost three centuries old, many 
believe that it was engendered by the 20th century in the aftermath of the two 
major wars. The modern view is that tolerance is an ‘essential part of a society in 
which every individual could lead an independent existence and an inseparable 
part of the idea that each personality in itself is worthy of respect; or, a necessary 
implication of the requirement that the state should be based on justice and be 
neutral towards the various concepts of good’ (Krstić, 2004: 137). Without 
tolerance of otherness and difference there can actually be no multiculturally 
organized society, a society in which media would be a channel of communication 
which provides information free from stereotypes and prejudice. The crucial 
thing, however, is where to draw the line, that is, the question whether limitless 
tolerance may degenerate into anarchy and even encourage violence through 
failure to act. The foregoing also suggests who should draw the line which a 
democratic society must not cross in tolerating extremes and how this should be 
done. Modern theoretical thought makes the determination of limits relative to 
the context, also taking into consideration that the community must be aware of 
the fact that the limits are not determined once and for all and that the question of 
‘moderation’ is crucial to making such decisions. In discussing the question of 
limits, Davis argues quite plausibly (as cited in Krstić, 2001, and Primorac, 1989) 
that since society must restrict liberties, there must exist an ‘economy of liberty’ 
which is necessarily an ‘economy of want’ since the clamour for liberties exceeds 
that which society can afford. This implies the necessity of drawing up a ‘budget 
of liberty” which, Davis believes, could quantify with precision such items as 
tolerance of liberty, quantity of diversity, rate of change and the effects of that on 
social disintegration (Krstić, 2004: 145).  
It appears that societies in transition are not yet fully agreed on the problem 
of tolerance, the absence of which is at its most pronounced in the media sector. 
There is no clear will for that either in the political or economic sphere, or in the 
media sphere. The tabloidization of the media sphere, including the public 
broadcasting service, ensures ‘no preconditions for the media representation of 
minority groups in society, while at the same time striving to make the reader 
passive by applying the principles of servility and pandering’ (Kanižaj, 2006: 24). 
States undergoing transition (van Cuilenburg, 1999) are distinguished by 
considerable media expansion and aggressive, unfair competition. In such 
unregulated media sectors, the plurality of media is a smokescreen for flooding 
the market with programmes which differ from one another only in terms of 
visual presentation, constants and form. So, plurality is no guarantee of diversity.  
The tabloidization not only of the press but of electronic media including 
the public broadcasting service (e.g., RTS talk shows with guests quarrelling all 
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the time) is both a media and essentially a social phenomenon supportive of 
evasive journalism focusing on matters ordinarily unconnected with the public 
sphere, e.g., sex scandals, touching human interest and bizarre world-of-crime 
stories …offering a ready-made framework for interpreting social and political 
reality in the shape of individual and personal motives and reactions (...) This 
fragmentation and trivialization of the complex social reality (…) reduces the 
ability of the public to impart sense to events and to think and act rationally 
(McNair, as cited in Kanižaj, 2006: 22).  
The total simplification of the media content does not leave room for cause-
and-effect considerations of questions of public interest including multiculturality 
and marginalized groups (national minorities being one of the most prominent 
among these). The emphasis is on sensationalism, dramatic quality, conflict, 
deviant behaviour inappropriate in a civil society. A minority group makes it to 
the daily newscast only if such a quality or activity is recognized and considered 
by the editor as newsworthy.  
In other words, media in transition societies for the most part ignore the 
problems of minorities except where these problems are the subject matter of a 
crime discourse. The selection of news items from the information source to the 
editor follows an internal implicit rather than an explicit logic and has a crucial 
bearing on the way reality is portrayed. While reality is exceptionally complex – 
based as it is on history, abstraction, discontinuity, irregularity, complex 
relationships and different views of the reality – the media logic rests on the 
concrete, the fragmentary, slices of life, selling the news story, and that without 
being able to present the background of an event. This is contrary to the logic of 
everyday life (Altheide-Snow, 1979, as cited in Kanižaj, 2006: 29).The 
deconstruction of that logic is the object of analyzing the discourse of the media 
content. This survey, too, uses its highly effective technique in the quantitative-
qualitative content analysis. 
Media in general and the public broadcasting service in particular are 
expected to exercise responsibility in the selection of topics to be treated, the 
placement of particular items in the programme schedule, the importance to be 
attached to a topic by means of specific mechanisms and, lastly, the effect of all 
this on the citizens’ assessment of the performance of public sphere actors. Being 
responsible for the choice made is the essence of ethical journalism, which implies 
not only rights but also obligations above all for a responsible attitude towards an 
item of information in respect of both the source and the recipient. Responsibility 
implies freedom of choice on the part of the journalist and the audience as indivi-
duals in both these case, as citizens of an open society, for today the citizen finds 
his chief stronghold in the sphere of civil society, and this is why one of their chief 
119 
tasks consists in protecting the autonomy of civil society and opposing from that 
stronghold threats (as well as real menaces) made not only by the state but by the 
market as well (Ridden and Turner, 2000: 144-145: as cited in Molnar, 2004: 33-34). 
Another question that arises is whether responsibility can be a moral 
recommendation to be followed unquestioningly according to instructions from a 
given list of good practices recommendations, or whether responsibility should be 
considered from the point of view of contextual conditionality, merely implying 
sufficient openness to the others and the different. One also wonders whether 
responsibility can give a feeling of self-rectitude or moral superiority or whether, 
to the contrary, it gives rise to anxiety that a decision was not quite correct or well 
balanced and that something else might have been better, something journalists 
will identify as a most frequent feeling even in their everyday practice as 
reporters.  
It should be borne in mind that the system of public service communication 
implies that decisions are based on preferences which are not eternal and which 
are themselves the product of conscious and deliberate confrontations of several 
opposing points of view (Keene, 1995: 131). This approach can help expose the 
hidden socio-economic and political forces which manipulate the public definition 
of risk according to their own narrow interests (…) in this way the public service 
media could help the public to embrace sober strategies for reducing or 
eliminating serious risks, according to Keene (1995: 130). In doing so the media 
could benefit greatly from the established democratic decision-making procedures 
which imply the right to say things some would not like to hear, but also the right 
to further consider and reconsider the options on the table.  
In the media sector there exist various aids designed to facilitate more 
realistic decision-making. One of them is M*A*S, standing for Claude-Jean 
Bertrand’s media accountability systems. M*A*S, according to its author, has a 
threefold aim, namely to help the journalist to serve the public better; to help 
them to form a profession and improve its standards; and to recover public trust 
in order to be able to resist political and economic pressure. The systems are 
developed in three areas. The first comprises texts and documents; the second are 
people (individuals and groups); and the third processes (short- or long-term). 
The inventory of written documents comprises 41 elements including general and 
specific codes of ethics, readers’ letters, blogs, web pages for example offering 
journalists information and advice on accountability promotion 
(www.ifj.org/regions), websites presenting foreign media coverage of the country 
with translated articles (e.g. Watching America), annual collections of newspaper 
reviews drawn up by reporters or media users and edited by academics. The 
second group comprises individuals or groups and presents 44 possibilities 
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including an in-house contents evaluation commission; an ethics committee: an 
outside critic paid by a newspaper to write regular columns about the paper; a 
consumer reporter who warns readers/viewers against misleading advertising; an 
ombudsman; a complaints bureau; journalist unions; a panel of readers; a radio 
club, to listen together and debate issues; national, regional and local press 
councils; media monitoring; an NGO for training the personnel; a journalists’ 
association; a government media office or a parliamentary commission… The last 
segment, the processes, comprises 28 variables. The recommendations in this 
regard are, firstly, to employ only staff with university degrees; all journalists and 
editors must attend professional ethics courses; further education of journalists; 
databases; a ‘media literacy’ campaign to educate the public against media lack of 
ethics and triviality; regular public opinion polls; international cooperation; 
regular conferences organized by journalists to discuss matters concerning the 
functioning of the media sector; awards and credits. Another classification of 
M*A*S depends on who is involved and the author suggests a division into 
internal (self-regulation proper, quality control in the narrow sense); external 
(accountability can be applied to the media without their consent); and 
cooperative (the whole media sector can join together for quality control). 
The Republic Broadcasting Agency issued in June 2007 a Generally Binding 
Instruction on the conduct of broadcasters in conformity with Article 12 (5) of the 
Broadcasting Law. In the chapter titled General Programme Standards, paragraph 
6) alone prohibits discrimination on account of sex, race and ethnic, religious, 
social or national affiliation. While even prescribing that television and the public 
broadcasting service in particular must ensure that persons featured in 
programmes must look and be dressed decently, the instruction does not address 
the issues of hate speech, discrimination and obligatory protection of minorities 
and/or minority and regional languages with due seriousness and in sufficient 
depth. Such lack of elements does not facilitate decision-making by editorial 
management and journalists in everyday media practice. While this may at first 
sight appear as a way of encouraging media independence, a public consensus 
must be reached on the limits of tolerance regarding public utterances carried by 
the media, bearing in mind that there must be clear limits to tolerance if the 
community really wants to follow the principles observed by democratically-
minded civil societies.  
Hate speech can also be regarded as engineered misunderstandings as part 
of a strategy of achieving dominion. Rather than consisting merely in imparting 
discriminatory messages brimming with stereotypes and prejudices about the 
others and the different, it aims at excluding the minorities from public life. By the 
same token, failure to impart any information can also be considered part of a 
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strategy sharing the goals of hate speech, namely exclusion of minority 
communities by denying them representation in public discourse. This means 
ignoring the minorities as such and their problems and failure to promote 
minority cultures and public use of regional and minority languages by means of 
the media. Although hate speech is a matter regulated by both media legislation 
in Serbia and professional codes of journalistic ethics, the strategy of integration is 
not fully defined.  
At present, the implementation is unsystematic and there are no 
mechanisms in particular concerned with the identification and penalization of 
omission or, more correctly, of the failure to inform the public.  
 
1.1.1. International and Domestic Legislation  
 
A precondition for the exercise of all cultural rights is the right to participate in 
cultural life, a right belonging to the fundamental rights of national minorities as 
the ‘right to the protection of their group cultural identity’ (Dimitrijević, 1999: 
126).  
 This right is closely linked with the right to freedom of expression, which 
implies seeking, receiving, using and disseminating information and ideas, 
regardless of frontiers, by any means including the mass media. This right 
involves various obligations of the state authorities including regulating and 
assisting the operation of media in national minority languages in environments 
in which they predominate.  
In countries establishing democratic processes only now, as is the case with 
Serbia, that is, countries where democratic laws are not fully established or 
enforced in everyday practice, ‘media are the only controller of government and 
the only link between that government and those who elected that government in 
a supposedly democratic way (Pešić, 2003: 37). It is therefore very important that 
such a role of the media should have a foundation in both international 
instruments and domestic legislation. 
Both international and domestic law regulates this area thoroughly at 
several levels.  
 The foundation is rooted in the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) with Article 19 providing for the freedom of thought and expression 
and for media freedom. The European Convention on Human Rights, in Article 
10, also specifies that everyone has the right to freedom of expression including 
freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas. The 
Treaty on European Union lays down, in Article II-71, that media freedom and 
plurality are to be respected. This fundamental piece of legislation includes the 
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prohibition of discrimination and hate speech. Hate speech is usually regarded as 
the dissemination of information based on racial, ethnic, national or religious 
discrimination, as hatred of and violence against any race and/or group of people 
of a different nation, religion or colour.  
The ‘first floor’ of international standards in the media sphere relates to 
freedom of disseminating information and protection from discrimination and, 
above all, from hate speech as already defined. There are many international 
instruments which define hate speech and prohibit discrimination in general and 
in the media in particular. The Council of Europe Declaration on the Freedom of 
Expression and Information states in IIIc. that the member states are resolved ‘to 
promote the free flow of information, thus contributing to international 
understanding, a better knowledge of convictions and traditions, respect for the 
diversity of opinions and the mutual enrichment of cultures’ (Tatalović, 2004: 11). 
According to the resource pack Achieving Media Responsibility in Multicultural 
Societies (2006: 14) the relevant provisions are included in Article 3 of the UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), 
Articles 20 and 26 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966), Article 4 of the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article II-81of the EU Treaty (2004), Article 7 of 
the COE European Convention on Transfrontier Television (1989, amended 1998), 
Article 22a of the EU Television Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive (1989, 1998).  
The ‘second floor’ consists of international instruments protecting minority 
rights, the Council of Europe being the most active institution in this regard, 
adopting in 1995 the most important related document, the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Minorities’ access to the 
media is a major test of the protection of minority rights and the democratic 
organization of a country. Article 9 of this Convention lays down the 
fundamentals of minority rights in the media sector. 
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that the right to freedom of expression 
of every person belonging to a national minority includes freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas in the minority language, without 
interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. The Parties shall 
ensure, within the framework of their legal systems, that persons belonging to a 
national minority are not discriminated against in their access to the media. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent Parties from requiring the licensing, without 
discrimination and based on objective criteria, of sound radio and television 
broadcasting, or cinema enterprises. 
3. The Parties shall not hinder the creation and the use of printed media by 
persons belonging to national minorities. In the legal framework of sound radio and 
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television broadcasting, they shall ensure, as far as possible, and taking into account 
the provisions of paragraph 1, that persons belonging to national minorities are 
granted the possibility of creating and using their own media. 
4. In the framework of their legal systems, the Parties shall adopt adequate 
measures in order to facilitate access to the media for persons belonging to national 
minorities and in order to promote tolerance and permit plurality of cultures.  
Another exceptionally important instrument is the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages. Article 11 of this instrument is crucial for the 
creation of minority media policy.  
The relevant standards are established by these international instruments. 
The first standard is that national minorities must have access to all media 
without discrimination, that they must be able freely and without any restrictions 
to receive and impart information regardless of frontiers and political government 
in power.  
The second right, also specified by our domestic legislation (notably the 
Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of the National Minorities in 
the Republic of Serbia, as well as the package of media laws of the Republic of 
Serbia) is the right of national minorities to establish their own media and to 
manage them independently, while the third right laid down by the Framework 
Convention is actually the obligation of the state to facilitate access to national 
minority representatives and public information media. This then relates to public 
broadcasting services. The purpose of this provision is to enable minorities to 
participate in the editorial policies and the preparation of programmes of public 
broadcasting services. As this was not fully understood and abided by by all 
countries, the Council of Europe subsequently issued commentaries and 
recommendations regarding precisely this Article, recommending all the 
countries signatories of the Framework Convention to finance separately 
programmes in national minority languages and programmes about national 
minorities made in the majority language. In other words, informing the 
minorities about each other in their respective languages and informing the 
majority about the problems and life of the national minorities is of equal 
importance. It is precisely in this second segment that Serbia’s media scene is 
insufficiently developed and democratically immature. So, it is not enough to pay 
lip service to the right of national minorities to be kept informed, it is necessary to 
provide money among other things to support such information. It is stated 
expressly that additional financial resources are to be provided for national 
minority media given that their operation calls for supplementary funding and 
entails extra costs.  
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What other conventions omit and the Charter underscores is the need to 
provide continued education of minority language and minority media journalists 
to bring them up to the standards of their colleagues employed by other media, a 
necessity also pointed out in the OSCE Recommendations for Serbia and 
Montenegro issued at the time the State Union still existed in 2003.  
The third level relates to cultural diversity and is still being developed as 
part of international legislation. In 2001, UNESCO adopted the Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity which deals with the subject only very 
generally and states the following objectives: 
- encouraging digital literacy 
- promoting linguistic diversity in the cyberspace 
- encouraging production, preservation and dissemination of diversified 
cultural goods through the media  
- global informative networks 
- promoting the role of public broadcasting services in developing 
audiovisual production of goods of high professional quality (Achieving media 
responsibility in multicultural societies; 2006:18).  
 Domestic legislation too defines this sphere in a very detailed manner. The 
Broadcasting Law, 2002 (Article 21, ‘Suppression of Hate Speech’, Article 68 ‘Basic 
Broadcaster Obligations in Respect of Programme Content’, Article 77 ‘Achieving 
Public Interest in the Public Broadcasting Service Sector’, Article 78 ‘Public Service 
Broadcasters’ Obligations in Achieving Public Interest’, especially paragraphs 2, 3, 
4, 5, 10 and 11, as well as in the Law on Public Information, 2003 (Article 38 
‘Prohibition of Hate Speech’), the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 2006 
(Article 14 ‘Protection of National Minorities’, Article 21 ‘Prohibition of 
Discrimination’, Article 79 ‘Freedom of Thought and Expression’), Article 48 
‘Encouraging Respect for Diversity’, Article 79 ‘Right to the Preservation of 
Identity’, Article 81 ‘Developing a Spirit of Tolerance’), provide for developing a 
spirit of intercultural dialogue in the media, prevent hate speech, and enable all 
living throughout the country to receive and impart information through by 
means of public information media.  
However, media theory and media legislation are still to come up with a 
clear definition as to what is meant by the notion of ‘national minority media’ 
and, in this connection, to offer mechanisms for the realization of media diversity 
and multicultural approach in creating media policy.  
The question still remains, first of all, whether national minority media are: 
(a) only those media outlets which are fully established and programmed in 
a national minority language and recruit their administrative and technological 
personnel from the national minority in question (such as the newspaper 
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publishing houses Hlas Ludu, Magyar Szó, Ruske Slovo, Libertatea); or whether 
they are also  
(b) those media which earmark only part of their ‘space’ or ‘air time’ for 
programmes in a national minority language or languages and engage for this 
purpose journalists from minority communities working as part of their own 
autonomous desks (such as the Radio televizija Novi Sad public service which has 
six national minority language desks as well as a whole majority-language desk 
and administration, Zrenjaninske novine with a page in Hungarian and Romanian, 
and Kikindske with a page in Hungarian edited by ethnic Hungarian journalists); 
or whether one may also regard as minority media  
(c) majority-language media which translate into national minority 
languages and publish or broadcast only part of their own output without 
engaging journalists from the communities in question (like the BETA national 
minority language service and Radio Niš news broadcasts in Bulgarian); whether 
these include 
(d) media established as multiethnic desks with productions in different 
languages fit into a single programme (like Multiradio of Radio 021 NS); or 
whether minority media can be thought of as including  
(e) those not designated exclusively as ‘linguistic’ and ‘ethnic’ but (also) 
‘racial’ or ‘religious’?  
Public broadcasting services in countries of South East Europe recognize 
two standards as far as media and minorities are concerned: 
- broadcasting information on multiculturality and national minorities 
prepared by journalists from the majority nation for a majority-language 
audience; 
- broadcasting information on multiculturality and national minorities 
prepared by journalists from minority communities for minority-language 
audiences.  
The first model is of limited scope and stereotyped perspective and does 
not fully meet the information needs of individual national and especially 
linguistic minorities.  
As regards the second model, its real threat is ghettoization, the shutting 
oneself off inside one’s native-language media and therefore limited access to the 
leading media establishments and prime-time slots. On the other hand, the 
majority believes that in this particular case it has solved the problem and fulfilled 
the requirements laid down in the international instruments it has ratified in 
order to become part of the democratic world. The essence of multiculturality is 
not achieved in this way, especially because the slots earmarked for minorities by 
electronic media, including the public broadcasting service, are for the most part 
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filled with folklore themes such as preparing traditional ethnic dishes, thereby 
reinforcing the widely-held stereotype that national costume, national cuisine and 
national folk music are the chief distinguishing features of a minority. On the 
strength of the foregoing, one should not draw the conclusion that the existence of 
national minority language programmes is not to the advantage of the national 
minorities concerned; rather, encouraging high-quality national minority 
language programmes and providing their regular translation into the majority 
language and broadcasting in prime-time slots on radio and television, 
particularly those of the public broadcasting service, is of great importance for the 
promotion of multiculturality. ‘If we really want to become open societies in 
which everyone can feel at home – and there is no reason why ethnic minorities 
should not feel that way, especially those in the southeast part of Europe – then 
the “mainstream”, that is , the majority programme, must open itself to the 
minorities. (...) So, instead of referring to minorities only in a political context, on 
the eve of elections and wars, and instead of identifying by nationality only 
criminals belonging to a minority, television stations, especially public ones, 
ought to bear this in mind while creating their “news agenda”. After all, 
everybody finds himself in a situation of being in the minority. One ought to bear 
this in mind, too. So, for a start, one should look at the world through the eyes of 
the other person. For, to that other person, we are the others.’ (Pešić, 2003: 42.) 
Minority audiences consider, according to a survey referred to in Achieving 
Media Responsibility in Multicultural Societies (2006: 39), that good national 
minority programming should achieve three objectives: 
- to inform, 
- to develop and shape a minority culture, 
- to educate. 
In this regard, a combined model can be considered a good practice.  
With a view to developing plurality of cultures and encouraging tolerance 
and non-discriminatory media discourse, possible recommendations for 
promoting media multiculturality and supporting national minority media would 
be based, above all, on improving and enforcing the legislation already in force, 
encouraging media self-regulation, empowering public broadcasters, organizing 
awareness-raising training for journalists on minority affairs and multiculturality 
issues, and cooperation between the public broadcaster and others, especially 
regional and local media, including minority communities and the 
nongovernmental and governmental sectors. Providing translation of minority 
language programmes for the general public which uses the majority language as 
its common means of communication is especially important.  
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1.1.2. Transforming RTV Novi Sad into Vojvodina’s  
Public Broadcasting Service 
 
The Law on Broadcasting provides for restructuring Radiotelevizija Srbije 
as a state-centric media organization into two public services: Broadcasting 
Institution of Vojvodina (RUV) with a registered office in Novi Sad and 
Broadcasting Institution of Serbia with a registered office in Belgrade, an 
undertaking completed in 2006 as far as the formal prerequisites are concerned.  
RTV (RUV) inherited a radio and TV programme schedule comprising 
broadcasts in as many as eight languages, including the majority language and 
national minority languages (Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Rusyn, Romany, 
Croatian, Ukrainian). RTV has desks for programmes in Serbian, Hungarian, 
Slovak, Romanian, Rusyn and Romany as integrated units structured as sectors. 
RTV has occasional broadcasts in Croatian and Ukrainian, and sometimes in 
German, that are prepared by individuals or by independent producers. All this 
complicates the position in the wider community of this major media 
establishment with a half-century tradition. In a process of transformation, 
multilingualism calls for serious thought to be given to the framing or creating of 
programme schemes which focus on multiculturalism or interculturality (a higher 
level of respect for and observance and practice of multilingualism and tolerance) 
as the principal way to strengthen the ‘Vojvodina identity’, a chief reason for the 
existence of the Provincial Broadcasting Institution. Mutual respect in these 
regions rests on knowledge of and information about the cultures of all the 
national communities inhabiting Vojvodina. The province’s public broadcasting 
service therefore has the task above all of promoting intercommunal tolerance 
precisely through the majority and national minority language programmes as a 
common asset for accepting and understanding diversity.  
It is worth noting that the Broadcasting Institution of Vojvodina broadcasts 
programmes using three frequency networks. One serves programmes in Serbian, 
another those in Hungarian, and the third programmes in the Slovak, Romanian, 
Rusyn, Ukrainian, Romany and Bunjevac languages. Owing to lack of adequate 
equipment, Banat and Bačka are very poorly covered by the second and third 
frequencies respectively. Specifically, the programme in the Bunjevac language 
cannot be heard in the area of Subotica, where the minority lives, and that in 
Romany in the greater part of Vojvodina. It should also be pointed out that RUV 
radio programmes at this moment (spring 2007) do not conform to the statutory 
minimum of 92 per cent for signal coverage of the territory of Vojvodina. The TV 
programme is broadcast on two channels. The first is reserved for the majority 
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language and the second shared by all the national minority languages as well as 
used part of the time for rebroadcasts of RUV Channel 1 programmes.  
RUV launched its own transformation process in the second half of 2006 in 
very unfavourable circumstances: it had no premises of its own (the Televizija No-
vi Sad building having been destroyed during the NATO air strikes in 1999) and 
very modest technical potential and, by far the most serious problem, personnel 
capacity, given that the transformation of the state-centric radio and television 
networks into public broadcasting services was preceded by rationalization of 
business operations including an offer to all the employees of a ‘welfare 
programme’ regardless of whether their professional skills were indispensable to 
the operation of the organization. The unselective welfare programme brought 
about a total collapse of operation, crippling especially the minority language 
desks of Radiotelevizija Novi Sad. This called into question the realization of 
programmes of the Public Broadcasting Service of Vojvodina and therefore its 
mission of developing information services in national minority languages.  
In view of the deterioration of the majority language and especially of 
national minority language programmes over the years, the management and the 
editorial and journalistic staff in particular are expected to address the framing 
and programming of both informative and educational and entertainment content 
in a systematic manner, as well as to create a new identity for Vojvodina’s public 
broadcasting service with focus on the fostering of multiculturalism, among other 
things. In order to achieve this, a thorough renewal of personnel and the raising of 
professional and technical standards is necessary.  
This study outlines the situation prior to and the initial steps taken during 
the transformation process as well as suggestions about improving and speeding 
up the process.  
 
1.2. The Method and Corpus  
 
1.2.1. The Method 
 
Analysis of the media discourse was the primary method of monitoring. 
Two techniques were employed: (a) quantitative-qualitative content analysis and 
(b) in-depth group conversation.  
(a) The quantitative-qualitative content analysis used a code comprising the 
basic information (media outlet, day of the week, programme, ordinal number 
and length of news item) including the coding of genre, topic, actor, information 
source, audio/visual presentation, occasion, location, news item author, subject, 
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subject personalization, explicit intertextuality, actors, actor personalization, 
actors value context.  
The analysis unit was, according to Emanuel Schegloff, communicational, 
namely the statement. To recall, according to Schegloff, determining the analysis 
unit, which must correspond to the nature of that being researched, is an 
important stage of methods and techniques determination in analyzing media 
discourse. Since we are here dealing with two monitoring cycles (first and third), 
a quantitative-qualitative analysis of the content of RUV’s main news and current 
affairs programmes (CIPE), the unit of analysis chosen was ‘the statement’, or 
more precisely the single item from the time of its announcement to the moment it 
is signed off. The same principle was applied to the second monitoring period 
covering so-called collage or slow-moving programmes.  
(b) The in-depth group conversation (focus groups), as a supplement to the 
quantitative-qualitative method of content analysis, was organized in December 
2006 in six languages and focused on the researchers’ most important questions. 
The discussion was semi-structured, necessitating an active role on the part of the 
moderators, who were themselves experts on the topic, cultural code and 
language.  
 
1.2.2. The Corpus 
 
The monitoring of programmes of the Broadcasting Institution of 
Vojvodina RTV – Vojvodina’s public broadcasting service in the majority and 
national minority languages – was carried out in three cycles from September 
2006 to January 2007.  
- The first monitoring cycle covering news contents in the main news and 
current affairs programmes (CIPE) took place from 18 to 24 September 2006. 
- The second monitoring cycle covering news and cultural-educational 
content took place from 6 to 12 November 2006. 
- The third cycle focusing on information content in relation to the election 
campaign took place from 12 to 18 January 2007.  
Each cycle involved the monitoring of seven days of radio and TV 
programmes in the Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak, Rusyn, Romanian and Romany 
languages.  
The first cycle covered a total of 73 main news and current affairs 
programmes and the second news, education and entertainment programmes in 
the majority and all minority languages for an average of three hours a day.  
The third cycle, following the model used in the first, covered news 
programmes with focus on the Serbian parliamentary elections campaign.  
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2. Analysis of Empirical Material  
 
2.1. Introductory remarks  
 
In this section we wish to present the findings obtained by quantitative-
qualitative analysis of programmes in six languages (Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak, 
Romanian, Rusyn and Romany) of the Broadcasting Institution of Vojvodina, with 
emphasis on the presence/absence of multicultural content in the public service 
provided, given that this media establishment’s mission is precisely to support 
minority cultures and communities and to promote multiculturality through 
majority and minority language programmes as a model of coexistence in 
Vojvodina. The analysis includes a number of results obtained by in-depth group 
conversation which relate directly to the presence/absence of multicultural 
content in Vojvodina’s public broadcasting service.  
The results relate exclusively to the period from September 2006 to January 
2007, that is, the time the RUV management began to take stock of the state of 
affairs inherited and to plan the transformation of this state-centric media 
organization into a public service outlet. This means that they should be 
considered in the given context, a very unfavourable situation for lunching a 
media outlet, in light of the communication needs of the province as a whole, that 
is, the needs of both the majority and minority population.  
It is worth recalling that the 2002 population census puts the national 
minority population of Serbia, not counting Kosovo and Metohija, at 1,135,393. 
The majority of the national minorities live in the Autonomous Province of 
Vojvodina: Hungarians (290,207), Croats (56,645), Slovaks (56,637), Romanians 
(30,419), Roma (29,057), Bunjevci (19,766), Rusyns (15,626), Macedonians (11,785), 
Ukrainians (4,635), Germans (3,154), Czechs (1,648) and others.  
Vojvodina’s electronic media cater for the own/native language 
communication needs of Serbs, Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, Rusyns, Roma, 
Bunjevci, Croats, Macedonians, Czechs, Germans, and Ukrainians. During the 
monitoring period the province’s public broadcasting service transmitted 
programmes in eight languages. The project team decided to monitor six 
programmes distinguished by decades-long tradition, rounded-off programme 
blocks, well-established desks with clearly-defined structures and hierarchies, and 
stable programme schemes meeting the information, education and entertainment 
needs of the audience in the majority and minority languages, both on radio and 
television.  
The monitoring is a long-term project aimed at identifying progress in 
transforming RTV NS into RUV. It may already be announced that an 
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improvement on the results presented in this report has been detected in later 
monitoring cycles. It should be noted that they will be discussed in detail in the 
next publications. This edition deals only with the starting position and the state 
of affairs inherited, point zero of the transformation of RTV into RUV.  
 
2.2. Results and Analysis 
 
The results of the three-cycle quantitative-qualitative analysis of RUV 
content concur with the results of similar surveys carried out in this country 
(Milivojević, Valić Nedeljković), in neighbouring countries (Vilović, Malović, 
Tatalović, Kanižaj) and elsewhere (Theun van Dijk).  
The concurring results indicate that reporting on minorities is directly 
conditional on the quality of intercommunal relations in an environment; there is 
no proportionality between the size of a minority population and its presence in 
the media; an imbalance of topics is in evidence (with political topics prevailing 
and minority culture, education and arts topics lacking); social stereotypes and 
prejudices are also reflected in the media content; the tabloidization of the media 
stimulates simplicistic, sensationalist and intolerant reporting on minority affairs; 
facts about cause-and-effect events are presented selectively in analysing 
phenomena relating to minorities, their rights, their position in society (for 
example, Roma are often referred to in connection with petty crimes). At the same 
time, media also encourage the dissemination of stereotypes and prejudices; they 
promote the discriminatory use of politically incorrect language; and they ignore 
minority problems as a whole. Topics relating to national minorities which are the 
subject of research are, according to van Dijk’s studies, mostly problems 
minorities inflict on society, and many topics which are a regular feature of 
coverage of majority population affairs (participation in the economy, politics, 
society) are lacking as far as minority populations are concerned although 
examples of good practices and results are as numerous in their environments. 
The predominant picture of the minorities painted by the media is that they are 
the cause of the problem (van Dijk, 1987). Minorities are the object of 
manipulation also when it comes to selecting news items and their representatives 
are not quoted (especially not in their native language with subtitles in the 
majority language (Valić Nedeljković).  
The provincial public broadcasting service monitoring results indicate that 
Vojvodina’s multiethnic character is rarely in evidence in RUV’s news 
programmes in any of the languages covered.  
The multiethnicity is given very scant coverage regarding: 
(a) the selection of topics dealt with in the news, 
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(b) the selection of persons whose activities or views are reported, and  
(c) the content of views being indirectly approved or criticized in a 
programme.  
a) The news content analysis code includes as a separate topic the absence 
of any mention of multiethnic life in Vojvodina, that is, of more than one ethnic 
community, e.g. statements by officials referring to the position or rights of 
minorities, educational or other activities connected in some way with ethnic 
communities, and even official congratulatory messages to ethnic groups on the 
occasion of their holidays. In spite of the very broad definition given to the topic 
of multiculturality, in the monitoring period RTV programmes contained very 
few items dealing with the subject either as a sole topic or a secondary issue. 
During the monitoring period, there was no mention of it in the TV news in 
Serbian and Romany and in radio news in Slovak and Rusyn, and only two or 
three times in other programmes.  
Multiculturality was registered nine times in a total of 775 registered topics 
in all TV news programmes (1.2 per cent) and six times in a total of 738 topics in 
all radio news programmes (0.8 per cent) during the first cycle.  
b) Persons from minority ethnic communities are relatively rarely featured 
among people whose activities or views are reported in the news, and this is true 
not only of the majority language programmes, that is, Serbian, but of 
programmes in the native languages of their respective communities. Non-Serbs 
accounted for 3 per cent of all persons featured (7 out of 203) in Serbian language 
TV newscasts and for 6 per cent of those featured in radio programmes.  
Persons of Serb nationality by far predominate also in ethnic community 
language programmes, in which minority members account for 1-20 per cent of all 
registered participants. Persons belonging to a minority other than the one in 
whose language a programme is broadcast are only very rarely featured. As a 
rule, persons from ethnic communities are more often featured in TV newscasts 
(10 per cent of the cases) than in radio programmes (6 per cent).  
Of all the programmes analyzed, TV programmes in Hungarian and 
Romany pay the most attention to their respective ethnic communities, with 17 
per cent and some 20 per cent of persons of other ethnicities featured respectively. 
The same findings were obtained, for instance, during the third monitoring cycle, 
which focused on the last week of the election campaign. It was noted that the TV 
programmes in the Romany language favoured the two Roma parties and the 
Roma association to the exclusion of all others, as a result of which the Roma 
audience was unable to hear and see other political actors during the crucial stage 
of the election campaign. 
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The corresponding percentage in respect of TV news programmes in 
Romanian and Rusyn were 12 per cent and 11 per cent, with Hungarian radio 
newscasts registering 10 per cent.  
Contrary to this practice, Slovak language radio and TV newscasts report 
the activities of Slovaks exceptionally rarely (1 per cent and 3 per cent 
respectively), with Rusyn and Romanian radio and TV services pursuing similar 
policies (2 per cent and 6 per cent respectively).  
The results mentioned, which relate exclusively to the broadcasts 
monitored, indicate an absence of coordination between the planning of 
programmes and the mission of the media, a flaw borne out by the fact that 
newscasts in minority languages pay insufficient attention to developments in the 
respective ethnic communities. This indicates that journalists preparing some of 
the newscasts spent more time translating agency news items than following 
events in their own and other minority communities.  
At the same time, one notices that journalists and editorial staff in 
particular are not sufficiently sensitized to the furtherance of a multicultural 
society which puts a premium on all ethnic communities being informed about 
each other’s affairs. The xenophobic shutting off within one’s own ethnic and 
linguistic community so far as the minority language programmes are concerned 
corresponds with the findings of other studies which indicate, in the aftermath of 
the break of Yugoslavia, a growing ethnic distance between national 
communities, that is, their shutting themselves off in Vojvodina/Serbia (Baćević, 
Golubović, Ilić, Cvejić, as cited in Komšić, 2006: 413-421).  
This finding was confirmed by members of the focus groups, who pointed 
out that in minority programmes in particular the same people keep appearing as 
experts; they speak on behalf of the minority and about it and represent 
minorities in programmes in their native language as well as in the majority 
language. Other studies have produced similar results (Noelle-Neumann – 
Mathes, as cited in Kanižaj, 2006: 28) which are seen as an ‘overlapping’ 
phenomenon. In other words, journalists follow what other media are doing and 
in turn invite the same persons or persons of similar standing to deal with topics 
which are seen as being featured frequently in the sphere of public 
communication. This is even more characteristic of minority communities because 
their choice is, a priory, narrower that that which the majority nation has to offer. 
At the same time, the elites are equally powerful and reduced to an even smaller 
number of people.  
One of the primary tasks of the public broadcasting service in Vojvodina is 
to reduce the ethnic distance again, further multiculturalism and facilitate the 
permeation of cultures. One of the ways of achieving this is by raising greater 
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awareness of the languages of others, something the public broadcasting service 
should do by introducing new programme standards, namely that every actor 
should speak or be quoted in his or her native language with translation into the 
broadcasting language provided.  
c) the content of views being indirectly approved or criticized in a 
programme. Absence of support for ethnic tolerance as a major social asset  
The analysis of the news programmes sought to register also specific 
elements, that is, subjects (objects) of views expressed by persons whose activities 
or opinions were featured in the news programmes.  
Interethnic tolerance was not a frequent subject of views of persons 
speaking in RTV news programmes: during the first monitoring period this was 
registered once in a Serbian radio programme and a Hungarian TV programme 
each, twice in Serbian TV and Hungarian radio programmes each, twice and three 
times respectively in Slovak programmes, and not even once in a Romanian TV 
programme, Rusyn radio programme and Romany TV programme. The 
broadcasting of multi-lingual items and the promotion of local language was only 
sporadic in all RUV programmes.  
Following are several examples which stood out among the rest on offer in 
RUV radio and TV programmes during the monitoring period covered by the 
expert report (September 2006 - January 2007).  
For instance, television broadcasts in the Romany language promoted 
multiculturality through various suggestions on how to integrate the Roma in the 
majority community. In one of the programmes monitored, a Roma spoke of good 
relations with non-Roma and cited the existence of many mixed marriages as 
proof of this. The context was education of Roma children in the village of Jabuka: 
the children attend school, have no problems with their non-Roma peers, and 
there is generally no discrimination in the village. Other researchers (Vesna 
Dejanović and Ljubomir Pejaković, 2006) also detect this trait which is 
prototypical of the Roma population, namely to perceive their distance towards 
non-Roma as being less than vice versa. In the Romany language broadcasts, 
multilingualism or rather bilingualism – the use of Romany and Serbian – is 
common practice. Programmes are often wholly in the majority language, with 
presenters only announcing and signing off in Romany. As much as one approves 
of bilingualism and the promotion of multilingual presentation of media content 
in multicultural environments as a good practice, in this case this is not desirable 
because these programmes should, above all, contribute to the standardization of 
the Romany language.  
The Rusyn TV broadcasts, which are almost wholly devoted to one field – 
education and culture (with an occasional sports programme) – represented a rare 
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example of good practice in the monitoring period. While promoting the Rusyns’ 
ethnic identity (with strong emphasis on the importance of their native language 
and national cultural values), it also exhibits a positive attitude to the 
multicultural and multiconfessional context. One of the reports was about a drive 
by the organization Caritas, which brings together youth from different ethnic 
and religious environments through sports and other voluntary activities. 
Another covered a folklore festival with participants speaking four languages: 
Rusyn, Russian, Ukrainian, and Serbian. A Rusyn language TV programme 
promoting the learning of the language of the environment deserved special 
attention. By way of encouraging the learning of other minority languages as a 
prerequisite for tolerance, the presenter announced a report on the teaching of 
Hungarian to non-Hungarian children in Kucura. She asked the children about 
their progress in learning Hungarian, the meaning of some words, whether they 
talked with anybody in Hungarian, how they liked the language, and so on. The 
urgency of such programmes is borne out by the fact that the teaching of 
languages spoken in one’s environment all but disappeared during the 1990s. The 
former good practice of raising young people’s awareness of others and other 
things through learning others’ languages is today very rare indeed. This is 
precisely why programmes of this kind are necessary as part of the primary 
mission of the public broadcasting service, which is the furtherance of 
Vojvodina’s multilingualism. 
The examples mentioned are about multiculturality being cultivated as an 
exception; they are not the norm and therefore they are all the more worthy of 
attention.  
In a Hungarian TV broadcast alone, and only in a linguistic context, 
multiculturality was promoted in a different way, as an integral part of everyday 
life; the stress was on its necessity in daily affairs without any noticeable rhetoric 
(which is a good thing).  
Of the total of 95 persons featured in the programme, 16 did not speak 
Hungarian. Serbian was mostly used in programmes for farmers. Of the 25 
persons heard speaking, 11 spoke Serbian and one Rusyn. In these programmes, 
too, there was no serious discussion of the difficulties being encountered by the 
Hungarian community in developing a multicultural society. The ethnic mix of 
Vojvodina’s population was referred to in this programme seven times from 
among a total of 95 topics, and that in the context of the need for tolerance and 
respect for minority rights.  
The majority language programmes rarely present the greats from the 
minority cultures; one of the exception was Radio Novi Sad’s collage programme 
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‘Od devet to jedan’, introducing the ‘great man of Rusyn culture Havril 
Kosteljnjik’.  
Discussions within the focus groups revealed highly positive participant 
reactions to multicultural themes. The expectations of the audience were noted 
that there should be many more such programmes and columns, as well as that it 
would be desirable to hear people speaking different languages with 
interpretation or subtitles provided. We wish to emphasize that the public 
broadcasting service is expected to improve noticeably the exchange of items 
within programmes, to offer a greater variety of topic concerning the life of other 
national communities, including minorities in Serbian language broadcasts. 
Suggestions were made, and noted, that the public broadcasting service should 
play an educational role in acquainting the audience with the minority languages 
spoken here.  
The public broadcasting service would in that way contribute to the 
deghettoization of the minority ethnic community and the presentation of their 
situation as it is, which should, after all, be the chief distinguishing mark of RUV 
programmes. The members of the focus group said they would like as their 
interlocutors members of other nations, both from the majority nation and other 
ethnic groups and not necessarily only their fellow nationals.  
 
3. Conclusion and recommendations for good practices 
 
The conclusion to be drawn based on the analysis is that multicultural 
context, as well as linguistic diversity, were not present enough in each RUV radio 
and television programme in the monitoring period (September 2006 – January 
2007). None the less, considering broadcasting as a whole, RUV is no doubt a 
unique media establishment not only in Serbia but in the territory of southeast 
Europe as well by virtue of its concept and the sheer number of multi-language 
programmes, and this gives it a comparative good practices advantage.  
In spite of good legislation and professional codes of ethics, most 
journalists in Vojvodina, including those employed by RUV, are not encouraged 
to follow and research themes from the domain of ‘otherness’, or even to 
understand the need for that.  
An occasional media ‘excursion’ to another environment/community/ 
marginal group cannot be regarded as a satisfactory informative practice. The 
worrying rigidity of this mainstream media practice is all the more apparent if 
one considers discriminated and media-neglected segments of minority 
populations within this corpus of ‘others’ and ‘otherness’, not to mention further 
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considerations such as gender, people with special needs, those with different 
sexual orientation.  
Owing to their decades-long shutting off within their own groups, the 
advent of democratic changes has brought about no reduction of the social 
distance between the minority (ethic, religious, gender, handicapped and other) 
communities and the majority population. This is also certainly due to their poor 
mutual exchange of information, a phenomenon borne out by the quantitative-
qualitative analysis of RUV.  
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that RUV broadcasts during the 
monitoring period do exhibit a high threshold of tolerance regardless of the fact 
that none of the individual programmes addressed – at least not sufficiently and 
adequately – the problems encountered by every minority community in 
Vojvodina in the development of a multicultural society; this could be achieved 
by identifying and exploring by comparative analysis the common denominator 
of all minorities in the province as far as this subject is concerned. It goes without 
saying that it would be a good practice for RUV to deal with these questions in its 
majority language programmes and thus fulfil its task and mission of a 
multilingual media outlet in a markedly multicultural environment such as 
Vojvodina.  
We should always bear in mind that stereotypes ‘fester’ inside us even if we 
do not believe in them. A first step towards multicultural conduct in public 
communication would therefore entail raising awareness of stereotypes and a 
conscious effort to avoid them in media rhetoric both in the use of language and 
in discoursive strategies of media speech and, later, when it comes to planning the 
programme content, selecting topics and events to be covered, choosing actors 
and information sources, using media performances (picture, sound, music…). 
The priority tasks of Vojvodina’s public broadcasting service in this regard 
therefore should include programme exchanges, joint shows, joint productions, 
translations of documentary and drama programmes, TV films in minorities’ 
countries of domicile with majority language subtitles, encouraging learning of 
and listening to the language of the environment.  
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Aleksandra VUJIC 
PUBLIC INFORMATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW  
OF NATIONAL MINORITY MEMBERS 
 
In 2007, Serbia was required to submit to the Council of Europe the first 
state report on the implementation of the Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages39 and the second on the implementation of the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities.40 At present, these international 
instruments represent the most powerful mechanisms for the protection of 
persons belonging to national minorities on regional and universal levels, their 
ratification being a condition for Serbia’s admission to membership of the Council 
of Europe. 
Simultaneously with the submission of the state report, in June and 
September this year, the Council of Europe was sent alternative reports41 on the 
implementation of the Charter for Languages and the Framework Convention 
prepared with the participation of members of 17 national minorities (in 
Vojvodina: Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, Rusyns, Bunjevci, Croats, Roma, 
Macedonians, Germans, Czechs and Slovenians, and in central Serbia: Albanians, 
Bulgarians, Bosniaks, Vlachs, Greeks and Aromanians), that is, representing 11 
national councils for national minorities and 15 organizations. 
 
◊ ◊ ◊ 
 
                                                 
39 Hereinafter: Charter for Languages 
40 Hereinafter: Framework Convention 
41 The reports were sumbitted by the Vojvodina Centre for Human Rights and the 
Committees for Human Rights in Serbia Network 
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The alternative reports show that commentaries about multiculturalism 
and encouragement of the spirit of tolerance and multicultural dialogue in 
Vojvodina were made by members of only some of the national communities: the 
Roma, Romanians and Macedonians were in principle satisfied with the 
contribution of their respective communities to the development of 
multiculturality in Vojvodina while the Croats and Hungarians made objections 
in this regard. The Slovaks, Rusyns, Bunjevci, Germans, Czechs and Slovenians 
made no comments at all. 
The Roma pointed out as a ‘step forward in an intercultural sense’ the 
bilingual TV programmes in Romany; the Romanians drew attention to an 
increase in the number of items on other national minorities in the weekly 
Libertatea, stressing at the same time that ‘monitoring of activities and events of 
other minorities within the framework of RT Vojvodina is almost nonexistent’; the 
Macedonians for their part were particularly optimistic about the fact that the 
‘fostering of the spirit and tolerance of intercultural dialogue and cooperation 
with members of other ethnic communities’ is characteristic of members of their 
minority.  
The Croats drew attention to the failure to sanction the use of hate speech 
on TV Novi Sad, and the Hungarians to the fact that the Executive Council’s 
project of the Affirmation of Tolerance and Multiculturalism is the only project of 
significance in this field and that it should be applied to other parts of Serbia.  
Data of the Vojvodina Centre for Human Rights concerning the ‘absence of 
an intention to further a multicultural society in Vojvodina, in which it is 
important for all ethnic communities to be acquainted with the lives of other 
linguistic groups’42 reveal insufficient involvement by both majority and minority 
media in this regard, also indicating lack of willingness in the province to engage 
in such work, given that ‘media can bring about changes in society only in an 
environment in which public attitudes are in favour of multiculturalism (for 
instance, of all the states reported on by the Advisory Committee for the 
Framework Convention, people in Norway alone wanted to find out more about 
their fellow citizens belonging to ethnic minorities).43 Research by the Media 
Diversity Institute points to similar examples in countries of South East Europe 
with a deficit of multicultural content in media programmes. The findings include 
that media standards and journalist practices produce only a limited number of 
reports on diversity and tolerance across the region and that simplified, 
                                                 
42 Alternative Report for Vojvodina, Vojvodina Centre for Human Rights, p. 33 
43 Pešić Milica, Medijsko prikazivanje nacionalnih manjina i unapređivanje duha 
tolerancije i međukulturalnog dijaloga, in Popunjavanje okvira, Savet Evrope, 2004 (p.140) 
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sensationalistic and often discriminative reporting about ethnic minorities is a 
‘common malaise’ which contributes to the creation of a vague and passive image 
of ethnic peoples. Prime-time media news programmes rarely quote or show 
them and give them no opportunity to interpret their activities themselves.44 
Some minorities in Vojvodina are objecting that the television and radio 
programmes produced for them do not pay enough attention to their languages 
and are getting shorter (Hungarians and Croats). Such programmes, which are 
undeniably deprived of intercultural content, carry the threat of the further 
ghettoization and marginalization of minorities in the province. This state of 
affairs is also borne out by the fact that members of national minorities in 
Vojvodina are rarely featured in the press and in prime-time TV and radio station 
news broadcasts other than political commentaries on their leaders or cases of 
their being targets of hate speech and discrimination. Minority representatives 
report mostly matters which affect them and only rarely other questions of 
relevance and currency concerning other ethnic communities and society as a 
whole. 
 
◊ ◊ ◊ 
 
Alternative reports lead to the conclusion that members of national 
minorities in Vojvodina consider that although they are able to exercise their right 
to public information in their native languages, they cannot fully enjoy it without 
an extra state endeavour, namely affirmative action, because of a whole range of 
shortcomings affecting its implementation. In this connection, the most frequent 
problems concerning electronic media which prevent the provision of quality 
information in minority languages are: 
• financial problems (Hungarians, Romanians, Rusyns, Slovaks, Bunjevci) 
• personnel problems: inadequate training and staff shortages in minority 
desks, age of journalists, low pay and uncertain job status of employees 
(Hungarians, Roma, Romanians, Rusyns, Slovaks)  
• insufficient minority participation and representation in the process of 
deciding on public information matters which concern them (having to do, for 
example, with the appointment of minority members to management and 
programme boards and to positions of authority at the provincial and republic 
levels) (Hungarians)  
                                                 
44 Pešić Milica (p.139) 
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• nonrecognition of the institution of councils for national minorities with 
regard to the Law on Broadcasting and disregard for national council decisions in 
the decision-making process (Hungarians, Romanians, Rusyns) 
• lack of adequate technical equipment of minority desks and obsolete 
equipment (Rusyns, Bunjevci) 
• poor reception and signal coverage (Croats, Romanians, Rusyns, Slovaks)  
• unequal treatment of individual minority communities (Croats, Roma) 
The problems concerning the print media are as follows: 
• unsolved systemic financing of minority print media and their 
dependence on funding by the provincial Executive Council in spite of the fact 
that founding rights with regard to print media have been transferred to the 
national councils (Hungarians, Bunjevci, Roma, Romanians, Rusyns)  
• decrease of the purchasing power of the population has affected 
the circulation of the print media (Hungarians cite children’s papers as a special 
problem) 
• personnel problems, desks affected by cash shortages, low pay 
(Hungarians, Slovaks) 
• no print media at local level (Bunjevci).  
Hungarians and Romanians also pointed out the inadequate quality and 
content of minority programmes, covering mostly music festivals and folk music 
events, as well as the absence of children’s, educational, entertainment and 
documentary broadcasts. 
 
◊ ◊ ◊ 
 
Considering that at the present day media must perform their activity in an 
increasingly competitive and commercialized environment, with the electronic 
media public services caught up in this vortex whether they like it or not,45 media 
privatization is emerging as a common problem of all the minority communities 
in Vojvodina. Minority members are concerned that certain scenarios regarding 
the privatization process may affect the treatment of media in national minority 
languages in various ways; for example, the limited number of their audiences 
can result in a lower income from advertising and, in turn, a general reluctance to 
broadcast minority language programmes especially at peak times.46 
 
                                                 
45 Torlek MekGonel, Pristup pripadnika nacionalnih manjina medijima, Popunjavnje 
okvira, 2004 (143) 
46 Torlek MekGonel, Popunjavnje okvira, 2004 (147) 
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Dubravka VALIC NEDELJKOVIC 
THREE ITEMS OF INFORMATION 
 
There are three items of information I omitted giving though they don’t 
concern this monitoring. One of these is a ‘slice of life’ story, as journalists are 
wont to say. Journalists from Stara Pazova radio got in touch with us yesterday to 
tells us that, as a result of privatization, this municipal radio station with two 
programmes and two frequencies at the moment, one for the Slovak language and 
one for the Serbian language, would keep only one, so that, even before the final 
decision regarding the allocation of frequencies is known, the Slovak language 
programmes will be joined to those in Serbian. What is more, the sacking of the 
journalists working in the Slovakian language is envisaged because there's no 
more room for them. They wanted to know what to do. So, this is a slice of life. I 
think that in January or February we shall have concrete facts about how such 
slice of life stories really affect people, that is, journalists. The Media Studies 
Department of the Philosophy Faculty and the Vojvodina Ombudsman have 
namely carried out an extensive survey about the position of Vojvodina’s 
journalists. The students have succeeded in completing 450 questionnaires with 
answers from people working in Vojvodina media. They had great problems with 
that because the journalists believed that the survey was a prelude to dismissals 
and were not willing to fill the questionnaires in spite of the fact that the students 
had been issued cards testifying to their identity and that the results would not be 
abused as this was a matter of scientific research. But the journalists simply 
believed that the data-collection involved the making of new lists to be used for 
dismissing people. Very interesting, isn’t it?  
And, finally, the third item of information: I wish to inform you that 
monitoring of majority- and minority-language media during the election 
campaign has been approved, with focus on showing doubly discriminated 
people – women politicians members of national minorities. I believe this is the 
first study of the kind in the whole region because it focuses on women 
candidates from the ranks of national minorities. 
 
Pavel DOMONJI: Just one question: What are the Stara Pazova journalists 
supposed to do now?  
 
Dubravka VALIC NEDELJKOVIC: They can do what we advised them to 
do, namely to first draw up a speech programme scheme rather than one 
combining speech and music, with a high quality content explaining why 
journalists are necessary, that programmes in minority languages are not only 
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about dancing but a very important way of fostering culture, language, traditions 
and so on. So, we advised them to work out their own programme scheme and to 
insist that the programmes, if they must be cut, should be cut proportionally, 
including the Serbian language programme, if that’s really essential. We 
considered it very important that they should take that proposal to several 
addresses. We pointed out to them that there are international conventions, laws, 
that things can’t be done that way. Our suggestion was to take that plan to the 
Slovak National Council, to the Secretariat for Legislation, Administration and 
Minority Rights, to go to the Information Secretariat of the Vojvodina Executive 
Council because, that simply isn’t a good practice model. We thought that these 
should be the first steps to be taken.  
  
 
Jovan KOMSIC 
THE PASSES THAT INSTILL FEAR 
 
So far I have refrained from speaking, but now I do want to say a few 
things, prompted by what Dubravka said about the fear of the poll. You see, the 
things Dubravka said could be an occasion for reflecting on the exercise of the 
minorities’ rights to information and, generally, on the atmosphere in which 
human rights and freedoms are exercised. The fears are not groundless. In the 
autumn of ’92, all of us employees at TV Novi Sad had our pictures taken for new 
passes. On the first of January 1993, some 200 ‘unacceptable’ ones were unable to 
enter the TV building because they didn’t have the new passes. They were denied 
entry. The new passes were only for the ‘fit’. Those who remained in journalistic 
establishments after that personnel cutback remember that and a number of other 
occasions of similar ‘stock-taking’. I’m citing this as yet another example of 
journalists’ fears and concerns. 
  
 
Pavel DOMONJI 
FEAR AND HANDICAP 
 
Evaluations of media practice are very important. I would say that their 
importance is twofold: first, they are important for the media audiences 
themselves, naturally if they can have access to the results. Evaluations are useful 
because they are a reminder to the audience that media representations of reality 
are constructions and that what media emphasize does not have to be important 
and essential to the audience. Second, evaluations are useful to the media 
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themselves because they give the media people an indication of whether they are 
or are not succeeding in fulfilling their role, in this case of satisfying the need for 
programmes expressive of the cultural identity of this or that social group.  
What is RTV’s contribution, if any, to social cohesion in Vojvodina, or does 
it encourage public fragmentation along ethnic lines? 
This question was raised in some form or other at our first round table too. 
I wish to recall that Alpar Lošonc warned then against the tendency to reduce 
Vojvodina to a consociation of ethnic elites, to reduce it to a mere sum total of 
ethnic compacts, to reduce it to pragmatic deals between the political elites.  
RTV is expected to report on developments in Vojvodina. However, most 
items in RTV news programmes are devoted to what goes on in the world, not in 
the province. I’m not saying that RTV should not also provide information on 
events beyond our frontiers, especially if they have a bearing on the situation in 
Vojvodina. Developments in neighbouring countries for instance. Developments 
in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia no doubt merit attention considering that 
members of the Slovak, Hungarian and Romanian minorities live here. But if 
excessive attention is paid to events that have no connection with Vojvodina, one 
may ask with good reason: does not such an orientation call into question the 
purpose of the existence of a special broadcasting service? 
If, as the scene of an event covered by the news, Vojvodina comes only 
second or third, what is the implication? What does this mean, then? Is RTV in a 
subordinate capacity to RTS? Belgrade affairs are given priority over Vojvodina 
affairs. Why? Republic officials and institutions have primacy over provincial 
ones. Why? Not to mention the fact that RTV neglects the citizens, their 
associations, nongovernmental organizations, for instance. Does RTV really 
stimulate pluralism of thought and contribute to greater freedom by enabling the 
ruling class to present its views and positions? 
There is another interesting detail. The question of Kosovo is the most 
frequent topic in the news programmes. In certain minority language services, say 
broadcasts in Slovak, Rusyn and Romanian, Kosovo as a topic figures more 
prominently than in programmes in the majority language. We should dwell on 
this finding.  
I am not denying that the minority members as citizens of this state are 
interested in solving the question of Kosovo in a way that will not jeopardize its 
territorial integrity. However, I see that the minorities’ interest in Kosovo does not 
reflect only their concern about the certain further fragmentation of the state, but 
above all their concern about possible negative consequences they might face 
should be question of Kosovo be resolved contrary to the demands of the Serbian 
authorities. If the minorities must prove their loyalty by paying more attention to 
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Kosovo in their news programmes than the desks using the language of the ethnic 
majority, this then testifies above all to the minorities’ fear of being exposed to 
renewed pressure and violence.  
This matter may be considered from another angle – what are the minority 
language programmes? Are they separate wholes, do they enjoy any degree of 
autonomy, do they satisfy the needs of this or that minority community and to 
what extent, or are they carbon-copies of the Serbian language programmes? 
The fact that RTV news programmes pay little attention to interethnic 
tolerance is another fascinating finding. If there is a place where tolerance needs 
to be discussed as an important practical-political virtue, then that place is 
Vojvodina. I have watched the quiz show ‘Koliko se poznajemo’ [How much we 
know about each other] on several occasions. As you may know, that is part of the 
project of the provincial Secretariat for Minorities, Administration, Legislation 
and National Minorities [sic] concerning multiculturalism and the promotion of 
tolerance in Vojvodina. The kids say that these programmes are boring to death. 
My son, for instance, says that a man who watches such programmes must be a 
true masochist. At some place in the report of the Novi Sad School of Journalism – 
I think it’s in the article by Milena Dragićević Šević – this programme is described 
as boring because it burdens the kids with a plethora of unnecessary and 
superfluous information.  
One more thing. The law on minorities of the neighbouring Republic of 
Hungary says that minority cultures are a component part of Hungarian culture. 
There is no such provision in our minorities legislation. But the absence of such 
provision is not the problem; the problem is that the works of Laslo Vegel or 
Vladimir Hurban Vladimirov, for example, are not considered part of Serb 
culture. The politicians often stress that the minorities are our advantage, our 
asset and our treasure, but this somehow is not reflected in the RTV programmes. 
This fact is not a handicap for the minorities alone. This fact is a handicap for the 
members of the majority because it deprives them of opportunities to acquire a 
better knowledge of the history, culture and art of their fellow citizens, to broaden 
their horizons and, if you will, broaden and enrich their self-knowledge. 
 
 
Antal BOZÓKI 
STOP TAKING MINORITY INFORMATION SYSTEMS APART 
 
First of all, I’d like to comment on what the director of the Vojvodina 
Centre for Human Rights in Novi Sad, Aleksandra Vujić, said in connection with 
the ‘alternative report’. I must express my objections to the fact that the civil 
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organizations of the Vojvodina Hungarians received no invitation to attend the 
gathering organized to prepare that alternative report; representatives of the 
National Council of the Vojvodina Hungarians alone received an invitation, but, 
as far as I know, it is not a civil organization at all. We from the civil organizations 
have had enough of people telling us how we live, what we feel and how we view 
our situation.  
It was for this reason that we held a conference of the Vojvodina 
Hungarians’ civil organizations on 3 November 2007, that is, before that 
consultation, and we prepared our alternative report on the situation of the 
Vojvodina Hungarians. The report was transmitted to the observer delegation of 
the Council of Europe, whose members visited Novi Sad on November 27. I 
protested to the delegation over this practice and attitude towards us, specifically 
towards Argus, the civil association of the Vojvodina Hungarian for minority 
rights of which I am the president and which is the oldest civil organization in 
Vojvodina concerned with the study of the status and rights of minorities.  
We submitted that report – in ‘white book’ form titled ‘The Situation of 
Hungarians in Vojvodina’ – to the OSCE and the Council of Europe. We expect 
the report to be included in the report by Andreas Gross, who, I hope, will make a 
realistic and correct report, though the delegation’s visit to Vojvodina was 
surrounded by considerable perplexity and mystification. Not even the 
programme of the delegation’s visit was made public.  
Mr Gross received us in the Hotel Park lobby where there was loud music 
playing, which wasn’t correct. But he received us all the same, though we thought 
grudgingly because we’d protested to the OSCE and the Council of Europe about 
the manner in which the visit had been organized. I think that this isn’t the way to 
do things. When a delegation of the Council of Europe or any other delegation 
comes to Vojvodina to discuss the situation and rights of members of national 
minorities, then its programme should include the civil organizations, especially 
when it is a question of preparing an alternative report. I hope that this won’t 
happen again because we’re always going to say what we think regardless of how 
others look at it.  
As to the topic itself, I wish to say this: the right to public information in 
one’s native language is of exceptional importance for every man regardless of his 
national affiliation. Members of national minorities, under domestic regulations 
and international conventions acceded to by Serbia, are entitled to that right and 
the state has the duty of contributing to the exercise of that right, above all by 
providing adequate financial assistance. However, the way in which this right is 
ensured is not irrelevant, that is, whether this right is ensured formally or at a 
professional level in conformity with the rules of the profession. As regards the 
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number of news media in the Hungarian language, there is one daily newspaper 
(Magyar Szó), two weeklies of which one is published in Subotica (Hét Nap/Sedam 
dana) and the other in Novi Sad (Családi Kör/Porodični krug), though the second is 
not of great importance being chiefly a review and entertainment paper not 
covering political topics, whereas the Subotica weekly is under the competence of 
the National Council, that is, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians. There is a 
youth weekly and a paper for school and pre-school children, published monthly.  
The press – I’m referring above all to the Hungarian language newspapers 
– is beset by material, personnel and technical problems. Radio Novi Sad’s 
equipment dates back to the 1950s and its medium wave coverage is poor, but this 
is another story, it’s been denied frequency, that is, it broadcasts in another 
frequency which cannot be received throughout Vojvodina.  
Regarding the editorial policy, I’d say that that Hungarian language daily 
and Hét nap, which is published in Subotica, are distinguished by partisanship. 
One might even say, and that’s why I’m saying this, that the Vojvodina 
Hungarians are gradually being deprived of their right to objective information. 
Whether this deprivation of rights is part of a ‘deliberate state policy’ as Mr 
Žigmanov termed it, it remains to be seen.  
The quality of the youth paper Képes Ifjúság has suffered so badly due to 
editorial policy, something I’m not going to go into now, that young people 
stopped buying it. It is currently published as a supplement to Magyar Szó, so 
everybody who buys that daily must buy the supplement. Because of its editorial 
policy it has lost its entire readership.  
In my opinion, the transfer of founding rights to the national councils, at 
the session of the Vojvodina Assembly on 29 June 2004, was a total failure. This is 
especially true of the National Council for the Vojvodina Hungarians which, as is 
well known, is composed overwhelmingly of members of the Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians. So, this is an almost purely one-party body. Moreover, as 
is well known, that council’s mandate expired as far back as 20 September 2006. 
Since 2002 Serbia has made no move towards adopting a new law on the election 
of national councils. Judging by the statement of the minister for local self-
government, it probably has no intention of doing that soon.  
Practice has shown that the founding rights – and now I’m talking about 
the electronic media too – oughtn’t to have been transferred to the national 
councils but only to the desks. As a result of the change of founder, the desks have 
lost their autonomy. The editor-in-chief and the director are chosen on the 
proposal or recommendation of the national council, and that in agreement with 
the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians This probably accounts for the fact why no 
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one replied to the advertisement for the position of editor-in-chief of Magyar Szó 
so, as a result of which the [old] editor-in-chief remained.  
The influence on editorial policy with the Hungarians is manifested as 
encroachment and guidance by the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, which isn’t 
right. This directly harms objective information. Thus you can read whole pages 
of interviews with leaders of the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians and 
representatives of various state agencies, which isn’t good. I’ve heard journalists 
say that certain politicians put questions to themselves and then answer them. 
This leads nowhere. At the same time there is lack of analytical and critical texts 
pointing out what’s good and what isn’t in the social development and political 
life.  
In fact, all that is leading directly to the impoverishment of the Hungarians’ 
culture and language and also information in their language. By the way, the 
circulation of Magyar Szó, which is probably lowest in its history, is the best 
indicator of its quality. 
As to the Hungarian language desk of RTV Novi Sad, the number of staff 
has been halved in the last decade, with those remaining performing their duties 
only with the greatest difficulty on account of, as I’ve already mentioned, their 
antiquated equipment.  
The TV Novi Sad desk, according to people who work there, had about 100 
employees and 20 stringers before October 1990. The desk’s systematisation of job 
positions in force permits only 26 positions including 21 journalist positions and 
five for auxiliary staff.  
During the 1990s, TV Novi Sad broadcast 20.06 per cent of its programmes 
in the Hungarian language, compared with a mere 4.65 per cent in 2007. This is a 
drastic cut, and it brought about a drastic fall in the quality of individual 
programmes.  
The lack of scientific, educational and children’s programmes and of 
programme exchanges with television companies in Hungary poses a special 
problem. All this is leading to the impoverishment of the language and culture of 
the Hungarians in Vojvodina. So, even seven or eight years after Milošević’s fall 
there is no exchange of television programmes in Hungarian. What is TV Novi 
Sad afraid of in such exchanges? Shouldn’t the local Serbs too be acquainted with 
the culture of the Hungarians? What’s the problem? Don’t there exist 
international regulations and international obligations concerning the exchange of 
ideas, the exchange of programmes, the need to get to know each other? Though 
everybody is referring to Vojvodina as a multiethnic region, nothing is being done 
in this regard.  
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The Radio Novi Sad Hungarian language desk had 101 employees in 1990 
compared with 43 at present. In their estimate, the broadcasting of quality 
programmes requires at least 67 employees, which means that another 24 should 
be taken on.  
The announcement of mandatory privatization of local radio and television 
stations has brought the provision of multilingual information in Vojvodina into 
jeopardy and could also be regarded as a breach of so-called acquired rights. The 
things I spoke about a short while ago also constitute breaches of acquired rights. 
We have this right, the guarantee of acquired rights, also provided for by law, but 
these rights are not exercised in practice. This also applies to the category of 
acquired rights in numerous other fields, not only in information.  
So far as I know, this was the way Radio Srbobran, the information centres 
in Sombor and Kula, were privatized, but then the privatization was stopped 
probably by agreement between the Vojvodina Executive Council and the Serbian 
Government. All this indicates that the Government of the Republic of Serbia has 
no clear concept of a minority policy. First they want that privatization at all costs 
in spite of being warned not to do it, then they call it off and no one is called to 
account for anything! What should be done about it now? Why were the radio 
stations privatized in Srbobran, in Kula and Sombor, what’s going on? We’ve got 
this twofold condition now, how is it going to be solved? A state shouldn’t have a 
legal system like that, permitting one to do things one way today and another 
way tomorrow… This also shows that the protection of acquired rights under 
Article 8 of the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National 
Minorities exists only on paper. This state of affairs must certainly be regulated to 
avoid even greater damage.  
Regarding today’s discussion, I think – wishing to be a bit more critical 
about this – that this discussion would probably have been richer and more 
comprehensive had minority desk representatives taken par in it.  
To sum up, this is what I propose:  
First, we should stop the deconstruction of the system of minority language 
public information, by which I mean the press and the electronic media. 
Second, the state should be consistently fulfilling its material and other 
obligations concerning the exercise of the right to public information in the langu-
ages of the national minorities, by financial participation corresponding at least to 
the percentage of the national minority members’ share of the total population in 
Vojvodina. Because the members of the national minorities are, like the members 
of the majority people, taxpayers who pay taxes used to finance the provision of 
information, among other things. Besides, TV Novi Sad should provide 
programmes in the Hungarian language – I don’t know the situation concerning 
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the other languages – according to the Hungarian’s share of the population. At 
present the share of the Hungarians of the population of Vojvodina is no longer 20 
per cent but only 14.28 per cent, I mean, the lowest ever. Laslo Vegel did not 
observe for no reason that ‘whenever we tune in to TV Novi Sad second channel 
programmes, we see members of national minorities doing nothing but dancing 
and singing’, as though nothing else goes no, no problems, everybody’s happy 
and content. I think that this state of affairs is untenable, nothing’s been done 
about it for years! Do we really want to do something about it or not? 
Third, something should by all means be done about the exchange of 
television programmes with television companies in the national minorities’ 
mother nations, to provide adequate cultural, educational, scientific-research, 
educational, sports and other coverage, because for us the elementary thing is to 
keep abreast of the culture, science and other aspects of the culture of the mother 
nation in order to preserve our identity, but not only because of that, but also to 
acquaint members of the majority people with the cultures of the minority 
peoples. At any rate, [the initiatives] to start the subtitling of TV programmes at 
long last deserve to be supported because that is of elementary importance for 
understanding the content. This really is a very serious matter, actually perhaps 
one of the most serious because providing information and being informed is the 
beginning of almost everything. So, one should by all means insist on the full 
exercise of the right to objective information. 
 
 
Aleksandra VUJIC 
CLARIFYING THE MISUNDERSTANDING 
 
Speaking about the conference organized by the Vojvodina Center for 
Human Rights and the Committees for Human Rights in Serbia Network, there is 
obviously a misunderstanding. I mean, the secretariats in charge of monitoring 
the situation of the minorities (the Secretariat for the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities and the Secretariat for the Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights) are two 
completely separate bodies and should not be confused. Our conference was 
devoted to the Alternative Reports submitted to the secretariats already 
mentioned, while the rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe visited our country independently of that. 
Another thing. An alternative report on the implementation of the 
Framework Convention and the Charter may be submitted by any organization or 
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NGO concerned with minority affairs, and also by any individual including all of 
you present here. The Vojvodina Center for Human Rights and the Committees 
for Human Rights Network for their part invited 15 nongovernmental 
organizations and all the national councils to draw up the reports together with 
them, but this could at the same time have been done by anybody else. What’s 
more, the Council of Europe is open to everybody and urges that as many reports 
be submitted as possible in order to gain a more complete picture of the situation 
of a country’s minorities. In view of the number of organizations participating in 
the drawing up of the reports transmitted by the Vojvodina centre and the 
Committees Network, we could say that this involves the collection of a number 
of individual reports, each of which was signed by the organization or the 
national council for national minority for which had framed it.  
Third. Those invited to the conference organized in the Assembly of 
Vojvodina included representatives of organizations, NGOs and national councils 
who took part in the drawing up of the reports: 15 nongovernmental 
organizations and 11 national councils for national minorities, together with 
representatives of domestic and international institutions concerned with 
minority affairs. So, the conference was devoted to the promotion of the 
Alternative Reports and there was no consultation involved. The Hungarian 
National Council was one of a total of 14 national councils invited, and the 
conference venue was provided by the secretary for legislation, administration 
and national minorities as a sort of favour to the citizens by a state institution 
representative. We are thankful to him for that because his gesture is a good 
example of cooperation between the governmental and nongovernmental sectors.  
The reaction we heard a short while ago, though somewhat awkward 
owing to lack of information about the functioning of the Council of Europe, was 
basically a call on the citizens themselves to take part in similar activities, so I am 
inviting all to start writing alternative reports in the future and then to send them 
to the secretariats mentioned previously.  
 
 
Antal BOZÓKI 
CALL FOR COOPERATION 
 
Dear Miss Vujić, you’ve just said that you’d had a ‘meeting with the 
national councils’, but your organization is a civil organization, isn’t it? The 
alternative reports are written, as far as I know, by civil organizations, but you’ve 
just said that you’d ‘collected the individual reports of various organizations’.  
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So far as I know, the national councils are not civil organizations. Besides, 
we are not pleased with the work of the National Council for the Vojvodina 
Hungarians either. What kind of report, whose report is it, then, which you 
wrote? That, if you’ll forgive me, is no report at all. If an alternative report is to be 
written, then let the civil organizations’ reports be sublimated, then make a single 
report which should be verified in some way.  
Please, I’m not angry with you. I’m angered by your unacceptable attitude 
to the civil organizations of the Vojvodina Hungarians, because you do something 
in our name, but without us and over our heads. We, the 14 nongovernmental 
organizations of the Vojvodina Hungarians, drew up our own report on the 
situation of the Vojvodina Hungarians in November 2007, that is, before you did. 
If you’re doing something on our behalf, then you should at least involve us in 
what you’re doing, or at least ask our opinion about that.  
We appended to the report a memorandum entitled ‘Active Minority 
Policy, Development and Peaceful Coexistence’, whose 22 points give a 
comprehensive overview of the situation and problems of the Hungarians in 
Vojvodina and which we handed to Mr Andreas Gross, the Council of Europe 
rapporteur, during his visit to Novi Sad on 27 November 2007.  
I am for cooperation between nongovernmental organizations and I went to 
see you at your office with this object in mind, although I am much older than 
you. I wonder why, for what reason are you not including the civil organizations 
of the Vojvodina Hungarians in such an activity?  
I used the word ‘consultation’ because I’d learned about your gathering 
from the media, and that only the next day, after the gathering had been held. I 
mean, this is the word that the newspapers actually used. So, I am kindly asking 
you now also in public to include the civil organizations of the Vojvodina 
Hungarians in activities concerning the minorities in the future and to leave us the 
option of saying ourselves what we think about our situation and the related 
problems, because we know that best and are aware of it. 
 
 
Mirko DJORDJEVIC 
RELIGIOUS PRESS IN MINORITY LANGUAGES 
 
Since the introductory statements have convinced me that we should deal 
with this aspect of the topic too, I’m going to say a few words about the minority 
language religious press in Vojvodina and about the state of affairs there. There’ll 
also be a few observations – it won’t be at length – which will dovetail into what 
has been said already, but first of all a few remarks. 
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First: We dealt with the media in Serbia recently and a good deal of that 
was published in the latest issue of Republika. True, the subject matter was 
somewhat limited, concerning church and lay media, and also reporting and 
writing about Kosovo. Second: this topic, the religious press in Vojvodina, is 
completely neglected. There are, of course, reports and analyses of a purely 
official nature at the provincial secretariat for legislation, administration and 
relations with minorities, as well as at the Ministry of Religion of the Government 
of Serbia, but no one has dealt with this topic seriously. It fits in here because it, 
too, is part of the press in the minority languages which is supposed to mirror the 
current state of affairs, which certainly concerns the question of Vojvodina’s 
identity, a situation which really hasn’t been explored.  
To make matters worse, the councils, churches and religious communities 
in Vojvodina have their media, print media, newspapers, periodicals, they also 
have electronic [media], but an overwhelming majority of them have nothing, 
these are so-called small religious communities which are portrayed in other 
church media, including lay ones, as sects, a problem which causes collisions on 
the public stage, and very complicated ones at that.  
Religious media in Vojvodina are generally characterized by being closed in 
on themselves, reduced to their own ethno-confessional communities. They don’t 
break out of that cliché and are not concerned with others too much. This is a big 
problem because there’s no communication between them in a general sense, a 
situation having to do with the general state of affairs around us. We have the 
problem of centralization there too. The majority of churches and religious 
communities in Vojvodina mimic their religious centres or carry out their 
directives. The language of hatred and exclusiveness may not be predominant – 
though there’s evidence of that too – but we have no communication to speak of 
either. Rather than exhibiting genuine pluralism of forms of religious association 
within the church and religious communities – something which objectively 
exists, it’s an objective historical fact – these media, in Slovak, Rusyn, Romanian, 
and so on, reflect another kind of pluralism, of a political character. What I’m 
saying is that these media are politicized to such an extent that the manner of 
their rhetoric is easily identified. Besides – this is yet another characteristic, 
though I can elaborate on it on some other occasion – some religious media, both 
electronic and print media, are dominated by certain clichés and stereotypes that 
are in evidence in various other media. Thus, to begin with the church media in 
the Serbian language, you’ll find in them two clichés all the time: the one is about 
the problem of Vuk Branković – betrayal. It has occurred to no one in the lay 
media, nor to anyone at gatherings such as this, to explain that it was a 
clergyman, of all people, Archimandrite Ilarion Ruvarac, who proved that Vuk 
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Branković was no traitor at all, that this is a cliché that’s been going the rounds 
since the 15th century and was created by a foreigner (Orbini) – in fact, the 
opposite is the case. All the same, this cliché dominates even today, it dominates 
and you can’t shake it off. The big problem about clichés is that it’s impossible to 
evaluate all that unless a thorough analysis is made, and there lies that other 
cliché that’s been running through the media in the Serbian language, with 
religious media in other languages also making references to it in this or that way 
– and that’s Svetosavlje [the cult of St Sava]. Third observation: all the church 
media outlets – both those of the smaller and those of the bigger religious 
communities in Vojvodina, including the media in Serbian, Rusyn, Slovak, 
Romanian languages, at least all those I have followed and analyzed – they’re all 
blind to the state of religious instruction which was, as you may know, 
introduced into the lay, state system of education by a provision having the force 
of law; the media are disoriented and one notices another fact, that they, the 
media are being manipulated by political power structures, as well as by power 
structures in the religious organizations themselves. 
Consider two things I’ve talked about on several occasions, things we in the 
media don’t see, a topic no one has addressed himself to – St Sava, ‘Svetosavlje’, 
that cliché, that’s an idea from Vojvodina dating back to the beginning of the 19th 
century, it originated here, in Vojvodina, though not under the name of 
‘Svetosavlje’, but as a cultural idea from Vojvodina without the word ‘Svetosavlje’ 
figuring there at all. The hymn Uskliknimo s ljubavlju [Let us sing with love] was 
first sung in Szeged; it has been modified nine times since and is still being 
reworked to fit the needs of the moment, so that, for instance, one version of it 
currently runs: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina, land of St Sava’s grandfathers…’ You 
see, this is the problem. So, the media are dominated, the religious press in 
Vojvodina is, by the Svetosavlje idea in a political sense, which – one need hardly 
go into that here – has nothing to do whatever with St Sava as a historical 
phenomenon. That’s the size of it. 
For comparison purposes, we can classify the media as periodicals, 
newspapers, bulletins, radio and television programmes. The periodicals for the 
most part deal with dogmatic, ecclesiological problems, and they include Beseda 
here in Novi Sad, of the Eparchy of Bačka, Srpski sion of the Eparchy of Srem and 
our Greco-Catholics’ Dzvony of Novi Sad, a rather solid paper albeit with limited 
resources, material and technical. They have no communication whatever because 
the other religious media write them off as Uniates, investing the concept of 
Uniate with a connotation that is obviously ideological and political. Some 
progress has been made concerning the Ecumenical Centre in Novi Sad, which 
has publications in several languages and scripts, it’s trying to bring all the 
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religious circles and confessions together, so to speak, and to let their voices be 
heard there, but their reach is limited, what with the phenomena already 
mentioned predominating. 
The trouble here is, somebody from the outside, that somebody being the 
state, not only manipulates members of religious minorities against their will, it 
manipulates them crudely. So the state ordains that there can exist only one 
Orthodox church, that there cannot be a Romanian Orthodox Church vicariate, a 
Macedonian Orthodox Church, or Montenegrin… What’s the problem? Let’s 
leave the law aside for now. The thing is, there is no communication at all within 
one confession, the media are blocked, so, for instance, the religious media in the 
Romanian language are concerned with this problem, of the Romanian Orthodox 
Church not being recognized in Serbia, although the Serbian Orthodox Church is 
recognized in Romania. These are problems that give rise to serious conflicts.  
I am saying all this because it’s time, and it’s long overdue, for carrying out 
a thorough analysis, a systematization of the thematic content of religious 
newspapers in Vojvodina and for identifying the patterns of political 
manipulation, as well as that which brings them together. The things the Christian 
denominations in Vojvodina have in common, that is far from being in the 
forefront, not even in their respective papers. Since no such analysis has been 
made, I’m going to say a few words about that. It is necessary to make headway 
so that we could come out of these complicated media collisions that give rise to 
social collisions. Whether the gymnasium [grammar school] in Novi Sad will be 
called Serb Orthodox Gymnasium or something like that, whether it should be 
attended by other pupils, we see that this is turning into a political problem 
without a real, historical basis for anything of that kind. A gymnasium can also be 
Jesuitical, but as a gymnasium it must have a curriculum.  
To repeat, many religious communities in Vojvodina have no media outlets 
at all. The fact that they have none may be explained by lack of financial 
resources, though it seems to me that this isn’t about financial constraints but 
about something else. An act of discrimination has been made, the law has 
privileged some and completely excluded others, and so we have a chaotic 
situation with repercussions on the social plane in the form of serious collisions, 
therefore a mere commentary is not enough and a real analysis should be carried 
out at some time. These media are, by all means, part of the media public sphere 
and influence the determination of identity, and so also of the identity of 
Vojvodina. In none of the religious media, Orthodox, Catholic, Evangelist, in the 
Rusyn and Slovak languages, for instance, is there any suggestion of an idea that 
one should discuss, in a normal way, the identity of Vojvodina, and therefore this 
sphere remains on the sidelines. After all, Vojvodina's Orthodoxy, as has already 
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been discussed, also Orthodoxy in Serbia, Orthodoxy in Ukraine, they don’t differ 
in dogmatic and ecclesiological terms, but in a culturological sense they do differ 
substantially. I have referred to Orthodox baroque before, for instance, so I’m not 
going to go into that again now, I only want to point out that this sphere should 
be included in one of the forthcoming sessions.  
 
 
Pavel DOMONJI 
NONAUTONOMOUS EDITORIAL POLICIES 
 
To follow up on what Sonja Biserko said, I’d wish to explicate a matter 
which only implicitly figured in her speech. We namely must bear in mind that 
the minority language media are, above all, media and that therefore their role is, 
as it were, to be of service to the public by providing accurate, timely, reliable 
information, to contribute to the critical examination of matters of public interest, 
as well as to the more transparent work of the key institutions within their 
respective communities. One should not forget the fact, either, that minorities are 
complex structures, with diverse orientations, interest groups, existing within 
them, that within minorities too a battle is being waged for the redistribution of 
influence, power and resources, and also that the media are one of these resources 
over which the opposing orientations are trying to establish their control.  
The survey referred to by Tomislav Žigmanov included the following 
question put to members of minority cultural elites: ‘Are you satisfied with the media 
informing you in your language?’ Most of the respondents expressed partial 
satisfaction. Those who were dissatisfied with information in their native 
language outnumbered those who were by almost four to one. The following was 
cited most frequently as the main causes of the dissatisfaction: not being up-to-
date, unobjective information, personnel problems, inappropriate length of 
programmes, technical obsolescence, poor territory coverage, lack of minority 
language programmes.  
Asked ‘What are your expectations of the media in your language?’ the 
respondents cited the following: greater objectivity and professionalism, better 
quality programmes, more equal treatment in the media field, better territory 
coverage, technical improvements, longer programmes and higher budget outlay. 
Similar answers were given in reply to the question ‘What would you like to 
see changed in public information in a native language?’ The most respondents – more 
than a half – wanted changes in the editorial policy and better programmes, 
followed by greater dispatch and objectivity of information, greater diversity of 
information, innovation of programme content and media political independence.  
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In reply to the explicit question: ‘What are your main objections to the media in 
your language?’ the respondents said: an unwillingness to open ‘sensitive’ issues, 
lack of competence, superficiality and incompleteness of information, coverage 
partiality and lack of a clear posture.  
Having referred in their replies on several occasions to problems 
concerning editorial policy, the members of the minority cultural elites were 
asked to evaluate the media editorial policy in relation to the centres of power. The 
replies received on that occasion show that most members of minority elites share 
the conviction that there is no autonomous editorial policy in the minority 
languages. The editorial policy, in the opinion of the respondents, was mostly 
under the influence of: political parties, founders, representative bodies (national 
councils and so on), editorial teams (by virtue of their professionality), local 
financiers, donors, minority community cultural societies, nongovernmental 
organizations, influential members of minority communities, local authorities, 
and so on.  
Asked what prerequisites should be ensured in order for the minority 
media to completely fulfil the tasks set to them, most respondents chose the 
following answers from among a choice of others in the questionnaire: increasing 
desk staffing levels, ensuring stable sources of finance, insisting on professional 
standards and journalist codes, raising technical levels, ensuring thematic 
diversity of programmes, improving coverage, and so on.  
 
 
Gordana PERUNOVIC FIJAT 
BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 
 
The provision of information in the languages of the peoples living in the 
area of Kikinda has been gaining in importance since the start of the battle for 
frequencies. VK Radio, which was granted a regional frequency, broadcasts 
programmes in the Serbian, Hungarian and Romany languages. At present, the 
municipal Radio Kikinda, which wasn’t granted a regional frequency but has 
applied for a local one, broadcasts programmes in the same three languages, but 
only the staff producing the Romany language broadcasts are part-time 
employees, with no pay, and the rest are full-time employees. Radio Tota (the 
Wheel) broadcasts most of its programmes in the Romany language, while KUM 
Radio, Radio Mokrin and Ami Radio broadcast most of their programmes in the 
Serbian language. The attempt by the local authorities – the coalition between the 
SRS [Serbian Radical Party] and several smaller parties – to discontinue the 
Hungarian language broadcasts of the municipal Radio Kikinda (the incident is 
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presented in the rubric ‘Povelja na licu mesta’ of the periodical Helsinška povelja) 
provoked a coordinated and very determined reaction of Hungarian cultural-
artistic societies, nongovernmental organizations, the SVM [Alliance of Vojvodina 
Hungarians], all media outlets not controlled by the citizens, and there was such 
public outcry, including notification of international organizations, that those who 
initiated the move backed down promptly and have not attempted anything of 
the kind. So, it was at least clear that multilingual information would be very 
difficult to abolish because it is supported by people with civil roots irrespective 
of their party affiliation (or ‘non-affiliation’) and nationality. Apparently the 
residents of Kikinda hold that the provision of information in several languages is 
something that goes without saying, something that must exist.  
The programme scheme of Televizija VK includes news in the Serbian and 
Hungarian languages, and this also applies to Televizija Rubin, which was denied 
a frequency; it will probably close down and its owner return to Kruševac. As to 
the print media, Mokrinske novine is published in the Serbian language, Ruskoselski 
glasnik in two languages which are about equally represented (the same texts 
appear in Serbian and Hungarian), Kikindske, published as part of Dnevnik of 
Novi Sad, has a weekly page in the Hungarian language, and Kikindske novine, 
formerly in municipal ownership and privatized in June 2007, has two pages in 
the Hungarian language. While at present there are no texts in the Romany 
language in the newspapers published in the municipality of Kikinda, articles are 
printed occasionally about actions of Roma nongovernmental organizations and 
prominent individuals.  
The election campaigns so far have not been characterized by an abundance 
of promotional materials in the Romany language (with none at all in some cases), 
and materials in the Hungarian language have not been in plentiful supply either, 
except those distributed in areas with a majority Hungarian population or those 
prepared by the SVM. The policy of other parties is quite frequently to address 
potential voters only in the Serbian language. Is this a matter of mistake, 
omission, ignorance or intention? – one can only guess.  
There’s an interesting phenomenon which perhaps merits being looked into 
by sociologists: Hungarians read papers in the Hungarian language and papers in 
the Serbian language, and they follow radio and television programmes in the 
Serbian and Hungarian languages, usually in broadcasts from Hungary; on the 
other hand, however, growing numbers of Serbs are no longer able to read a line 
of text in the Hungarian language, nor can they understand a sentence spoken on 
Hungarian radio or television. There are estimates (admittedly they’re not 
substantiated with figures and would therefore pose a real challenge for 
researchers) that in Austria-Hungary more than 80 per cent of Serbs were 
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bilingual, being able to understand at least one language other than their own. 
The same phenomenon was observed in other peoples, who also spoke the 
languages of their neighbours. Children of both sexes ‘went visiting’ places 
differing from the ones to which they were accustomed, staying at the houses of 
neighbours belonging to other nations, other faiths, living and working with the 
hosts and having meals with their families in order to learn the language. That 
wasn’t an exclusive pastime of the idle well-to-do people who, as a matter of 
course, learned the German and French languages, but a practice among the 
poorest: community living simply necessitated that one should have a practical, 
rather than purely theoretical, knowledge of several languages: knowledge of 
languages was necessary at the workplace and for business purposes. For 
example, as late as the 1930s, Stevan Fijat, a tailor from Perlez, knew and 
communicated with this customers in Serbian, Hungarian, German and 
Romanian; Radivoj Pakaški, a clerk from Ruski Krstur, spoke Serbian, Hungarian 
and German, the last so well that Germans hired him to translate things for them, 
and when he was taken prisoner of war he acquired a solid knowledge of Russian 
during the four years he spent in Russia; Sava Ninčić, a teacher, spoke Serbian , 
German, Hungarian, as well as learning Slovakian while serving as teacher in 
Kovačica, all this being active knowledge comprising reading, writing and 
interpreting. This practice was inherited from the former Austria-Hungary: 
newspapers in the German, Hungarian and Serbian languages were published in 
Kikinda up to the outbreak of the First World War. Although the Jews, not a large 
but economically a significant and respectable category, had no newspaper in 
their own language (though they had books), they read the papers in the 
languages in which they were printed without a problem because they spoke 
those languages. Every Jewish doctor, tradesman or solicitor without exception 
knew the language of every people living in the town. Even today one encounters 
among people over 60 years of age somebody who speaks several languages. The 
legendary professor of the English language in Kikinda, Richard Pfeffer, spoke 
Serbian, Hungarian, German (as his mother tongue), Slovakian and Polish, an 
accomplishment which deserves to be respected and followed.  
Learning the languages of other peoples living in the same town (or village) 
has no attraction for the majority of the Serb population (if it had, they would take 
the trouble to learn them). While young people do learn English to some extent, in 
order to be able to communicate with their peers from other countries, or out of 
the desire to go abroad at last and never come back, the adults do not bother at all, 
at least not until they lose their jobs and are made to attend an English language 
course run by the employment office. So there we have a paradox: a young person 
speaks, reads, writes English and translates from it rather well, communicating 
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without a problem with young people from, say, Norway or the USA, but is 
unable to greet a Hungarian neighbour with a few words in Hungarian, let alone 
communicate with him. An educational worker in Kikinda is openly boasting of 
not knowing a word of the Hungarian language although he has been married to 
a Hungarian woman, herself an educational worker, for 30 years. This example 
should be quite enough to make the point.  
There are, of course, different examples. 
Tibor Katai, the ethnologist and choreographer with the cultural-artistic 
society Egység (Unity), says: ‘I was rather surprised to see Serb children enrolling 
in folklore courses, they speak Hungarian and want to learn more. 
 They come and ask: “Do you also organize Hungarian language courses?” 
I was at a loss: “No, we don’t.” “But where then can we take lessons?” “The only 
thing to do is to go to a Hungarian language teacher and ask him if he wants to 
give you lessons privately.” These days some schools are providing Greek 
language lessons for adults, but no one is organizing teaching of the Hungarian 
language. I think that we should be more enterprising.’  
Tamara Isakov, a pupil attending the Fejes Klara bilingual instruction 
primary school: ‘Our Hungarian friends learn both Serbian and Hungarian, while 
we learn only Serbian. 
 This is discrimination: this way we’ll speak one language less. Why don’t 
they start teaching us languages earlier? At the kindergarten there was a woman 
teacher who spoke Serbian and Hungarian and addressed each child in his or her 
language. So we learned both languages and began talking to each other. But she 
got married and moved to Senta, and the other teachers didn’t speak Hungarian.’  
Istvan Mezei, a labourer: ‘My daughter has had English language lessons 
since she was six, in addition to learning to speak Serbian and Hungarian at 
home. The more languages you know, the more you’re worth.’ 
In contrast to this last, upbeat statement, it is possible to cite far more 
examples of mixed marriages where the children speak no other language than 
Serbian. According to Kornel Boronka, the president of the Kikinda office of the 
Alliance of Romanians, this is seen in marriages between Serbs and Hungarians, 
and even more in marriages between Serbs and Romanians (of whom there are 
not many in Kikinda). As to the Romany language, it is still a terra incognita for all 
save the Roma: instances of non-Roma speaking the Romany language are few. 
Ljubiša Francuski, an ambulance driver: ‘I picked up Romany as a child 
from the children in my neighbourhood. 
 For them it was fun to teach me, and for me to speak a language no one in 
the class spoke. Later in my life I learned English and German (I worked in 
Germany), but it is at my present work that the knowledge I acquired in my 
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childhood has been useful to me. While driving back from the Roma settlements 
on the outskirts of Kikinda – the roads and the living conditions are appalling out 
there – being able to address the patients and their relatives in their own language 
has been useful to me. All of a sudden, they appear more trustful.’  
Trust is a key word in the relations modern Europe is trying to build, 
offering all an equal chance of expressing themselves in their own language. After 
all, there’s no need to reinvent the wheel in this regard: evident and telling 
examples of practices involving the use of different languages date from Austria-
Hungary, as already mentioned (we need not go further back into history than 
that); I’m referring to the books and newspapers in different languages that were 
freely published throughout the Empire. They had to pass through censorship, 
but books in German and Hungarian were also subject to censorship, that was the 
procedure before you were permitted to print them. Here’s one example: a copy 
of the Bible translated by Đura Daničić, property of the great-great ancestor of 
mine Lazar Pakaški, a 1867 edition, Pest, ‘the printing house of Hornjanski and 
Traeger’. So, in the middle of Pest of all places, having a majority Hungarian 
population, Hornjanski and Traeger – a Slovak, Czech or Pole and an Austrian or 
German, judging by the surname – print a book in the Serbian language, in a very 
elegant and readable Cyrillic script. People of any knowledge of the print media 
will be aware that, in order to print a book in the Serbian language, Hornjanski 
and Traeger had to have in their printing shop first of all the Cyrillic fonts, to use 
the modern term; second, they had to have a typesetter with a knowledge of 
Serbian, a printer who spoke Serbian, a reviser, and they also had to have at least 
some knowledge of Serbian to make sure that nothing politically suspicious got 
through in order not to have problems with the imperial administration. But why 
did they print a book in the Serbian language, given that it was not an official 
language of the Empire? Because it was their job to print books, newspapers, 
invitations, almanacs and other publications, and that in a language specified by 
the client and, probably, using the type chosen by him. In those days business 
crossed all barriers between people and will cross them again, when common 
sense and the normal need to communicate prevail over the need to talk about 
territory, blood, honour, the need to shut oneself off inside one’s frontiers instead 
of seeking contact with other people. And, when we have hammered out the final 
business arrangements, we can proceed to the exchange of cultural goods. Among 
which the knowledge of languages is exceptionally highly valued. The challenge 
is there but it won’t wait long: this match is not won by those who know how to 
fight, but by those who are prepared to learn things.  
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Jovan KOMSIC 
SERBIA – AN UNFINISHED STATE 
 
In Kikinda in 1860, the German, Hungarian and Serbian languages were all 
in official use, to use the modern expression. I don’t know whether this was a 
requirement imposed by Vienna, but it was no doubt a good example. So, I’m 
pointing out the fact that the Serbian language was in use too as further proof of 
Kikinda’s multicultural and multilingual tradition.  
We are currently going through democratic transition and have relegated 
the communists with their sinister decades-old luggage to the past. We have 
achieved this by combining the forces of the Serb ethnos intelligentsia, as well as 
those of the intelligentsia of a good many minorities in Vojvodina. Some members 
of the minority intelligentsia used to say that the decades of self-management and 
Tito’s socialism had catastrophic consequences for, say, the identity of the 
Hungarian national community. There were probably very serious problems and 
consequences for the national identity and the community itself, especially at the 
time when the nations were opening up and entering into interaction with each 
other, the time when we had the highest ratio of ethnically mixed marriages in 
Europe. So, while such things are happening, there will always be people who 
will say that they pose a threat to the national substance. In my works I have 
quoted a number of authors who hold that such things are very dangerous for the 
identity of the nation and the community. But, let us ask ourselves what are our 
fundamental values? What kind of state do we want? What kind of national 
policy? What kind of project for the province? It is only after we have asked and 
answered these questions, it is only then that we shall be able to judge the 
institutions in terms of consistency of behaviour in interaction. Let’s proceed from 
this: are our institutions already distinguished by consistent behaviour in 
interaction? This is the elementary definition of a custom turning into an 
institution, an institution which is far more durable and much more serious a 
civilizational affair than an organization.  
Let us not be angry with the national councils. States in transition, states 
like this one, necessarily experiment. Serbia is an incomplete state (Zoran Đinđić), 
an unripe state, so one wonders what kind of policy concept we need. What kind 
of multiculturality concept? Some very serious authors from the Serb cultural 
body with pro-European orientations are already expressing doubts about the 
concept of multiculturality and pointing out that multiculturality has proved 
disfunctional. Some serious theorists abroad are also warning against the 
controversial effects of multiculturality. All right, there are also authors who say, 
‘You can’t exorcize the devil with Satan’s help.’ As the research results presented 
164 
here show, the solution does not lie in shutting oneself off from others, nor in 
segmentation, nor in running away from interaction. But what kind of 
interculturality and interactivity concept do we want? Interactivity, inclusivity, 
sensitization, these words are especially frequent these days. All right, let’s go 
into that now. How do we sensitize the powerful ones to support a good idea? But 
let’s first see what a good idea is. Provision of information in minority languages? 
Yes, it is a good idea to preserve the elementary prerequisites of multiculturality 
and human and minority rights. The state, if it wants to be a European state, must 
invest more money, and that’s where we agree. So, the state must help towards 
solving the problem of the media, because the media are not only something one 
fights for in the battle for markets, a battle resulting in the tyranny of the majority 
consumers. While on the one hand we expect of the state to intervene, on the 
other we merely watch the politicization of our own ethnonational interests 
without giving thought to that which constitutes the joint institutional framework 
for all of us regardless of the tribe to which we belong. Let’s see what kind of 
Vojvodina we want and let me wind up with a discussion of poverty and fears. 
Regarding Aleksandra Vujić's report and all these surveys, what are they about? 
They are about fears. Journalists don’t want to give complete information about 
themselves. Why, at the time of the ‘differentiations’ in 1988, the marking down of 
us ‘autonomist’ communists, the key criterion of suitability was our attitude to the 
rallies, the way the rallies were covered in the broadcasts of TV Novi Sad 
including the minority desks. Mind you, 20 years later people still live in fear of 
losing their regular pay, I meet them in the streets of Novi Sad and they complain 
to me all the time. However, they have survived and kept their regular jobs 
because even under Milošević the television had to sham multilingualism, though 
even now they fear that their attitude to Kosovo will be used as a criterion in 
possible new differentiations. So, let us have understanding for this deeper level 
of the problem. The problem is, the state is impoverished, it has no resources for 
ensuring the elementary rights, the rights to employment, to social security, to 
certainty, to wellbeing and a future, then a whole range of human and minority 
rights, as an essential condition of quality living.  
What is implied by the European model? What can we do now? What is the 
purpose, the effect of our discussion today? We had excellent introductory 
statements. The state institutions do not make such serious analyses and do not 
posit the problem with such seriousness. Now, how can one use these statements 
to sensitize the political class of Vojvodina? Where is the political class of 
Vojvodina? Why, from the point of view of the distribution of power, we’re on the 
margins. I don’t like feeling like someone being on the margins, I think I’m not a 
person on the margins. But, at the same time, I don’t wish to live in the illusion 
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that the media scene in Vojvodina shakes whenever I say something. It shakes, 
my eye. In order for discussions of this kind to have effect, we must have here 
with us people from the most influential, most powerful parties in the Vojvodina 
Assembly, people from the relevant democratic parties with a pro-European 
orientation, all who are responsible for the provision of information. All of them 
must be publicly asked specific questions by the nongovernmental sector. What is 
their concept of Vojvodina? What kind of information concept? What kind of 
multiculturality concept? What kind of human rights concept? What kind of 
concept of Vojvodina’s place in Europe? Well, when all of them are gathered here, 
then we can include in the dialogue the topic we’re discussing today. Our topic is 
overshadowed by much broader and more substantial topics and we’re also 
marginalized by the media. The news media thrive on thrill. At the moment 
there’re no brawls, no expulsions, no intercommunal incidents, so the media 
simply aren’t interested. But the organizers of discussions of this kind should 
consider using some of the stage-manager’s tricks to make them more attractive.  
 
 
Dubravka VALIC NEDELJKOVIC 
A VOJVODINA WITHOUT POWER-WIELDERS 
  
This time I’ll refer back to our research, to the monitoring of the Novi Sad 
School of Journalism. What did the monitoring show? The monitoring showed 
that the news category is the predominating media genre in the minority 
programmes. What does it mean? It means that Beta and Tanjug news items are 
simply translated, and that’s why there are so many Kosovo topics. I think that 
Jovan Komšić is partly right, that they really think that their ratings depend on 
how they report on Kosovo. However, I think that this is also due to something 
else, beginners are namely entrusted with doing the news every two hours. The 
model is simple, you put in whatever you receive, what Koštunica said about this 
or that, what So-and-So did, finally what Pajtić did, and when you add all that up 
Kosovo accounts for 17.5 per cent of the air time. Well, this is a bad model. 
However, I don’t think that it is a matter of editorial policy so much as it is a 
matter of inertia. To be sure, there is also fear, but there’s more of what I’ve just 
mentioned. The fact that media aren’t paying enough attention to themselves is a 
far more serious matter, it is a big problem. Therefore they’re not going to be the 
fourth estate for very long, in the sense of the hackneyed phrase. Blic yesterday 
published a list of the 50 most powerful media people in Serbia, with not one of 
them from Vojvodina. You should please read the article. The list includes people 
from advertising agencies, god knows who all those people are. Mind you, even 
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the person who is the general manager of Radio televizija Vojvodina didn’t have 
the honour of being included among the most powerful media people in Serbia. In 
a way, this is a reply to what Komšić said. We’re somewhere on the margins. That 
survey of the 50 most powerful ones may have been faked, it doesn’t matter, Blic 
is still the newspaper with the largest readership in Serbia, is it not? They have an 
annual survey of the most powerful people in the fields of education, culture, 
politics, media, and so on. And among those 50 most powerful media people, 
there isn’t even one from Vojvodina.  
  
 
Boris VARGA 
MINORITY MEDIA ARE RATHER SELF-CONTAINED 
 
I think that one of the main causes of all the problems mentioned here lies 
in unskilfulness, that is, because journalists lack qualifications, especially many of 
the journalists and editors running media in national minority languages. 
Speaking the language of a national minority myself, Rusyn to be specific, and 
having contacts with colleagues from national minority language desks, I consider 
lack of skills as one of the main problems concerning the ‘self-contained 
behaviour’ on the part of ethnic communities in Vojvodina and probably in 
Serbia. 
All these media ‘fears’ we’ve been talking about at this round table, the 
alleged political and state pressure, the things said regarding the coverage of 
Kosovo, the inadequate media conduct in somewhat extreme political situations, 
all that is due to lack of professional journalist skills. To be specific, my view is 
borne out by the facts presented by T. Žigmanov in his address, by the surveys 
showing that media in national minority languages in Vojvodina have the least 
percentage of qualified journalist personnel. What is worrying is the fact that as 
many as 30 per cent or so of journalists have secondary school qualifications.  
Second, the Media Department at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad is 
currently training the first generation of journalists, and the Novi Sad School of 
Journalism is also training professional multi-lingual journalist personnel in 
Vojvodina. I can tell you from experience that they’re really good journalists, at 
least those we’ve had the opportunity of seeing during their practical training.  
Another serious problem, other than lack of qualifications among 
journalists working for media in national minority languages, is how to replace 
generations of journalists in national minority language desks with qualified 
personnel who will be graduating from the Media Department of the Faculty of 
Philosophy in Novi Sad in the years to come or at least passing the courses of the 
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Novi Sad School of Journalism. The adequate replacement of qualified personnel 
should be effected primarily through specific laws and regulation and monitored 
by the nongovernmental sector and journalist associations. 
The media in national minority languages are rather self-contained and 
staffed mostly by journalists graduating from the National Languages 
Department of Vojvodina, whose knowledge doesn’t fully meet the needs of 
modern media undergoing constant development and improvement. National 
minority language desks are often conservative and sensitive to change; I’m 
saying this out of experience with certain desks in the Rusyn, Slovak and 
Romanian languages Qualified and inexperienced journalists are often not 
accepted and they therefore must work in Serbian language media or, because of 
the reasons mentioned before, they do not want to collaborate with media in their 
native languages.  
To sum up, lack of qualifications and conservatism give rise to closed 
media ‘communities’ which are pray to political and other manipulation. A 
skilled workforce in national minority language media will reduce such risks and 
raise the quality of information. Therefore one should seek additionally to 
regulate and professionalize the media of the ethnic communities in Vojvodina.  
 
 
Gojko MISKOVIC 
A RAVANGRAD’S MEDIA NOCTURN 
 
My considerations will necessarily be focused on the media situation in 
Sombor, with special references to information in minority languages. In doing so 
I can’t shake off the impression that we live in a primordial creation which we can 
call a state only if we have plenty of imagination and good will, something which 
is neither at least neutral nor discriminates positively in favour of the needs of its 
citizens of minority ethnic origin. Within the journalistic profession, lack of 
professionalism and inadequate horizontal communication and solidarity are 
easily perceived. 
Our impoverishment and decay is mirrored by the fate of the weekly 
Dunataj, whose existence over the decades was cut short by a decision of the 
national socialists of Slobodan Milošević and the Radicals; after the change of 
government, the paper was relaunched in 1997. Under the guidance of its ‘spiritus 
movens’, the director and executive editor Istvan Varag, the decision was taken 
internally that Dunataj should be a paper in Hungarian rather than a weekly for 
the Hungarians. The prospect of this much-needed weekly being destroyed by 
blind privatization and market forces was averted on time mostly thanks to Mr 
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Virag’s personal engagement; this was accomplished by transferring the founding 
rights from the local self-government to the Hungarian Civil Hall in Sombor.  
What was, almost simultaneously, happening to Somborske novine? Under a 
travesty of a law still in force, it was privatized along party lines and is now in 
fact subordinated to the party interests of the Democratic Party of Serbia. Every 
Friday, its readers have the pleasure of being offered the global-planetary 
ruminations of the ministers Predrag Bubalo, Zoran Lončar, Aleksandar Popović, 
the nation’s high priest and grudge-monger Matija Bećković… It is only thanks to 
the fact that Dunataj escaped the fate of being privatized by cronies that we can 
stay that by virtue of its structure, number of news items and analytical texts this 
weekly outclasses the much thicker Sombor (DSS) novine. If you see what the one 
and the other publishes, you realize the importance of professional and personal 
considerations for the quality of a media product.  
The local media scene in Sombor was destabilized by the arrogant and 
autocratic operation of the Republic Broadcasting Agency (RRA). It seems to me 
that in many aspects this ‘institution’ outdoes the present Serbian Government. 
Have a look at the list of television stations granted permission to broadcast in the 
territory of Vojvodina and you’ll see that there aren’t more than five! On top of 
that, only one member is from the territory of Vojvodina, and his appointment 
provoked considerable debate and disagreement in public. In our Sombor case, 
the chosen media outlet is of the highest ‘quality’ but only on paper, since reality 
convincingly contradicts that which is written about it. One wonders whether 
such an information monopoly may not cause incidental as well as planned 
disinformation of the public through not fully verified reports: when recently they 
announced the results of a public opinion poll about the most popular people in 
Sombor, the most surprised ones were precisely the people who had been 
declared ‘winners’. For this reason, I propose entering a corrective in the laws and 
regulations governing the electronic media in the shape of a Broadcasting Agency 
of Vojvodina as a guarantor of neutrality and as a counterbalance to the creature 
the RRA has become. Making decisions mostly by crude overruling and providing 
livelihood to a great many yea-saying employees with a clerk’s mentality, it is in 
the danger of becoming an end in itself. Given that Radio televizija Vojvodine 
already exists as the proclaimed public service, I don’t see why it is not possible to 
have an efficient and effective regulatory body responsible for the same territory 
and citizens. 
The present position of Radio Sombor also deserves mention. Its decline is 
the result of experiments by the ‘democratic forces’ and a desire to create new 
sinecures in the shape of directorships. There was a ray of hope during 2005 and 
2006 when the radio was under a professional appointed in a round of personnel 
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musical chairs. His programme conception appeared promising and contained 
revolutionary elements: the language of the tolerated ethnic minority (Hungarian) 
emerged from its strict ghetto in the shape of a one-hour slot and began to be used 
throughout the programme, with similar plans in relation to the other historically-
founded languages in Sombor (German, Croatian) and the nongovernmental 
sector. Such a media concept met with the combined resistance of ‘journalists with 
national-socialist and democratic leanings’ and local politicians of insignificant 
merit. Because the ‘alliance of the stupid and the indifferent’ created in this way 
replaced the maverick director summarily, this municipal media outlet was not 
restructured and revitalized ahead of privatization.  
 
 
Alpár LOSONCZ 
MINORITY MEDIA TRAMMELLED BY SHORTCOMINGS  
OF THE MINORITY POLICY 
 
The speakers spoke well, I liked it. I think that they made an adequate 
presentation of these complex problems, so it remains for me merely to 
paraphrase what has already been said here. One can hardly resist the impression 
that the problems being discussed here are not a mere segment of the minority 
policy, but a test for the minority policy as a whole and even for self-
understanding on the part of the society as a whole. It has occurred to me that, 
during the 1990s, when we first used syntagmas such as collective rights and 
affirmative action, we always found it appropriate to mention the media, that is, 
information in minority languages. Because the problems of minority media lie at 
the heart of every minority policy. It is not a surprising that what has been said 
here today reflects the whole ambiguity, inconsequence which characterizes the 
national, social policy of the political classes in Serbia. The first thing to note is the 
fact that there is no consensus about the main project regarding society in Serbia. 
It won’t go amiss to mention that a substantial segment of the political classes or 
elites, whichever you prefer, either think or say that only a monoethnic 
community can be successful and democratic. Traces of such a discourse can be 
found even in the Constitution. Because precisely such a kind of discourse runs 
through the Constitution, and if we look at the situation from such a perspective, 
it is clear that everything that’s been happening to the minorities, the 
intercultural, multicultural aspects of the majority-minority relationship, 
everything’s dealt with on an ad hoc basis. For instance, if you consider the 
political moves made since 2000, the impression is that they were always forced 
and unwilling moves, not moves resulting from a well-thought-out, coherent 
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national policy. The conclusion to be drawn on the basis of these arguments is 
that there is either no consensus in Serbia about the majority-minority 
relationship and about how to regulate a heterogeneous and complex community, 
or such consensus as exists is too weak to be used for consistent regulation of the 
relationship between the majority and the minority. The regulation of institutional 
relations all too often bears the mark of political occasionalism: decisions are very 
often made according to the situation. The inconsistency of the minority policy 
(which always reflects a position on the majority-minority relationship and, at 
least indirectly, on the structure of the political community), the propensity to 
take ad hoc measures, the increasingly frequent practice of dealing with particular 
situations not through automatic procedure by the state bureaucracy but under 
contingent external and internal pressure, all that merely testifies to the fragility 
of the consensus mentioned.  
So, there’s nothing new under the sun, it seems to me that what we’re 
saying about the media follows from this basic constellation. Besides, we cannot 
ignore the fact that a good many minority issues have been pushed into a region 
that is extra legem, that is, unregulated by law. In this connection, I fully agree with 
Jova Komšić’s observation that ‘all that is terribly dependent on the institutional 
order established’. Because everything having to do with the minorities, the 
minority media, is always linked to the current constellation of power, that is, to 
the shortcomings of the institutional infrastructure. Now, one should consider 
critically things such as institutionalized stability and well-shaped or unshaped 
political will in relation to consequent regulation of minority questions, including 
that of minority media. 
This question is characteristic also because the troubles of transition, if I 
may say so, have a bearing on the issue we are discussing. What is the distinction 
of the market in Serbia? – of course, it is monopolized, carved up by a multitude 
of monopolies. In view of the monopolies of this kind existing in other spheres of 
social life, one can hardly expect the situation here to be different. Or, in view of, 
say, the quality of the transition being implemented in Serbia which, as we are 
very well aware, is creating a great asymmetry of power, which is reflected on the 
minority policy and consequently the minority media. It’s hard not to see that the 
quality of the privatization is reflected in, borne out by these relationships. Of 
course, the privatization is being constantly referred to for a reason, and it is in 
terms of the privatization that we see the lack of consideration regarding the 
media, the extent to which the situation is susceptible to the current whims of 
power. For instance, one of the most powerful political parties has been claiming 
from the first that the minority media will be privatized, but then, all of a sudden, 
as a bolt from the blue, a different message is reaching us. The elections context 
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may have to do with this. All this indicates that there’s no concept, that we’re 
faced with demonstrations of power all the time. To cite Jovan Komšić again, 
because he is quite right: the state must experiment during transition in order to 
arrive at optimum solutions. Certainly, but ours is not the kind of state which 
would engage in experiments, because in order to experiment, one must be 
sufficiently strong, sufficiently audacious… but what we have is, above all, a 
weak state that is constantly exposed to all kinds of oligarchic economic, business 
interests, pressures from different business empires. There may some day come 
along a well-wisher from the ranks of the oligarchy to put the country on the right 
course, someone who may say something along the lines of, ‘well, we’re for 
European values, for European codes’, and so on. Such newspeech, empty 
rhetoric already exists, many use it ritually, without thinking what it means. 
However, a serious policy cannot be based on that. And especially a long-term 
policy cannot be based on that.  
Now, we’re taking about the national councils and the press. What’s the 
problem there? 
The problem doesn’t lie in the fact that the national councils are mere slaves 
or instruments of a political orientation, I would say that this is more a 
consequence, that is, that it is not the cause. The cause is something else! I mean, 
national councils installed in a system like this produce extremely problematic 
results. To be sure, journalists themselves, weighed down by fear, behave in a 
conformist manner, without taking any risks, and without risks there is no true 
journalism… A journalist will never have a minimum of courage if he does not 
have any sense of social and legal security, that’s simply impossible. That is, if the 
sword of Damocles is suspended above your head all the time, if you think that 
tomorrow you may be fired from your job by some minority or majority political 
leader, naturally always in the name of economic efficiency. Today we have one 
myth, one mantra, which is the source of considerable manipulation, namely that 
there’s no money, that business operations must be rationalized, that one must 
have economic efficiency. You can use this to get out of the way anything you 
don’t like without being outright violent. Because these days violence is far more 
subtle than it was a few years ago. But this is where questions are raised that are 
often left unanswered… Ethnic parties can always invoke the power of a 
totalizing principle, say, the ‘interests of a given minority’, something that is very 
difficult to problematize in the impoverished public sphere of the minorities. 
So, what is our problem? The problem is that in the present constellation 
the national councils are only a kind of smokescreen, they have no authority 
whatever, no competence, while making decisions de jure. This means that any 
political option, any political whim, any political group which prevails at the 
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moment can make a decision, a legitimate decision, by relying on a national 
council. There, that’s the problem. I don’t consider it the main problem, as Duško 
(Radosavljević) put it, that certain doctors, professors, idle intellectuals, people 
from the academic sphere, and so on, do not want to profane themselves by 
participating in everyday politics. The problem lies in the deficiencies of the 
institutional order. 
By the way, there are other things that need thinking through. One such 
thing was mentioned by Pavel (Domonji) when speaking about the problems of 
the minority media. Add to this what Dubravka (Valić-Nedeljković) said, namely, 
that there’s no need to watch the minority media, to accept anything from them, 
given that they merely translate what has already been announced by Beta and 
Tanjug. This really doesn’t make sense. Of course, we should consider such an 
important thing as, say, what it means to write a critical article for a minority 
media outlet. We namely say that it is to be expected that journalists with 
minority media establishments too will follow the line of least resistance, that they 
too will conform. Why shouldn’t they be that way, if conformity means having a 
sense of elementary rationality in a situation like ours?  
To wind up, although there’s a lot more I have to say, but, what can one do, 
how can we possibly influence the state’s will? 
In this regard, I always see – to put it scholastically – two levels: the one 
level is the level of multiculturalism, the other level being the level of 
interculturalism. Multiculturalism refers to the level of institutions, of institutional 
relations, institutional infrastructure – that segment of the social world is not 
based on, is not instituted on the basis of, one’s goodwill or disposition but is 
founded on coercive rules. Therefore, in this respect, to put it this way, the state 
must behave consistently and categorically clearly. Of course, our state doesn’t do 
that. Another thing, this interculturality thing, what Aleksandra (Vujić) said a few 
moments ago is a valid point, because indeed a growing indifference between 
various ethnic groups is in evidence throughout the world. Of course, this fact 
calls for an explanation, but we have no time for that. Let’s just say that, according 
to authoritative studies, even the much-vaunted Switzerland is increasingly 
characterized by indifference between its various constituent nations. In such 
situations the state can act only indirectly, because a state cannot create an 
intercultural mood. Whether I or any other minority actor, if I may say so, am 
interested in what goes on in Serb culture and vice versa, the state cannot 
engender that in me. But the state can and should create the conditions for 
intercultural communication of the widest possible kind. Bearing in mind the 
poor performance on the part of the institutions in Serbia, as well as the 
weaknesses of the mechanisms for coordinating the problems of a complex 
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society, the exposure of the state to contingent power influences, the negative 
developments in the system of minority political representation, the legal 
uncertainty regarding the regulation of minority questions, it won’t be hard for 
me to conclude that the problem lies in our state’s being inconsistent, 
unimaginative in the creation of intercultural conditions.  
 
 
Nedim SEJDINOVIC 
NO STRATEGY 
 
At today’s round table on national councils and their internal problems, the 
drift of our discussion implied an assumption that the transfer of founding rights 
from the print media in national minority languages to the councils is a final and 
good solution. This, however, is a kind of stop-gap solution, a decision which 
actually indicates lack of any strategy at all. I mean, this is a matter of a lack of 
solutions, an attempt to somehow get around the substance of the law and to buy 
time until such moment as the state has enough capacity to take care of the media 
in national minority languages, to protect the media against possible bad 
consequences of privatization. 
I think that it is abundantly clear that the transfer of founding rights is a 
transitional solution and that the privatizing of these media, the print media in 
national minority languages, is an inevitability. Of course, much depends on the 
capacity of the state to give them some protection from closure, not to expose 
them to a fierce market competition in which they have a marginal starting 
position. This, then, is what we ought to discuss. 
Not enough has been said here about what should be done about the media 
in national minority languages since, as we have noted, neither the state, nor 
apparently the province, has any strategy other than putting off the final outcome. 
I think that both studies presented could be a good basis for nongovernmental 
organizations to put forward some strategy for solving this problem. 
Some of the possible solutions were discussed at the round table organized 
by the Independent Association of Journalists of Vojvodina at the beginning of 
2007. Suzana Jovanić of the Fund for an Open Society put forward ample 
arguments in support of the need for the state to set up a fund to finance media 
coverage in minority languages, through competitions enabling the participation 
of all media, including those not operating in national minority languages. As for 
the electronic media in national minority languages, she (Suzana Jovanić) put 
forward the idea, saying that it was absolutely not incompatible with the media 
legislation, that part of RTS subscriptions should be channelled not only to a 
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public service provider in national minority languages but also to local and 
regional radio and television stations broadcasting in national minority 
languages. I think it is interesting and should be considered. 
I should say that the disheartening findings of the research presented by 
the keynote speakers which can be summed up in a few words – lack of capacity, 
want and so on – can in many instances also apply to many majority media 
establishments belonging to the smaller body we call the serious media. At that 
conference I mentioned there was another interesting development, namely that 
almost all the representatives of minority language media came out strongly 
against privatization. However, so far as I could gather, privatization was 
opposed not only on the grounds that the media themselves would be 
jeopardized, but to some extent as a result of inadequate capacity, a measure of 
conformity, a lethargy, a desire to preserve the positions gained during the 
‘burgeoning of socialist self-management’. 
In conclusion, I wish to wind up with an almost anecdotal incident: a 
colleague of mine working for a reputable newspaper published in minority 
languages – I don’t find it necessary to name it – asked the president of the state, 
Boris Tadić, for an interview on the occasion of the newspaper’s anniversary. He 
agreed and, naturally, wanted the questions in advance. One of the questions was 
about dealing with the past. 
The question provoked a sharp protest from Boris Tadić’s public relations 
officer, who said: ‘How come a minority media outlet like you is interested in this 
matter, who gives you the right to ask such a question at all?’ This was an 
unmistakeable indication of her attitude towards the minorities and the things 
media in national minority languages should concern themselves with in general. 
Talking about whether there is a question of fear involved, of a struggle to retain 
job positions, or of mere inertia on the part of minority media desks which only 
translate agency news items, one should bear in mind that the minority media, in 
common with the minorities in general, usually behave according to what the 
majority expects them to do. 
 
 
Vladimir VALENTIK 
THE APPLICABILITY OF OUR MODEL 
 
I am glad, above all, because, following the keynote speeches, certain views 
about this topic have evidently been successfully put across. Thus many of my 
impressions – as someone looking from the outside without having done any 
research in this sphere – largely correspond to or are even identical with some of 
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the information we’ve obtained through research, that is, based on methodology. 
I’d like to focus on a few of the theses topicalized during this discussion, above 
all, regarding the multiethnic identity of Vojvodina and its relation to media or 
information. Before we can discuss the multiethnic identity of Vojvodina we may 
proceed from the thesis that the circulation of information must be ensured. 
However, as the research has shown, we are faced with a situation where 
minority information in particular is restricted. In addition to the mentioned 
causes of the closedness of minority information, for instance the educational 
structure of journalists working for those media, one should bear in mind a 
mechanism that is activated in a situation like that. One might say, somewhat 
humorously, that minority journalists – in both electronic and print media – know 
all their readers, viewers or listeners in person, particularly those from smaller 
minority communities. In such a situation, in addition to education, human nature 
plays an important part, having a tendency to ease or, as you put it, conformism 
and lethargy. Therefore, being in a situation like that and owing to a natural 
tendency to easygoingness, these journalists, regardless of their education and 
skills, neglect their work, they begin to take things easy and are content with what 
they have achieved. The security of existence is most important of all. It is for this 
reason, among others, that the local or minority media oppose privatization. In 
such a situation we have something which may be incomprehensible in ‘normal’ 
reporting, namely, that the editor of certain media outlets are insufficiently 
informed about things they are reporting! Nothing is more detrimental to 
reporting. Such a situation results in the decline of reporting. In general, this is a 
logical development that follows from the situation I have described. Although a 
serious analysis of the whole structure necessitates taking into consideration the 
other levels of this phenomenon, I have, for the purpose of this discussion, singled 
out a close relationship between cause and consequence.  
At today’s round table the privatization of local media has been referred to 
a number of times. Specifically, as regards the Slovak minority community, the 
privatization of local media and radio stations with a long tradition is under way. 
The local population in the regions concerned has grown used to those media. If 
they are closed down, my feeling is that the population will miss those media 
much more than they would miss information in the Slovak language provided 
by the Radio Vojvodina public service. I think that people are more attached to 
local media – again, I wish to make clear that this is an impression – especially to 
radio, then to the public broadcasting service.  
Looking at the normative side, the acquired rights have been referred to in 
the context of attempts to stop the privatization of minority local media. These 
radio stations have been in operation for some 40 years: Radio Petrovac, Radio 
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Kisača, which is probably the oldest local radio station in Vojvodina, Radio 
Kovačica, which has programmes in the Serbian, Slovak, Romanian and 
Hungarian languages, Radio Stara Pazova, where we have this situation, which 
used to broadcast Slovak programmes from four to six hours depending on the 
time of year, on Radio Stara Pazova channel two. As regards its privatization, the 
situation is at a standstill.  
It was only yesterday (11 December 2007) that the Municipal Assembly of 
Bački Petrovac discussed these questions. By coincidence, nothing was done in the 
four years during which the privatization of local media was being announced. 
Twenty days before the privatization deadline was to expire, they decided to 
transform the public institution into a public company in order to create the 
conditions for its privatization within the next two weeks.  
On the other hand – speaking of privatization – various risks are emerging 
and they have been referred to here. There is being created, among other things, 
the prospect of political manipulation of those media – not direct but covert, 
through intermediaries. There is also the danger that the radio stations founded as 
private enterprises may seek the support of national councils in an effort to obtain 
frequencies, because the owners, the founders of those radio stations had the 
ambition to broadcast in minority languages too. A written application to this 
effect is granted in the majority of cases, but, as it turns out, it is not binding on 
the owner. In most cases, on being granted a frequency, the owner broadcasts in 
the minority language for a month or two, then discontinues the programme 
because it doesn’t pay.  
To conclude. I’m going to say a word or two about the minority print 
media. I’m not going to talk about Hlas ludu, whose founding rights have been 
taken over by the Slovak National Council. 
By tradition, Vojvodina Slovaks have had a publishing industry that is 
separate from the information industry, that is, from the weekly Hlas ludu. By 
coincidence, the publishing industry, which accounts for the bulk of the Slovak 
language periodicals in Vojvodina, found itself in private hands less than two 
years ago. So, the publishing establishment was privatized. It so happened that 
publishing in the Slovak language was not the publisher’s prime activity and the 
whole affair was not much of a success. Actually, in this connection, I’d like to 
mention a model which we have established and which, I think, is applicable to 
other minority national communities in Vojvodina. A national council has 
possibility to set up funds for certain activities. On the other hand, as a legal and 
legitimate representative of its national minority, it can enter into a protocol with 
a government authority, in this case with the Executive Council of the Assembly 
of Vojvodina. Based on that protocol, it can secure certain specific-purpose funds. 
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On the other side, if there exists within the national community concerned an 
entity engaged in such an activity in order to ensure its continued operation, it 
can conclude a protocol with the National Council Fund because publishing, 
which is its core business, is commercially unviable. This, then, is a model that can 
be applied. We at the Slovak National Council have set up such a fund. It has 
operated since 1 September 2007 and relates to publishing activity and the 
provision of information, but only specialized. The only children’s periodical in 
the Slovak language is financed in this way. Also the only journal of literature and 
culture in the Slovak language. Novi život, the only periodical of the Vojvodina 
Slovaks, and Narodni kalendar, the year book published since 1919, are also 
financed in this way.  
The model we have applied to the print media may also prove applicable in 
the case of local radio stations. So, the national councils for the minority 
communities could establish information funds and use them to finance the 
broadcasting of programmes in minority languages. Such funds could be co-
founded by local self-governments, which would earmark assets from their 
budgets for this purpose. This would ensure the provision of information in 
minority languages by private media at local level. 
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VOJVODINA  
AND MULTICULTURALITY POLICIES 
- Experiences and Prospects - 
 
 
 
 
 
Pavel DOMONJI 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
The recent elections have confronted us with the fact that Serbian society is 
deeply divided into two, nearly identical, parts. The ideological portraits of these 
two Serbias are being trumpeted daily by the media and party propagandists. The 
one Serbia is usually labelled as isolationist and nationalist, the other as pro-
Europe and democratic. The boundary between these two Serbias is not as well-
defined and impermeable as it looks at first sight, because a strong nationalist 
rhetoric exists also within this other (self-styled as) civil and liberal, especially 
with regard to Kosovo. Though this rhetoric may be a tactical concession, a small 
subterfuge on the part of an ideological mind, to weaken and cushion the 
onslaught of the first Serbia, at this moment is of less importance. What seems 
more important to us is the answer to this question: Which of these two Serbias 
has more consideration for the demands coming from Vojvodina?  
In determining the subject for discussion, we used the plural in the name of 
the round table on purpose and defined the subject as policies of multicultu-
ralism. We didn’t do that because Serbia is divided, but because multiculturalism 
is not a homogeneous concept with only one meaning. The question is: What kind 
of policies of multiculturalism are suitable for Vojvodina? Which type of 
multiculturalism is better suited to it – interactive, segregative or liberal?  
Incomplete states, states faced with the loss of part of their territory and 
societies devoid of a basic consensus are not a rich seed bed for the practice of 
multiculturalism. Nor are, after all, societies faced with an identity crisis of the 
majority nation. Where the state borders are in question and the identity crisis is 
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long-lasting, as is the case with Serbia, nationalist concepts see in multiculturalism 
an obstacle to social progress and a threat to the national identity.  
Not infrequently, the ideological alarm bells and agitated ideological 
recitals about the national identity elicit in us an image of identity as an isolated 
and closed monad. The maintenance of that identity, the preservation of its 
‘authenticity and original purity’ is usually considered as part of the job of a 
special social stratum – the national intelligentsia. The impression is that, even 
when they talk about multiculturality, a good many intellectuals are doing this 
very insincerely and not with a view to promoting the relevant policies.  
One of the problems is that the word culture as part of the conceptual 
construction multiculturalism is construed in a strong ethnical sense. For instance, 
who does Miroslav Krleža belong to? To whose culture – Serb or Croat? Did 
Krleža write the short novel about the Baroness Lembach in the Serbian or in the 
Croatian language? Is this a question of two different languages, or is it a question 
of different names for one and the same language? Or, what about Nikola Tesla, 
for example? He died in the United States, but he was born – where, in Austria-
Hungary or in Croatia? Does he belong more to Gospić or to New York? Does he 
belong more to the Serbs, Croats or Americans?  
If Krleža belongs to both the Serbs and Croats, doesn’t that render absurd 
the idea of a pure national or cultural identity? If Krleža is a constituent of Serb 
culture, then, for instance, Paljo Buhuž, Martin Jonaš and Laslo Vegel are that too. 
If Miroslav Krleža is a Croat, Martin Jonaš a Slovak, and Laslo Vegel a Hungarian, 
then Serb culture cannot be reduced to its ethnic foundation. Cultures are, 
therefore, open, inclusive and hybrid, but the boundaries dividing them are 
political. What I said is nothing new, but I hold that it is worth while to recall such 
‘trivial’ things from time to time. 
For a plural and complex society, which is what Vojvodina is called, a 
situation where political and ethnic boundaries coincide is a very unfavourable 
one. The chances of multiculturalism increase where political and ethnocultural 
identities separate. Why? Because that leads to a multiplication of identities on the 
one hand while weakening the ethnicization of politics on the other. Where social 
and economic disparities are ethnicized, for instance, the result is a highly 
flammable, explosive mix which can easily threaten ethnic peace. At the 
provincial elections, the SRS [Serbian Radical Party] met with debacle. The 
Hungarian Coalition too met with failure, winning half as many mandates as it 
hoped it would. Are these facts of any deeper significance? Do they indicate, for 
example, a weakening of the attraction of ethno-cultural differentiations? Which 
political actors and party affiliations, what policies, including policies of 
multiculturalism, can draw benefit from this? 
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There are not only boundaries dividing ethnicities, but also boundaries 
within ethnicities. There are not only boundaries between, but also boundaries 
within cultures. A minority community is just as complex a structure as the 
majority community. Individuals adopt and incline towards different cultural 
models, demonstrating different value systems, exhibiting different affinities 
regarding sex, belief, music, clothes, food and a number of other things.  
I’m mentioning sex on purpose. The feminists teach that we are in the 
domain of biology as regards sex, and in the domain of culture as regards gender. 
What is the relationship of feminism and multiculturalism? Is multiculturalism, 
from the standpoint of feminism, a bad policy? What is its attitude to 
multiculturalism in the case of a minority culture, whose preservation it 
advocates, having been turned into a haven for barbarous practices?  
Problems exist also in relation of some other groups. For instance, the 
majority of refugees have in common with members of the ethnic majority their 
ethnicity, language, religion… A few years ago, the refugees accommodated at 
Palić asked the state to grant them a national minority status. The refugees, to be 
sure, are a minority but not an ethnic one. This bizarre demand speaks of three 
things: first, it speaks of a desire to substantially improve the desperate situation 
of the refugees by means of national minority status. The second thing lies in the 
answer to the question: Why by means of national minority status? Because the 
intention was not only to draw the attention of the international community and 
its agencies, but also to make it intercede with the government to solve the 
problems. And, finally, the third thing: this item of information is significant in 
that it testifies to a lack of ethnic solidarity. There was not only no solidarity, but 
the refugees were looked upon as a burden and a source of problems. For 
instance, in places where refugees have settled in large numbers and built new 
small settlements, there are no street canals and the streets are very narrow. 
During long periods of rain this causes certain problems. The indigenous 
population grows irritable and the newcomers are at a loss, because street canals 
did not exist, nor were necessary, in the places they came from. I wish to point out 
that the refugees did not bring along with them only their bags, as people are 
often in the habit of saying, but also the cultural context in which they became 
socialized and which they draw upon in organizing their new life, something 
which gives rise to problems in their new environment and generates a strong 
aversion towards them. 
Highly ethnicized policies are blind to such internal differences, differences 
existing within one national community. Being narrow-minded and intolerant, 
they considerably influence the formulation of demands of other ethnic 
communities. In considering, for instance, the demand of certain Hungarian 
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parties for territorial autonomy, one should bear in mind that it is partly a 
reaction to a highly-ethnicized context in which minority demands are ignored 
and depreciated.  
Where multiculturalism is not only an ideal but also a concrete policy, its 
content is found in the various sub-systems of society: political, cultural, media, 
educational… Now, what kind of educational policies, for instance, are conducive 
to multiculturalism? Do our educational policies encourage young people to 
adopt some aspects of their neighbours’ cultures, or do they, more or less, suggest 
to them to distance themselves and shut themselves in the identity of their own 
ethnic group? I wish to recall that Alain Finkelkraut writes in one of his essays 
that barbarity begins when the individual shuts himself within the cultural 
identity of his own group. Lastly, the main ambition of this fourth panel 
discussion is to help, as far as possible, by means of adequate policies, the 
democratic consolidation of these regions and the application of solutions which 
satisfy the key interests and needs of the citizens.  
 
 
Tamás KORHECZ 
STATE, PUBLIC AUTHORITY  
AND POLICY OF MULTICULTURALITY 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper devoted to problems linked with the policy of multiculturality 
in Vojvodina consists of three small chapters.  
The first part gives a definition of multiculturality in a rather broad and 
general manner and points out possible attitudes of public authority to the 
phenomenon we have defined as multiculturality. The second part of the paper 
sums up the policy of the Assembly and the Executive Council of the 
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina on multiculturality in the past seven years. 
This part draws attention to some guidelines, characteristics and results of that 
policy in Vojvodina. In the third part we shall try to define outlines and principles 
of a future successful policy of multiculturality in the territory of Vojvodina. 
 
Multiculturality and the public authorities 
 
When speaking about multiculturality, like any other social phenomenon it 
can, of course, be defined in different ways, it can be approached from different 
points of view and, of course, we shall never reach full agreement on how to 
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define the phenomenon of multiculturality. We’d like to offer a definition here 
which is rather widely accepted. Under this definition, multiculturality means a 
situation where a number of different cultural identities occur, exist in a defined 
area, in the territory of a state or a narrower region as part of that state. We are 
here referring above all to differences between ethnic and national cultures, 
though multiculturality can also be considered at the level of sub-cultures. 
Multiculturality therefore exists if the citizens inhabiting a defined space have 
different cultural identities, notably linguistic identities, but also identities with 
regard to folklore, popular customs, identities concerning religion and 
denomination, certain specific systems of cultural values which form an integral 
part of everyday life. Of course, when speaking about cultural patterns and 
cultural identity, we must make clear that there are no strictly defined boundaries 
between those cultures. Cultural identities, their boundaries are not fixed and 
immovable, they develop and change in a dynamic way. However, irrespective of 
this relativity, when speaking about multiculturality we are referring to more or 
less defined separate cultures existing in the same area.  
In terms of such multiculturality, neither Serbia nor Vojvodina is quite 
uniform, for there is hardly a state in which multiculturality is not part of 
everyday life to a less or more extent, that is, part of the life of people living at 
least in some parts or regions of those states. There are, of course, more or less 
multicultural states in this regard, and it goes without saying that multiculturality 
is bound up with multiethnicity and multinationality. Though different identities, 
national, ethnic, religious, cultural, and even linguistic identities often overlap, 
this overlap is never complete, for while someone may belong to a group in an 
ethnic or linguistic sense, his or her cultural activity can be part of another culture 
or of the other culture too.  
In each of such multicultural states, the state and public authorities pursue 
a different policy, can have different attitudes towards this phenomenon. In this 
connection, the state is not referred to as a central authority, but as a public 
authority as a whole, by the state we mean also local self-government and the 
various forms of regional autonomy or regional state. Each of these levels of 
power can have a uniform or partly different attitude to multiculturalism in its 
territory. To put it simply, states can be grouped together in three categories 
according to their policy in the sphere of multiculturality.  
The first category includes states pursuing a policy which may be defined 
as ‘nationalistic’ or a policy of ethnic or cultural homogenization. Such a policy 
implies, in a less or more extent, systematic activities on the part of the state in an 
area where multiculturality already exists, that is, where there are a number of 
cultural identities, the aim being to create a dominant cultural identity within the 
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state by employing more or less rough methods of forcing other cultural identities 
out of public life. Of course, such a ‘nationalist’ policy can have very diverse 
forms, very diverse methods, but the objectives of such a policy are plain, namely 
to achieve the homogenization of the cultural space, the homogenization of the 
population in terms of language, religion, tradition and value system 
characteristic of each individual culture.  
I should term the second kind of policy a state can pursue in relation to 
existing multiculturality a policy of multiculturality. Such a policy regards 
existing multiculturality as an asset which ought to be preserved. Therefore such 
a policy treats multiculturality not only as a reality but as something which is in 
the interests of the state. Such states regard the safeguarding and development of 
cultural pluralism as an important objective of state policy. To be sure, there are 
different variants within such a policy. While one variant of that policy lays stress 
on the element of conserving cultural diversity and rounding off individual 
cultural identities, another emphasises some other element, the element of 
multiculturality where the state fosters the mutual knowledge and permeation of 
different cultures in addition to creating conditions for the preservation of specific 
cultural identities. 
The third form or third kind of policy a state can pursue in relation to 
multiculturality is a ‘culturally neutral policy’. Some call such a policy a liberal 
policy, though one may wonder how liberal it can be. In this case public authority 
considers that as regards culture, language, tradition and cultural identities the 
state should not play an active part, should not interfere and implement no policy 
of one kind or another. What distinguishes this policy is the presumption that the 
state must be neutral in the domain of culture. However, as Will Kimlika has 
proved in his works in a well-argumented way, no state policy can be neutral 
with regard to culture. This third kind of policy, liberal policy supports, mostly in 
a covert manner, the process of cultural homogenization and gradual 
disappearance of the multicultural character of the state.  
 
Policy of multiculturality of AP Vojvodina organs 
 
After this introductory part, we’re going to discuss briefly the analysis of 
the policy of the Executive Council of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina in 
relation to Vojvodina’s multiculturalism during the last seven years. Although 
Vojvodina is not unique by virtue of being multicultural, it is a unique area in 
Europe in terms of certain attributes and degree of multiculturality, with regard 
to language, cultural output, media and languages in which programmes are bro-
adcast. In view of this, the significance of the policy of multiculturality in Vojvo-
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dina is arguably greater than in some states or regions in Europe. During the pe-
riod 2001-5 this policy was characterized by very vigorous development of an 
institutional and legal framework designed to safeguard national cultures, espe-
cially those of minority communities in Vojvodina. During this period, the Vojvo-
dina administration placed the policy of multiculturality among its political prio-
rities. At this juncture it is worth mentioning that during this period allocations 
from the provincial budget for safeguarding and developing the cultures of 
national communities increased more than ten times in real terms. In this period 
various institutions for safeguarding or developing national and cultural identity 
were set up, several secondary schools in the Hungarian language were 
established, a faculty in the Hungarian language was established, an institute for 
the culture of the Vojvodina Hungarians and four other national communities 
were established, the Romany language weekly Them was launched, education in 
the Croatian language in primary and secondary schools was introduced, the 
newspaper publishing house Hrvatska riječ was established, a Bunjevac 
newspaper and a paper in the Ukrainian language began to be financed from the 
budget, professional theatres in the Slovak, Romanian and Rusyn languages were 
established, and so on. In most cases, the institutions in question are completely 
new, with no predecessor in history, rather than revamped establishments. One 
need hardly say that all this required large budgetary outlays.  
Since 2005 there has been a new element in the policy of the Executive 
Council, namely the policy of interculturality. Organs of the Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina have launched several projects, the largest being that of the 
APV Executive Council called the Affirmation of Multiculturality and Tolerance 
in Vojvodina. This project is unique in European proportions by virtue of its 
budget, number of participants and character accorded to it by the public 
authority. The project consists of various programmatic activities sharing the 
same objective, with over 200,000 mostly young people from Vojvodina 
participating in its realization at present. The object is, on the one hand, to raise 
the awareness of young people of multiculturality as a value and distinguishing 
mark of Vojvodina through a tolerance quiz, a tolerance cup and ethno-days in 
schools and, on the other, to acquaint youth with the cultures of other 
communities in the territory of Vojvodina through new knowledge. The object of 
the project is to get to know other cultures and cultural diversities other than ours, 
to orient young people towards the cultural wealth and heritage of Vojvodina. 
The project, whose realization began in the autumn of 2005, is characterized above 
all by its mass character and the continuing expansion of programmes. Since 2005 
the number of programme participants has grown steadily, as have the budget 
funds earmarked for the purpose. Another characteristic of the project is the 
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highly active participation of Vojvodina schools; this is what really matters and 
what distinguishes this project from all the others, namely its realization in close 
collaboration with institutions in the education sphere and partly with institutions 
from the field of culture and public information. So, this is not a project which 
bypasses institutions but a project increasingly involving both RTV, Vojvodina’s 
public broadcasting service, and all educational institutions throughout 
Vojvodina. The project was not envisaged as a campaign, a project of the 
Executive Council, but designed to be incorporated in the continuous efforts of 
institutions and establishments throughout Vojvodina. The fact that young 
people’s support for the project is far greater than at fist envisaged is an especially 
valuable experience. It had been predicted by many that the project would fail 
owing to resistance on the part of institutions, establishments, young people. 
Fortunately, it turned out that young people were willing and glad to participate 
in the project, the only cause for concern being the fact that there had been no 
such projects and curricula in the past. Unfortunately, owing to lack of 
understanding on the part of the authorities charged with preparing the school 
curricula, many of these projects have not yet been included in the curricula and 
extracurricular activities, though this has not had negative effects on the success 
of the project.  
 
Outlines of a quality policy of multiculturality  
 
At the end of this paper we shall define some elements of the policy of 
multiculturality based on the practice of the Executive Council so far. It is of 
special importance that the policy of multiculturality should (in addition to 
safeguarding and developing the institutional and legal framework) be defined 
and declared in the highest legal acts as an asset of special importance for 
Vojvodina. Such a definition of multiculturality as a special value in the highest 
acts would only amplify the significance of such a policy. The implementation of a 
policy of strategic planning is also very important. In order to realize such an 
asset in everyday life, one must define a clear strategy, with specified 
implementing agencies, fixed-term commitments and measures designed to 
ensure the successful realization of such a policy. Unfortunately, such a strategy 
has not been framed and this might be considered as an omission on the part of 
the provincial organs in the past period. It is important for multiculturality to be 
as evident as possible, to be more transparent at every turn – public rather than 
private multiculturality is what distinguishes such a policy.  
Language is a key element of any policy of multiculturality and must not be 
neglected in relation to Vojvodina. Any relativization of the importance of 
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language and script in Vojvodina is erroneous and in some way amounts to a 
covert policy of assimilation. Because there can be no multiculturality in 
Vojvodina without the existence of multilingualism in Vojvodina, the policy 
pursued by the state in the sphere of language must change. This is not only a 
matter of the official use of language, enormous as its importance for 
multiculturality is, but primarily of the need to foster multilingualism in the 
territory of Vojvodina more generally. The things which were widely in evidence 
in the present territory of Vojvodina in the 19th century must be encouraged and 
promoted also today. In the 1990s vigorous attempts were made to reduce and 
eradicate multilingualism in Vojvodina. In markedly multicultural environments, 
it would be very good if the majority of citizens were to use the languages 
characteristic of the environment. Istria in Croatia is a good example of this. The 
example may not be most appropriate but it can be important. In Istria, 90 per 
cent of the total population is multilingual (speaking both Croatian and Italian) 
although Italians account for 10 per cent or so of the population of Istria.  
In addition to continuing the present policy, as well as strategic planning in 
the domain of multiculturality, a significant role should be played by institutional 
development of multilingualism in Vojvodina. Efforts should be made for as 
many residents of Vojvodina as possible to become multilingual, above all 
through the educational system, but also with the help of the media. Important as 
it is to enable and help members of national minorities to learn the Serbian 
language as much as possible, it is of no less importance for as many Serbs as 
possible to become multilingual in places and areas with very high percentages of 
Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian populations.  
 
 
Dragan PROLE 
LOCAL HERITAGE – MAINSTAY OF POLICY  
OF MULTICULTURALITY 
 
The inevitability of the policy of discontinuity 
 
In spite of the optimistic forecasts pompously announcing a picture of a 
completely different Serbia after 5 October 2000, the view that the legacy of the 
1990s lingers on tenaciously in Serbia is almost universally held. The reforms, the 
magic word by which optimists put so much store, have not made much headway 
in spite of undeniable successes. Without embarking on an analysis of the state of 
affairs in the domain of the state apparatus and all its auxiliary services, we may 
note insufficient reform progress also in respect of the reception of the minority 
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communities by the majority people, and also in respect of the degree of exercise 
of minority rights, of psychological security as their equivalent of life and true 
indicator of the quality of interethnic relations. 
The legacy of the 1990s is far from benign: xenophobia, the branding of 
minority communities as a detrimental factor upsetting the spiritual and 
jeopardizing the territorial integrity of Serbia, the treatment of minorities as a 
security risk... The new political reality has been created by the almost daily 
presence of these model attitudes towards minorities. Voices regarding the ethnic, 
religious and cultural plurality as factors aimed primarily at the destruction of the 
vital interests of the Republic of Serbia, including at secession, have not yet 
disappeared from the public scene. In this connection, identifying all minority 
community interests as anti-Serb interests is especially dangerous. Given the 
intensity and public influence of such voices, the considerable period of time since 
the end of the wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia has unfortunately not 
brought about an improvement. What is more, the generations brought up and 
raised in an atmosphere in which positive conceptions about the possibility of 
‘brotherhood’ between different peoples were destroyed and the belief promoted 
that one should recognize as a ‘brother’ a member of one’s own nation, have 
exhibited potential for violence against people other than ‘brothers’. One’s 
‘brother’ in the former Yugoslavia is simply not the same as the person called 
‘brother’ these days, because ‘brotherhood’ has now assumed strong nationalistic 
connotations which are not easily discarded. 
If the fights between young people that have been registered in many 
places in Vojvodina are ethnically motivated, then they merit much greater 
attention than the phenomenon of sporadic incidents, above all because they 
reflect in a brutalized and denuded form a state of affairs characteristic of the 
legacy of multicultural relations at the beginning of the new millennium. Besides, 
the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo has additionally complicated 
matters: by potentially fuelling arguments equating minority and secession, it 
reduces to the absurdum any effort to promote multicultural relations as a step 
against the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. In a 
word, creating an atmosphere for considerably weakening the motives resulting 
in conflicts in the aftermath of Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence, has 
become an even more difficult task. 
 
‘Consistency’ in authorities’ attitude to minority communities 
 
For all the tumultuous events on the political scene and the political actors 
succeeding one another on it, eight years after the 5th of October the attitude of 
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the political elites to minorities can be described as only too consistent. The 
problem is, what makes it consistent is not the absence of a radical break with the 
previous state of affairs, but the refusal by the republic government, in which 
power is concentrated, to constitute a special ministry for minority communities. 
Such a ministry had not the least chance of being constituted even during the last 
Serbian Government reshuffle aiming to maximize the number of ministerial 
posts. This only proved what had been suspected before. This is why critics 
incline to the assessment that the ministry that operated at the level of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was primarily a simulation, given that the dissolution of 
the union did not lead to the institutionalization of its republic level equivalent. In 
spite of the law that was passed and the establishment of the National Councils as 
intermediaries between the state and the minority communities, one may 
conclude that very little has changed on the plane of daily experience. 
If we pay attention to the situation in the region, we shall be hard put to 
identify recipes applicable in Vojvodina. The impression is that the mechanisms of 
political power not only in Serbia but in most countries undergoing transition in 
the territory of Central and South East Europe are operating on the presumption 
of the homogenization of culture. The attitude of one culture to another is always 
the result of a previous situation of the first culture. The effect of this is the far-
reaching marginalization of moments of mutual influence, that is, of the 
constituent role which intercultural relations played in the formation of own 
culture. To the extent to which is has been deprived of the influence and criteria of 
the political elites, the autonomous force of culture is heading in precisely the 
opposite direction. Its intention is not to homogenize the cultural ‘specificities’ of 
particular nations, and to present them in markedly ‘purified’ forms, but to 
establish the differentiation of cultural reality in which there is always room for 
the presence of the ‘alien’ (belonging to a minority, a neighbour) within one’s 
own. 
One of the fundamental prerequisites for the implementation of genuine 
reforms in Serbia is the affirmation of such model of ‘cultural translation’ of 
identity. Its potentials are extremely applicable primarily at the level of education, 
as is nicely illustrated by the monographs on ‘cultural ties’ published in Serbia in 
recent years. However, they are not confined to the sphere of translation and 
publishing with the object of throwing light on the historical closeness and 
permeability of particular cultures, because their scope of political applicability is 
far greater.  
There is no doubt whatever that the efforts of the republic and provincial 
authorities aiming to generate different intercultural relations in a highly 
unfavourable context are confronted with an exceptionally delicate and complex 
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situation. All the same, it seems necessary to express reserve towards the 
effectiveness of billboards bearing messages such as: ‘Let the neighbour’s cow live 
and be healthy”. [The popular curse runs: ‘May the neighbour’s cow die’.] 
 
Impotence of propaganda in policy of multiculturality 
 
In appraising the justifiability of such propaganda,47 we shall be much more 
circumspect if we bear in mind the observations which recognized in that 
approach a mechanism capable of distorting everyday language into an 
instrument turning into a means rather than an end in the hands of those to 
whom it appeals. It is therefore not by accident that words such as tolerance and 
wealth of diversity, which are most often used in campaigns of the provincial 
authorities, have long lost their substance. Faced with the complexity of life’s 
phenomena they simply don’t have much chance, even from the point of view of 
those who are always inclined to recognize in them affirmative expressions of 
sociality.  
There is no doubt that the situation in the field of culture is not immune to 
the sphere of morality, which itself is often suggestive of a financial logic, namely 
that discretion which predominates in conditions of welfare turns into public 
commotion once the means become scarce.48 Frequent recourse to phrases about 
multicultural relations indicates that there is an awareness of the need for 
‘normalization’ and improvement, as well as suggesting that we lack other 
mechanisms for addressing the present situation. 
Although a well-wisher might observe that the European Union too relies 
on metaphysical constructs in the form of phrases such as ‘unity in diversity’, one 
may reply that the main pillars of sociality shouldn’t be advertised alongside 
consumer goods after all. Furthermore, everybody who has outgrown his or her 
                                                 
47 The reference here is above all to the strong critique of the inevitable manipulative 
characteristics of propaganda inaugurated by Adorno and Horkheimer: ‘Propaganda for 
changing the world, what nonsense! Propaganda turns language into an instrument, a 
lever, a machine. Propaganda fixes the constitution of man, such as came about under 
social injustice, insofar as it actuates that injustice… Everybody knows deep inside that by 
using means it has became a means itself, like in a factory.’ Dialektik der Aufklärung, 
Frankfurt am Main 1969, p. 273. 
48 This topic was raised by Otfried Hoeffe, who remarked wittily: ‘It is interesting 
that as a subject of ethics, morals are treated like money. Where there is enough of it, in 
banks, discretion is required, and in the exercise of morals, modesty; it is only where there 
is lack of it that the matter finds itself in the vortex of public confrontation.’ Moral als Preis 
der Moderne. Ein Versuch über Wissenschaft, Technik und Umwelt, Frankfurt a/M 1993, p. 291. 
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childhood feels or knows that advertisements inevitably conceal an element of 
allurement.  
On the other hand, the heavy burden of legacy and the collapse of the 
values relied upon by the socialist community make it necessary to create news 
forms of togetherness. The legitimation of these forms must be based on social 
reality rather than on the stimulative qualities of propaganda. At the same time, 
mass confidence in the future, stabilization and improved economic situation and 
in benefits from European integration must nevertheless not be left unattended.  
Speaking in principle, Vojvodina is, after all, not reducible to a space whose 
content is exhausted in interethnic strife. Its history abounds with examples of 
multicultural life which in many respects can serve as models in European 
proportions. It is therefore to be recommended that one should rely on the 
phenomena from everyday life, which is generally comprehensible to all and free 
from any manipulative influence.  
In this light, the initiatives of the provincial authorities to change the 
schoolchildren’s attitudes to multiculturality by means of ‘familiarization’ quizzes 
do not seem a particularly happy solution! The fact that they are evocative of the 
forced learning of information about the ‘glorious’ past of the ‘progressive’ 
representatives, that is, of the communist descendants of our nations and 
nationalities, is not the only reason. Those who learned from publications like The 
Seven Secretaries of the Union of Communists Youth of Yugoslavia in preparation for 
the former quizzes know best how little they remember. The competent Provincial 
Secretariat would operate much better if it stopped being self-assured and held an 
occasional consultation with representatives of institutions and nongovernmental 
organizations committed to improving the multiculturality situation on the 
ground. It is illogical that the provincial authorities and the nongovernmental 
sector should operate as institutions engaged in the same activities but on two 
different planets. 
Unlike the quizzes, which involve formal familiarization with cultures 
existing next to us through a wealth of data about historical events and 
distinguished individuals, and whose flaw lies in the fact that such knowledge 
may not bring about a change of value judgements, acquaintance with living 
fellow-citizens, their lives, dreams and emotions can go a long way towards 
relativizing the discrediting fallacies. This is why information about local heritage 
can be much more convincing and productive in the shaping of human relations 
than data pertaining to the history of a people. Life’s content has proved to be the 
deciding factor in the policy of multiculturality insofar as it rids the whole subject 
of elements of a tribunal, of an atmosphere in which we accuse and pass 
judgement on each other. 
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Such a policy would rely on more discrete operation of the political sphere 
implying above all the disqualification of any emanation of violence both in 
verbal and in brutal, physical form. One thing is certain: the disappearance of 
words such a tolerance and multiculturality from public life will not necessarily 
mean that all the problems addressed with their help have finally been solved; but 
it will certainly indicate the existence of certain new elements rendering 
unnecessary their presence on the horizon of daily experience.  
 
 
Nicu CIOBANU 
VOJVODINA AND MULTICULTURALITY POLICIES 
Experiences and Prospects 
 
A discussion of Vojvodina’s multiculturality is actually a discussion of its 
substance: Vojvodina indeed is an authentic combination of multiculturality. That 
is its specific genetic code. Precisely because of this, its is necessary, from time to 
time, to re-examine the extent to which the rights of different ethnic collectivities 
are exercised as an indicator of co-existence in Vojvodina, or of unity in diversity. 
Unfortunately, the past 20 years are a period when Vojvodina’s multiculturality in 
particular was seen as a political and economic burden, leading to the violation 
and abolition of many of the acquired rights of national communities.  
The multiculturality of Vojvodina, its distinguishing mark, has 
continuously been violated to such an extent that differences between various 
ethnic communities in terms of the exercise of their rights are becoming 
increasingly noticeable, all of which is happening with the support of the power 
structures. A new reality is being created, new criteria – different, unequal – are 
being imposed, and this is hugely frustrating for anyone aspiring to establish 
higher standards. It is obvious that because such a state of affairs suits all political 
structures, even in the wake of the 5th of October, all the more so as it constitutes 
the legacy of the 1990s, they feel no primary responsibility for it; but they are 
responsible in that they are unwilling to change it.  
As has been seen, effective mechanisms for normalizing a distorted, 
disrupted multiculturality should not be sought either in the political will of the 
authorities – by the way, these very authorities will take credit for them whenever 
they can – nor in the outcome of real needs for something which would bring 
about harmony and respect for the fundamental principles of a civilized society 
and respect for human rights, but in the pressure of the international community 
and the imposed need to adopt European values.  
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The Vojvodina’s multiculturality has also been used as a means of 
manipulation. The political elites have used multiculturality as a safety valve on 
the road to the achievement of their political objectives, not infrequently also as a 
blind for the concealment of semblances, in trying to win political points and 
favours both at home, in the electorate, and abroad.  
If all this is taken into consideration, it is not easy to lay down and foster 
genuinely neutral standards. This may give rise to crucial problems: reconciliation 
of legitimate demands for unity and diversity; achieving political consensus 
without cultural uniformity; coexistence but not also assimilation; fostering the 
unity of the Vojvodina cultural space while at the same time respecting its 
legitimate cultural diversity; respect for all cultural identities without weakening 
the identity of collectively belonging to Vojvodina’s multiculturality. Vojvodina’s 
multiculturality should be approached as a reality, as an essential component of 
its existence, and less so as a pathetic manifestation of its wealth behind which 
lurk the pitfalls of a politicized society. Not as a folklore phenomenon or an 
ideological relapse into the past, though there were periods when Vojvodina was 
stronger, more substantial precisely in that past.  
The very notion of culture and its manifestation plays a crucial role in 
understanding Vojvodina’s multiculturality, different views of culture result in 
different understanding of multicultural practice. This is not only a question of 
different meanings of the concept of culture, but of different aspects 
encompassing the content of the concept of culture. Today Vojvodina’s culture is 
increasingly seen as an open-ended, evolutive process, never as a process of 
mutual permeation of intercultural influences. The level of development and 
compatibility of cultural identities of different ethnic communities, above all their 
permeation, are without doubt essential components of Vojvodina’s reality on the 
path of building a healthy multicultural society. Affirmative action in operation, 
as a major component of multicultural practice, and political will are essential 
factors for establishing and facilitating communication between different cultural 
models.  
Today, the participation of national communities in the Vojvodina 
government is on the margins of their needs, but not of their real potential. It is 
only a part of the political discourse, not a part of practicable intentions to really 
do something about it. This moves us away from an authentic Vojvodina 
multicultural space. The example of Vojvodina enables one to perceive a variety 
of relationships between existing, traditional, ethnic communities, but more recent 
developments make it necessary to adopt a different concept of a different 
multicultural reality, different from that which had been emblematic of Vojvodina 
during the past 30 years. Besides the traditional cultural models of Vojvodina, we 
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are faced with new models in the aftermath of the developments/wars of the 
1990s, with the fact that there is communication as well as tension between the 
indigenous population and the newcomers as representatives of the new cultural 
model, a matter discussed earlier by Mr Domonji, among others. The extent of 
that population’s integration is, actually, a prerequisite for the proper functioning 
of the society as a whole, so one should pay special attention to multicultural 
relations as an essential element of a healthy society. It is precisely this 
communication, or, more specifically, it is on this communication that the 
prospects of Vojvodina’s multiculturality depend. Impairment of the 
multicultural space of Vojvodina means encroachment on its essence. It goes 
without saying that in this process both the media and the structures of 
government, as well as relevant nongovernmental organizations, bear enormous 
responsibility for the definition of the level of existing multicultural relations, 
which implies the identification of new cultural models with the object of 
avoiding potential risks of conflict and of preventive action in this direction. If we 
regard relations between different cultural models as relations between different 
national cultures and entrust the matter to the testing ground of political 
discourse, we shall not achieve the desired effect of unity in diversity. Political 
discourse usually leads to deception and to strengthening of the national culture 
model. Vojvodina doesn’t need strengthening but articulating national cultural 
identities, the mutual permeation of different cultural models and the creation of 
a new, qualitative content.  
A distinguishing mark of Vojvodina is cooperative multiculturalism, which 
thrives on the coexistence of different cultures. Such a model usually accepts the 
coexistence of different cultures but opposes their mingling. A multiculturalism 
which does not lead to integration is a factor which inevitably leads to separatism, 
just as a policy overemphasizing identity and a struggle for rights – not within the 
majority people, but between members of national communities, a struggle 
degenerating into a fight for special treatment, status, benefits and privileges – 
can become a factor of destabilization in Vojvodina. This also gives rise to radical 
multiculturalism, which often espouses the collective rights of a cultural minority 
in accordance with their demands for autonomy, whether linguistic, cultural or 
territorial autonomy. The realization of such kind of multiculturalism ought to be 
addressed with great responsibility and competence. Therefore, from a political 
point of view, multiculturalism must strive towards the abolition of mechanisms 
for the exclusion of diversity, that is, towards increasing the potential for 
integrating unity into diversity. Instead of emphasizing cultural differences, one 
should accept a model of cultural and national permeation, intermingling and 
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reciprocal influences. Any model other than this may bear the risk of ethnic 
separatism.  
Since Vojvodina’s future lies in its multiculturality, it must be fostered as a 
real need, a specific, precious asset developed over the centuries, rather than as 
political window-dressing by the structures of power patterned on the imposition 
of the affirmation of multiculturality and employing the mechanisms of socialist 
realism – a consideration the Secretariat for Legislation, Administration and 
National Minorities had in mind in initiating, supporting and realizing a great 
number of projects.  
 
 
Svenka SAVIC 
WOMEN’S CONTRIBUTION TO MULTICULTURAL VOJVODINA 
 
Vojvodina is today held up as a positive example in the region where many 
different national groups have lived for a long period of time without major 
upheaval. Hence the hope that this region can be a desirable example of what the 
European Union has in its programme of unity in diversity. In Vojvodina, an 
enviable level of multicultural life has been achieved, although during the 
previous century there was a sizeable reduction of the number of ‘others’ relative 
to the majority population. 
So far no one has raised the question of whether the development of 
multiculturality in Vojvodina has also been marked in gender terms. Have 
women contributed or not to the furthering of coexistence in the province and in 
what way? Do women belonging to other national communities contribute to the 
development of multiculturality in a different way from women belonging to the 
majority nation? (One should bear in mind that the term majority people has 
changed essentially over the past two centuries: at the end of the 18th century 
non-Serb population predominated compared to the situation in Vojvodina 
today.)  
Our social sciences are concerned with the question of multiculturality 
mostly at global level, less so at individual level, and almost not at all in terms of 
gender problems (male and female population). This is why we find it rather 
difficult to address the whole problem in a different way. 
In a poll of female students (Savić, 2001) we asked whether today young 
women from the majority people in Vojvodina (Serbs) look upon women from 
other national communities among whom they live in the same way or whether 
they differentiate between them. Whether, for example, they see women from 
another national community as being ‘more’ different and feel towards them a 
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greater social distance as a result, or whether they have the same attitude to 
women from other national communities. 
I’m going to present here only a few basic items of information from that 
research. 
Regarding their attitude to women from other national communities with 
whom they coexist across Vojvodina (Albanians, Croats, Jews, Hungarians, 
Germans, Roma, Romanians, Rusyns, Slovaks), young Serbs have an attitude of 
‘otherness’ which they manifest through various prejudices and social distance. 
Serb women have more positive attitudes to Croat, Slovak, Rusyn, Jew and 
German women and markedly negative attitudes to Albanian, Roma and 
Romanian women. For instance, Roma are dirty, uneducated, have lots of 
children… Albanians are subordinated to their husbands, have lots of children... 
Such stereotypes among Serbs bear out elements of patriarchal or hierarchic 
attitudes to ‘other’ women, as well as considerable ignorance and lack of 
knowledge of women from other cultures. 
Whereas Croat, Hungarian, Slovak, Jewish women figure as part of the 
family, relatives or neighbours, Roma and Albanians are hardly accorded a 
positive attribute or seen as being part of one’s environment (other than when 
begging in the street).  
In addition to having negative attitudes to women from certain national 
communities, young Serb women see themselves as tradition-bound, dominated 
by their men and subordinating their lives in large part to the needs of the 
narrower and wider community (the Kosovo Maiden model, the Orthodox 
persuasion…). Dissatisfied with their own position in society, they project part of 
their subordinate role to women from other national communities living in these 
parts. 
We added to the information obtained on the basis of the poll data from 
interviews (oral history) conducted with (un)known (elderly) women from 
different national communities in Vojvodina. This information contains an 
abundance of examples of how women from different national communities 
cooperated with each other, helped each other, how they learned from each other 
and went to each other’s aid as trusted friends. There is also information about 
how events in general (street roundups, colonization, post-1990s refugee 
situation) affected their lives. The results obtained by combining the two methods 
of data gathering enable us to challenge the belief that a multicultural form of life 
is in itself something positive. One might rather say that this approach too gives 
grounds for the preservation of the patriarchal mode of life, at least where women 
are concerned, because traditional cultures rest on a hierarchically organized 
order, an order with man’s power at the top of the pyramid. Therefore, in 
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theoretical considerations of multiculturality in general, and with special 
reference to Vojvodina, one ought to bear in mind that the polysemy of this term 
clouds the real picture. Interculturality and multiculturality carry the danger of 
reflecting patriarchal relations of domination in both society and education. Thus, 
some ‘different’ people are considered more different, and therefore also more 
undesirable, in the multicultural society we are all so proud of. With regard to 
women, Roma, Albanians and Romanians are considered ‘more undesirable’ that 
women from other national communities, at least according to our poll. Further, 
this term conceals the fact that in many cases it is not a question of coexistence but 
of parallel existence, without cooperating, getting to know each other and 
respecting each other.  
We don’t have enough information about relations between women from 
different national communities (for instance, relations between Hungarians and 
Slovaks, or Serbs and Romanians, and so on). It is therefore necessary to continue 
and identify in further research the substantial and numerous contributions made 
by both famous and less well known women from different national communities 
to Vojvodina’s multiculturality (of which we are today so proud to ourselves and 
to others). 
Given that multiculturality involves respect for the (cultural) customs of a 
community, I should like to recall some facts by way of a proposal for discussion. 
Nearly every community has customs by which woman’s subordinated position 
is confirmed in this or that way. Let us cite only those glaring examples which are 
directly contrary to women’s rights and human rights, those which are part of 
traditional cultures in various parts of the world, including these parts. For 
instance, forced marriage, where a girl not yet of age is married to a man chosen 
for her by others, is still practiced by the Roma community today (and was 
practiced by the Serb community in the previous century). Further, customary 
law is still in force in respect of succession: female children inherit less than male 
children, although our law is very modern in this regard. There are customs in 
other cultures (distant from us) where a woman is cremated when her husband 
dies, where she is stoned for adultery, denied the right to vote and be elected, 
where barren women are cast out, where female genitals are cut, not to mention 
polygamy… 
While some people in this country are currently proposing that marriages 
between minors should be punished by law, at the same time there are instances 
of religious dignitaries having more than one wife including under age ones. We 
see how elusive is the meaning of multiculturality when broadened with the 
perspective of gender equality. Introduce the variable of social power into this 
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perspective, and we see that those who have power also have the right to keep 
woman in patriarchal subordination, and that under the pretext of a custom. 
In this connection, Ana Bogdanić deconstructs the very notion, as well as 
the theoretical framework, of multiculturality by analyzing a newspaper article 
published in Croatia about a Roma man raping an underage Roma girl, his distant 
relative and refugee from Kosovo, near the town of Rijeka. The court imposed an 
exceptionally lenient sentence (a suspended six-month prison sentence) on the 
grounds that for Roma girls, entering into sexual relationships at a young age is 
part of the Roma community’s traditional culture. In doing so, the court 
manifested its ignorance of fundamental human rights to a life without violence 
and its patriarchal attitude to women, namely the fact that it considers the act of 
rape as carrying less weight than a traditional custom. Apparently the court chose 
no other time than the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-15) to exercise ‘flexibility’ 
in its appreciation of the Roma question and knowledge of the intercultural. 
So, the problem is: how can one respect cultural customs which provide 
shelter to barbarity and brutal violation of women’s human rights in relation to 
universal human rights and cultural rights in particular? In this connection, we’re 
raising the question of human rights: are they universal or are they, after all, 
conditioned by culture and particular? If the existing patriarchal relations and 
woman’s subordination to the needs of the community as a whole and of man 
(husband) in particular are hiding behind the concept of multiculturality, then we 
do have big problems. Findings of gender studies – research concerned with the 
deconstruction of culture in order to identify oppression of women – strongly 
emphasize the need to take account of gender perspectives, among other things, 
in discussions of multiculturalism. 
 
Notes 
 
At the time of the research our state was called Serbia and Montenegro. Meanwhile 
the two states have separated, which would be reason enough to conduct an additional 
poll and ask the question: If I said to you ‘Montenegrin woman’, what would your first 
association be? 
Basic findings indicate that young Serb women have a positive attitude to 
Montenegrin women, above all an attitude of respect, though they see them too as victims 
of patriarchal norms in society: the woman who stands behind the Montenegrin man; a 
woman who is a slave to her home and family; under great influence from her husband; a 
person who is aware of her position in the home and doesn’t fight for her self-respect too 
hard; a woman in a subordinate position in relation to a man; a woman subjected to her 
husband; a woman whose life closely follows strict patriarchal conditions; a woman with a 
patriarchal upbringing; obedient to husband, father; mother of a patriarch.  
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Mirko DJORDJEVIC 
VOJVODINA’S IDENTITY – SOME MARGINALIA 
 
In lieu of a prologue 
 
It goes without saying – at least on this occasion – that there is no need for 
any reference to the history of Vojvodina, it’s not something that’s unknown, and, 
besides, I have written and talked about that on numerous occasions. Right now, 
however, top scholars are involved in serious debates in Europe itself about 
Vojvodina’s identity, citing the ‘Vojvodina model’ as a warning to Europe. Some 
of these studies place the problem on the widest possible foundation, an approach 
which is still largely lacking here.49 On another occasion – somewhat earlier – the 
same author explains the matter in quite precise terms.50 Academician Beranger 
proceeds from the fact that in the space of the post-communist East – the historical 
space of a long-disappeared empire – there is a nostalgia for a state which is gone 
and that this is no accident. Hence the conclusion on which we, too, insist: states’ 
forms or ‘frameworks’ under international law are far more ephemeral than they 
appear to us, with cultural patterns usually outliving such forms. Of course, if the 
meaning of the syntagma ‘cultural and identity pattern’ is construed as it was 
construed by Slobodan Jovanović in one of the best short essays on the topic we 
have in the recent history of our political publicist writing. The truth of this has 
been borne in on us in the aftermath of the latest collapse of the etatistic ‘greater’ 
Serbia concepts from the period of Milošević’s Balkan war adventure, though 
there had been such concepts in the shape of ‘greater’ Bulgaria, Romania and so 
on before. This leads to some other conclusions of current relevance. The idea of 
national unity as a cultural idea based on language and traditions makes sense 
and is viable, but its opposite – the etatistic notion of unity – is deleterious and 
risky. That all Serbs or all Hungarians are linked together by language and 
cultural traditions is not in issue, but it is when it comes to realizing a state that 
there are collisions whose scenarios are known to us: a modern state can be 
organized on principles of fullest diversity, but a purely ethnic or religious or 
confessional state is impossible. Without these facts one can hardly engage in 
serious discussion about Vojvodina’s identity. Some of the examples are from the 
context of daily politics and they tell us a lot, since Europe is being built on this 
second principle.  
                                                 
49 Jean Beranger: L’Austrische-Hongrie 1815 – 1918. Paris, ed. Armand Colin, 1994. 
50 Jean Beranger: Lexique historique de l’ Europe danubienne – XVI – XIX siecles, 
Paris ed. Armand Colin, 1976. 
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Historical fanaticisms as a substitute for reality 
 
A few days ago the notorious ‘Serb vaivode’ sent word from The Hague 
that the murderer of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić is another Gavrilo Princip. He 
is not the only one – a good many members of the national elites think that way. 
Arguing that the late Zoran Đinđić was not an Archduke Ferdinand does not 
make sense; but this reference to Gavrilo Princip urges us to touch upon another 
thing connected with the topic being discussed today. The well-known French 
historian Francois Fejto – everybody finds his name difficult to pronounce, he is of 
Hungarian origin and well acquainted with the situation in Vojvodina – puts 
forward several theses which merit attention. Though we may argue them on 
some other occasion, his remarks about Gavrilo Princip are important in this work 
whose title Requiem for a Defunct Monarchy contains yet another thesis; one should 
take this into consideration when talking about the Vojvodina model which is 
today rightly seen as a historical paradigm.51 We shall here leave aside the 
question of whether the Monarchy fell apart or was murdered by some in the 
West because it was catholic, which allegedly appealed to the masons and 
Clemenceau, as well as to the Paris intellectuals following the Jacobin ideals of 
nation states that were later adopted by all ethno-nationalists in particular. We all 
know the Balkan ‘story’ at least from the events from the last decade. What is 
important in this regard is that with the shots fired by the Miljacka river ‘Serbia 
ushered in terrorism as a new form of political struggle’. This conclusion is 
important also because the latest developments show that this still holds true in 
the Balkans – and not only regarding the Serbs – or that no lessons are learned 
from experience of the last decade.  
 
The Vojvodina stamp on the multitude of languages 
 
Naturally, this is emblematic and is not mentioned as a mere bizarre 
incident but as an important sign. It is hardly necessary to debate whether the 
Vojvodina ‘model’ is perfect: naturally it is not and one should do everything to 
develop it in accordance with the principles of the balance achieved. Although 
this is not easy in view of the blind forces of daily politics, the principles we have 
mentioned do mean something. Something to all the peoples, ethnoses, religions 
and confessions in the region. This is also the political philosophy on which the 
EU is being built.  
 
                                                 
51 Francois Fejto: Requiem pour un Empire defunt, Paris, 1988. 
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Gordana PERUNOVIC FIJAT 
TERRA INCOGNITA: THE ROAD DOESN’T PASS THIS WAY 
 
On my way back from Kraljevo, where I was on a recent visit, to Kikinda, 
where I live, I took a taxi to take me to the Kraljevo bus station. ‘Where are you 
from?’ inquired the talkative taxi driver. ‘Ah, from Kikinda? I know where it is, I 
once drove to Budapest, Kikinda’s round about there,’ he said complacently. By 
the way, Kikinda’s not ‘round about’ Budapest, it takes five, six hours to get from 
Kikinda to Budapest on condition that your means of transport is a car and not a 
train or bus, and that the queue at the Horgoš-Reske border crossing isn’t too 
long. And, second, from whichever angle you look at the road map, the Kraljevo-
Budapest road doesn’t run via Kikinda – actually it runs nowhere near. Whether a 
motorist heads for Budapest via Belgrade and Zrenjanin, or via Novi Sad and 
Subotica, he doesn’t have to pass through Kikinda, unless he intends to make a 
detour before he goes on.  
Thus, a conversation lasting less than 60 seconds confirmed to me what I 
already knew: that for people living in Serbia south of Zemun, and particularly 
south of Belgrade, Vojvodina is a rather unknown and exotic land.  
By the way, the orchestra performing on the barge restaurant on the Ibar (a 
young girl from Kraljevo was celebrating her eighteenth birthday) played a great 
many songs composed and sung in Vojvodina for many decades. They were not 
only Đorđe Balašević’s songs, but hits that are, perhaps, a century old or even mo-
re. There’s no doubt that none of the musicians and guests knew that those songs 
were from Vojvodina, especially because they were played on instruments that 
are not used in Vojvodina, in a strange rhythm so unlike Vojvodina, and because 
the guests danced a somewhat subdued version of čoček to the music. The songs 
are, therefore, all right; but talking about autonomy isn’t. And when multicultu-
rality does make the ‘agenda’, people only talk in phrases such as, ‘It doesn’t mat-
ter what nationality he is, only what kind of man he is’, and so on. After all, what 
is the use of talking multiculturality in places inhabited by only one people (Ser-
bs) with a percentage of, say, Roma, where even refugees from Bosnia (and Serbs 
by nationality) have not succeeded in settling in large numbers? What kind of 
multiculturality is possible in an environment where being Serb and Orthodox 
Christian is the only pattern, where there are no other patterns? In Kraljevo, in the 
SOS Children’s Village for parentless children alone there are a few children of 
Slovak (two) and Hungarian (one girl) nationality; this fact is pointed out with 
pride, as proof of a genuine multiculturality, because the staff make it possible for 
the children to mark, say, Easter, according to the rules of their faith. But the SOS 
Children’s Village is something else: it was set up by an Austrian foundation whi-
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ch establishes such villages all over the world, guaranteeing the children in each 
of them respect for their national and religious identity – but what about the 
environment? Now, who was it that said, ‘We like minorities, but only if they’re 
quite small’? In other words, the establishment ‘likes’ other nations (and misses 
no opportunity of pointing this out) only and solely if they are so small in number 
that they can be used for cosmetic purposes, a trump card the authorities pull out 
when they want to portray themselves as ‘completely’ well-meaning and Europe-
an, especially where there are no minorities at all. By the way, my return to Kikin-
da dispelled a good part of my hopes that things could be different. Though the 
last election round did ensure that Savo Dobranić (DS) would be provincial depu-
ty instead of his rival Dr Branislav Blažić (SRS), one has no reason whatever to 
believe that the treatment of other nations in Kikinda, and ‘further afield’, will 
change in the immediate future. Because the Radicals won in our place, their 17 
mandates combined with three SPS and two DSS ones were enough to form go-
vernment. In this government, Jasmina Dudaš continues to serve as coordinator 
for national minorities, her only qualification for the job being that she is married 
to a Hungarian; and it is on the strength of this that she’s in the habit of saying 
(not only in private, but also for the media) that ‘intercommunal relations in Ki-
kinda are excellent’. A graffito on a building in Kikinda reading ‘God, save us 
from the plague and the Croats’ (wherever did its author read that phrase?), as 
well as hate graffiti targeting Jews and Hungarians scrawled on the house of an 
elderly resident, a Hungarian women, caused a reaction from state institutions, 
which dispatched a delegation post-haste to look into the matter; however, the lo-
cal (SRS) authorities replied that ‘there are no problems’, at least that they saw no-
ne, so, if they could not see any problems, it meant that there were in all probabili-
ty none. For the nations which are not particularly numerous in the Vojvodi-
na/Kikinda milieu, there is only one choice left: either to demand protection of 
their rights as loudly as they can, or to fall silent forever (the quite likely outcome, 
con-sidering that their members are actually dying out). At the seminars of the 
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, organized by the Novi Sad 
office, I’ve heard it said often that we’ll have wonderful multiculturality mecha-
nisms some day, only none of the peoples who could benefit from such mecha-
nisms will be around any more.  
Some time ago, a branch of the Community of Romanians, of whom there 
are some 200 in Kikinda municipality, was established in Kikinda (with Kornel 
Boronka the branch president). Most of them have Serb first names and surnames. 
They don’t speak the language well or don’t speak it at all although Romania is 
eight kilometres from Kikinda. A member of the majority nation commented, 
‘Why are they organizing themselves into that association since there are so few of 
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them?’; but then, he added that he had ‘nothing against that, let people gather 
together, it’s nice of them to be cherishing their culture’. In the vocabulary as well 
as in the minds of the large majority of the population, ‘cherishing one’s culture’ 
on the part of less numerous peoples implies only folklore events along with 
exhibitions of fancy work and traditional cooking. National diversity is still not 
reflected at all in political life, other than when the municipal president (SRS) 
turns up – but not always – at events organized by cultural-artistic societies for 
the cultivation of Hungarian and Roma cultures, and attends Jewish Culture 
Days, something he does regularly. Absurdly enough, Hungarians occupy several 
key positions in the ruling SRS in Kikinda, which couldn’t be said of the DS, LSV 
and LDP. In the local elections the Hungarian coalition won two places in the 
Municipal Assembly of Kikinda; however, the less numerous minorities (a 
pleonasm?), represented in the town and the villages by only a few families (Jews, 
Germans), are simply not visible, including in politics. The Roma are nowhere to 
be seen either, although they are more numerous. The only exception are those 
Roma who are with the SRS and those undergoing NGO education.  
There is another curiosity visible in the political and everyday life of 
Kikinda, namely differences between Serbs and Serbs. The indigenous Serbs – 
descendants of the border guards from the time of Maria Theresa – and the Serb 
colonists still exhibit a kind of anecdotal mutual intolerance, which didn’t stop 
with the arrival of the refugees in the 1990s. ‘What do you think, how do I feel, 
being from a mixed marriage?’ a friend of mine asked me much to my surprise, 
because I knew that both her parents are – Serbs. ‘My father’s a Ličanin [a native 
of Lika region], my mother a Bosnian, but both were born in Vojvodina. What am 
I to consider myself – a Ličanka or a Bosnian? How should I declare myself?’ she 
went on, moved. I admitted that I myself was at a loss and suggested to her, with 
a touch of irony, to sort out that horrible personal problem herself. Such problems 
are likely to become more frequent and drastic as a result of Montenegro’s 
declaration of independence, and now there’s Kosovo as well, given that 
sentiments about one’s nationality and homeland are very difficult to explain, and 
even more difficult to talk about, because everybody’s on edge, people fall out far 
more easily than they come to an understanding. Contrary to the popular saying 
that only time will tell, we don’t need time to tell us who is going to implement 
policies of multiculturality and in what way in such a social climate, a climate 
made worse by the population’s poverty, insecurity and lack of prospects, 
because we’ve already seen too much to expect anything. After all, other than 
paying lip service, the government and its institutions have no intention of really 
framing and carrying out a policy of multiculturality, otherwise they would have 
already found the means to do so, given that they have both the money and 
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personnel for that. So, implementing a policy of multiculturality will – again! – be 
considered as something which, in the opinion of the majority and its institutions, 
‘the world is forcing us to do’. And so we have to do that which the world is 
forcing us to do, though we try our best to only go through the motions, without 
getting to the bottom of things, because that would not be to the liking of the 
majority of vote-casters.  
To paraphrase Pavel Domonji: the policy of multiculturality is a sort of 
foreplay. Some have heard of this word, but don’t understand what it means; 
other have heard it, but pretend they haven’t; and others still have heard it but, 
guessing that it’s indecent, don’t use it. And neither the first, nor the second, nor 
the third know to put the word into action, so they don’t put it into action and 
wouldn’t be seen dead asking someone who knows. The maxim about translating 
words into deeds is of no use here. That is, not counting those few who know how 
and would like to do it, only those in power don’t ask their opinion and don’t take 
them seriously; and so, inevitably, they are sooner or later reduced to small 
groups of people in the know who discuss good things with much zeal and little 
clout, with the reality outside pretty much the same as before.  
If Vojvodina doesn’t raise the question of policy of multiculturality, the 
odds are that Serbia won’t. As far as some of the nations which once were part of 
the ‘multifariousness of Vojvodina’ are concerned, the hour is rather late.  
‘Yet late is better than never’ – Tolkien.  
 
 
Boris VARGA 
VOJVODINA: MULTICULTURALITY AND CIVILITY52 
 
In Vojvodina, the notion of multiculturality in practice often excludes the 
values of civil society, or civility, which is a higher objective of modern 
democratic societies and the European Union. This is due to the absence of civil 
values in Serbia, weak legal foundations of multiculturality and abuse of the 
ethnic question for daily-political purposes. 
  
The elections and the Constitution 
 
The campaign for the presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia in 
2008 showed that few parties are prepared to propagate civil values in Serbia, and 
                                                 
52 ‘Civility’ as a term to denote a universal, supranational system of values based on 
the fule of law and on political and social pluralism. 
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thereby in Vojvodina. In the past two years, a number of factors have further 
jeopardized civil values in Serbia: the adoption of the new Constitution, the 
declaration of Kosovo’s independence, and the ‘swing to the right’ during the last 
parliamentary elections on the part of the leading members of the former DOS 
coalition: DS and, in particular, DSS and NS. 
The fact that the new Serbian Constitution was not confirmed de facto in 
Vojvodina was borne out by the poor voter turnout. The new Serbian Constitution 
failed to deliver on the promises of the pro-Europe forces to reinstate Vojvodina’s 
1974 autonomy status. Also, the Constitution differentiates between the citizens in 
the very definition of the state: ‘The Republic of Serbia is a state of the Serb people 
and all citizens living in it’. Looking upon the nation as an active real category, 
where membership is gained through ‘becoming one of the people’, causes great 
problems for the integration of societies, that is, of states, as testified to by the 
processes of ‘falling apart’, from the former Yugoslavia to the present, and further 
on (Pešić V., Nacionalna država (ili o Srbiji i Građaniji)). 
 
Multiculturality and democracy 
 
Nearly two decades after the introduction of multi-partyism, Serbia has no 
well thought-out conception of multiculturality. In Vojvodina, the most conspicu-
ous multiculturality model in evidence was created in the communist era, with 
the apparent objective of preserving the local ethnic communities through 
Cultural-Artistic Societies (KUD), a model which began to change actively only 
after 5 October 2000 (Losoncz A., Vojvodina and policies of multiculturality 
(discussion)). Such a KUD-ite model of multiculturality is often alienated in 
character because it closes the community, nurtures local ethno-nationalism and 
impedes the integration of national minorities into contemporary Serbian society.  
In legal terms multiculturality in Serbia is not fully regulated and is prone 
to political manipulation. Although important steps have been taken in building a 
new model of multiculturality in Serbia since the fall of the regime of S. Milošević, 
the process remains incomplete. The first national councils for ethnic communities 
have been established, but there is still no law on the national councils although it 
was announced over half a decade ago. Also, the state has no well thought-out 
and uniform policy with regard to national communities. Thus, at state level, two 
almost identical bodies for coordinating the national councils have been 
established – one at provincial level and the other at republic level (Ilić S., 
Vojvodina and policies of multiculturality (discussion)). These national bodies for 
the coordination of national councils have not become fully operational and have 
mostly been used for current political purposes.  
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The values 
 
The existing multiculturality value system in Vojvodina often does not 
correspond to the system of general civic values. Interculturality and 
multiculturality carry the danger of reflecting patriarchal relations of domination 
in both society and education (Savić S., Doprinos žena u multikulturalnoj 
Vojvodini). Nearly every local ethno-nationalism in Vojvodina has its foundations 
precisely in patriarchal society.  
The absence of civility causes segregation in contemporary Serbian society. 
Owing to the lack of universal values, and that in an atmosphere of national 
euphoria (like in the wake of the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence), local 
ethnic communities in Vojvodina project vulnerability fears, seal themselves off 
and often become nationally radicalized inside. In view of this, one may assume 
that, should Serbian society become integrated into the European Union and 
develop civic values, one of the more difficult processes will involve ‘opening up’ 
these local communities because they are not very responsive to change (let us not 
forget the KUD legacy).  
 
Existential autonomies 
 
The calls for territorial autonomies in Serbia and Vojvodina are a direct out-
come of the absence of civic values. The Hungarian national community in Vojvo-
dina is satisfied with the creation of conditions for personal autonomy but, in vi-
ew of the political influence brought to bear on the national community and the 
unstable state of Serbian politics, representatives of the Hungarian ethnic commu-
nity are also demanding territorial autonomy in the north of Vojvodina (Galam-
bos L., interview with Inter). Development of national civic and European values 
would obviate in Vojvodina the need for territorial autonomy on an ethnic basis.  
Official Belgrade’s rhetoric about lost territory – bearing in mind Kosovo 
but not acknowledging the two million or so citizens of Albanian nationality – has 
realistic chances of provoking a reaction by the Albanians in the Preševo valley in 
the shape of demands for ethnic autonomy, something which could be interpreted 
as their existential protectionism to say the least.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no uniform interpretation of multiculturalism in Serbia and 
Vojvodina. The process of creating a legal framework for the development of 
multiculturalism is incomplete, which leaves room for manipulation of ethnic 
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issues for current political purposes. Considering that the Serbian state does not 
foster civic values in society, ‘greater-Serbian nationalism’ has a direct influence 
on the development of so-called ‘minority nationalisms’. If a system of civic 
values is not developed in Serbia, and therefore in Vojvodina too, the state might 
enter upon a period of long-term political, societal and territorial destabilization. 
There is no doubt that the development of multiculturalism, as a component of 
civility in Serbia and Vojvodina, can facilitate, among other things, the process of 
integrating the state into the European Union.  
  
 
Gojko MISKOVIC 
 ‘TITANIC’ AND ‘CARPATHIA’ 
 
The scuttling of nation-building strategies 
 
It was with great personal satisfaction that I listened to Mr Mirko Đorđević 
and his richly argumented and, above all, deeply sincere approach to exposing 
the lies that fetter the majority ethnicum in the territories of Vojvodina and Serbia. 
I am probably one of the few apostates who possess and read proscribed books in 
order to find out how many dramatic untruths the unfortunate citizens of this 
ruined country have to cope with. To repeat, I am very grateful to Mr Đorđević 
for providing me with so inspired a cue.  
Having arrived from Sombor and driven on Vojvodina roads, I would like 
to present what I wish to say in the form of several fragments or themes. I’m 
coming from a city which de facto isn’t that any more. For a very long time, for 
nearly 90 years, there have been attempts to challenge the supranational idea 
which Vojvodina, of all parts of the former Austrian empire, that is, Austro-
Hungary, has adopted most successfully as a model for the future. If in a city, 
held up for a reason as a hearth of the urban spirit, you have such uncivilized 
phenomena, like distribution of bread free of charge in a place where bread has 
never been in short supply, then that is something deeply alarming. Nevertheless, 
thanks to individual acts of resistance that finally translated into a civic action in 
defence of a minority’s rights, with the participation of a good many of us 
gathered here, we can say that there is hope. And yet, your hope diminishes when 
you see that these victorious political pseudo-elites, with their avowed advocacy 
of Europeanism, are also unable to recognize the social trends, that they do not 
want nor wish to stop leading us up the garden path with their petty-politicking.  
I wish to say that I take the things we encounter every day as a kind of 
occupation and enslavement of the spirit and identity, as an attempt at all costs to 
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subject all Serbs in Vojvodina to a chimerical and ethno-phyletic approach being 
enforced by the priestry of the Serbian Orthodox Church. On my way to this 
meeting, I reached Srbobran or Sentomaš, as the Vojvodina Serbs used to call it. If 
you ask me, parallel use of the name Szenttamás again would do no harm, but 
when, driving along the road, you come across pictures of Hague inmates, 
garnished with posters of Obraz, and also posters of the Radical candidates, then 
you have no more doubts whatsoever as to why the name Szenttamás was painted 
over with black car spray at the exit from Srbobran.  
Last night I watched what I would describe as a tragic episode of the 
spiritual decay of Vojvodina’s RTV. The television was showing a rather unusual 
Russian serial, with fierce black-robed Russian priests questioning and revising 
the past, or rather the history of the Byzantine Empire; I recognized in that an 
attempt to create an orthodox church of god in Russia and Serbia which never existed 
save in the realm of ideas. I watched the programme with my son and, you can 
take it from me, this 14-year-old saw easily through the whole rubbish they kept 
pouring on us through the screen. What I saw last night was really the worst 
product of malignant intellectualism which is very often pressed on us as the only 
permitted interpretation of the past, as well as of the future.  
I shall finish my ruminations aloud with a bit of black humour symbolism, 
something which may soon become part of our future’s ‘manifesto’ and which 
states – Zemun is ours! The results of the second round of the Vojvodina elections 
show very clearly that the citizens are much more intelligent than are the bunch of 
politicians and analysts concerned only with themselves. I fear that in addition to 
this slogan we shall have a ‘Titanic-Carpathia’ situation, only this time the 
‘Carpathia’ (Vojvodina) in its role of rescuer of the surviving citizens from the 
‘Titanic’ called Serbia, won’t be able to repeat what the steamer Carpathia did in 
the case of the glorious and tragic shipwreck. It also seems to me that the political 
will of the triumphant group of people who, at the end of 1918, gathered together 
in a festive mood in the former Hotel Meier in Novi Sad, in the shape of the 
Grand National Assembly of Serbs and Bunjevci, that that political will will not 
stand the test of the near future. 
In the days to come, we shall need much more sense, realism and 
conciliatoriness than the present social pseudo-elites in Vojvodina and Serbia 
have. I think that they and their predecessors are not aware of the fact that 
throughout the 20th century they sowed a great deal of wind but that the storm is 
yet to come.  
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Alpár LOSONCZ 
MULTICULTURALITY AND POLITICAL ALCHEMY 
 
As I listened to Mr Pavel Domonji’s opening speech, I thought that I must 
have confused the decade, I thought that I was actually living at a time two 
decades ago. What I’m saying is not a critical remark about what he said, but 
rather a diagnosis of the current state of affairs. I mean, what he said sounds like a 
repetition of the things debated during the 1990s. It’s simply baffling that, after all 
those varied and heated debates, assurances and attempts at enlightenment, if 
you will, we should still be at the starting point. Because, for instance, the fact that 
identity is of a dialogical character, that identity cannot be understood in terms of 
an unadulterated essence, that identity always comes into being though 
interference, these are, I think, the starting points not only for me, but for the 
people sitting at this table, who have taken part in many a crucial practical action 
in Serbia. To discuss things we already know, to repeat things which are already 
on record, that’s too much even if our aim is to underestimate ourselves. But in all 
this, as I said a moment ago, there is a gloomy diagnosis of the present situation. 
In other words, the repetition of known facts bears witness to our impotence. 
Besides, though I know very well that this session is not devoted to elections, I 
can’t help feeling that, in connection with the elections, there is a symbolic 
moment which throws light on our general condition. Because, regardless of the 
outcome of the backroom dealings which are part of the post-election alchemy, it 
is clear that one of the principal players on the Serbian political scene is going to 
be the same agent that dealt many a blow to multiculturality in Vojvodina during 
the 1990s. Meanwhile, our political elites, parts of the state apparatus, have 
learned Europe’s official language of multiculturalism, they know how to repeat 
certain slogans parrot-fashion. In the end, everybody will officially become great 
fans of multiculturality, if not for pragmatic reasons, then because of the reality 
tailored by Europe. I have no objection to that. The only problem is, 
multiculturality in Vojvodina is an irreversibly reduced demographic substratum. 
During the 1990s the ethnic map was changed very much as a result of various 
actions, which I’m not going to go into now; in the end, we shall be happily 
savouring European multiculturality, enjoying exposure to all kinds of ethnic 
content, cooking according to the recipes of various ethnicities – only the 
protagonists won’t be there. I’m not looking at this now as a kind of incidental 
moment, but as a problem of continuity with the 1990s. If I’m not mistaken, 
Dragan Prole suggested in his address that there is a continuity that is too strong, 
that there aren’t any elements, as it were, of a necessary discontinuity between the 
1990s and the present decade. Whatever might be said about this period, about 
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the constellation in the wake of the year 2000, there is a strong tendency in the 
Serb political elites to normalize, to Europeanize nationalism, and so it seems to 
me that the things which are about to happen, at a symbolic and at all other levels, 
will somehow lead to a quiet rehabilitation of the 1990s, so that in the end those 
years will look to us as a mere incidental calamity. The trouble is, this 
presupposes the erasure of some people’s memories. After all, one might call this 
national reconciliation, syntheses and unifications of various kinds, this can 
teleologically be placed in the context of European integrations, we may come up 
with all kinds of euphemisms, one might argue that this involves blending 
nationalism with sound Serbian capitalism with European overtones – but that 
won’t change things. The question, then, is which part of the truth are we 
prepared to sacrifice for the sake of our pragmatic designs? As things stand at the 
moment, this part of the truth is too substantial. Of course, there’s truth in what 
Pavel termed aptly as our ‘twoness’: democratic and undemocratic fronts, 
democrats and radicals, national and non-national ones, global and parochial 
ones, and so on. All these are rigid divisions which are de facto of little relevance. 
They are artificial bounds serving to justify things or used by some to assuage 
their troubled conscience. These differences are very porous, though this might be 
put in stronger terms. Vojvodina’s multiculturality is the first victim of 
reconciliation marked by excessive pragmatism over the Serbian election 
arithmetic, that is, of investing the Socialists with the image of a nationalist-
turned-European upstart. Multiculturality is, namely, again subject to an all-
embracing relativization, which is bound to gain strength in Serbia as a result of 
the conclusion of new political alliances. Or, to put it another way, 
multiculturality is becoming a pale memory of something which presumably 
existed at one time, or something it could have become. 
To return to our findings. Now, what is the source of multiculturality in 
Vojvodina? Although this is not immaterial, it is strange that it needs to be raised 
anew in spite of all that has already been said in this regard. Contrary to what 
some would like to believe, the source of multiculturality doesn’t lie in economic 
migration evocative of the situation in West Europe or the United States. It 
doesn’t imply the survival of an indigenous population in the wake of 
colonization, as in Canada. This is about the course of history, and I fully 
understand why Mirko Đorđević brought historical considerations to the fore a 
little while ago. History is the source of multiculturality in Vojvodina, more 
exactly the tortuous course of history which has brought the present ethnicities 
into a complex of both conflict and cooperation. Denying this source means not 
seeing the essential. But in discussing history in this case the reference is not to 
something antiquated; rather, history hints at tendencies which we must 
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constantly strive to understand. The history of Vojvodina’s multiculturality is not 
something ephemeral, it is the crucial element in the fashioning of present-day 
multiculturality. 
In appraising a policy of multiculturality or a policy towards 
multiculturality in Serbia, my personal assessment is as follows: undervaluation 
of multiculturality began in Serbia even before Serbia, her political, and also her 
intellectual elites, even familiarized themselves with multiculturalism in the strict 
sense of the word. This is where the simulation of pursuit of multiculturalisms 
began; while I couldn’t present an exhaustive catalogue of critiques of 
multiculturality in Serbia, studies concerned with the problem in a serious way 
are not very numerous. So, multiculturalism in Serbia is being criticized even 
before we have approached the problem at all. And this is one of the reasons why, 
in 2008, we are still at the starting point and must talk about the basics. Therefore, 
I find it hard to get over the suspicion I feel that it was only in the context of the 
call of European integrations, and with an eye to a quantitative increase in 
European resources that can be shared out, that the elites mentioned became 
genuine advocates of the ominous multiculturality.  
 By the way, multiculturality is, to my mind, an attempt, to put it briefly, to 
render different ethnic groups visible, what is more, to render them visible to the 
public by using a non-hierarchical model. Multiculturality is always bound up 
with some policy or other, it is a specific link between policy and culture. I can’t 
conceive of multiculturality without having regard to certain political moments. 
To say that it ought not to be politicized, that it ought to be kept out of petty 
politics, as is implied by reducing multiculturality to simple ethnic manifestations 
– that’s naïve and taking a rosy view of things. Experience, namely, shows that an 
ethnic community will have difficulty obtaining certain cultural resources unless 
it has a measure of power. Finally, multiculturality is a story which exists only in 
a democratic regime, whereas in a democracy there’s power, conflicts, a scramble 
for resources. Being plaintive about this won’t do any good at all. Now, we’re also 
talking about interculturality, the source of many misunderstandings. 
Interculturality is to me a set of patterns of behaviour at the level of everyday life, 
it is the habitualization of these patterns, their permeation, the being interested in 
another culture, the being ready to adopt the content of another culture and so on. 
Indeed, this question – the extent of permeation of different patterns of behaviour, 
different cultures at the level of everyday life – is more a matter of sociology than 
of political organization of reality. I find this distinction, too, important for the 
following reason: we also recognize such situations elsewhere in the world – and 
I’ll give you an example right away – where you can have a consistently 
developed multiculturality pattern alongside weak interculturality patterns. For 
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instance, Switzerland is a good example of that. While many speak of Switzerland 
as a ready-made utopia with regard to multiculturality, many anthropological 
and culturological studies indicate the existence of weak codes regarding 
interculturality. These studies reveal that there is, simply, a marked indifference 
to other cultures. The significance of this distinction is that it gives us an insight 
into the tasks the state has in this regard. It is obvious that it can promote a 
multicultural content in a much more implicit way than an intercultural one, 
namely that in relation to the latter it can proceed only in an indirect way. 
Multiculturality and interculturality, then, may be combined in various ways, and 
it seems to me that we here, in Vojvodina, will have to give thought to such 
combinations.  
I wish to say a word or two about experiential tendencies in Vojvodina. I’ll 
mention that I’ve been influenced by a survey I read about recently and that I’ve 
been looking forward to an opportunity to comment on it. The survey, involving 
secondary and primary school pupils, was conducted under the umbrella of the 
Secretariat for Legislation, Administration and National Minorities and the 
Pedagogical Institute of Vojvodina and gives us very interesting information. The 
good thing is, we are currently faced with contradictory tendencies, as distinct 
from, say, research carried out at the beginning of the present millennium, where 
we found markedly regressive tendencies. So, we have positive tendencies which, 
simply, indicate some sort of progress and – in a manner of speaking – realization 
of some results of the mentioned multiculturality policies at the level of 
Vojvodina. For instance, elements of violence are apparently on the decrease – 
something we should welcome – ethnic distance is reduced, young people are 
paying visits to each other, and so on. 
On the other hand, however, there is something extremely worrying and I 
wish to lay as much stress on this as possible. There are latent conflicts between 
pupils, latent conflicts which are very often actualized. Now that I’ve come to this, 
I’d like to point out one more thing: I think that we are very mistaken in viewing 
the problem of intercommunal relations and multiculturality independently of 
other trends in society; these things, simply, are not independent of each other in 
spite of our tendency to view them apart. But to return to the mentioned example 
and demonstrate what I mean. Actually, the majority of violent conflicts are not of 
an interethnic but of an intraethnic character. In other words, brawling and 
violence occur mostly within the same ethnic community. What does this prove? 
This proves that in this society there exist codes of violence which are very often 
latent, very often concealed, but that at certain moments they rise to the surface 
with a vengeance. The problem lies in the fact that multiculturality itself is not 
impervious to such influence. 
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At the very end, I wish to say one more thing. I have always believed that 
in Serbia, and therefore in Vojvodina too – given that Vojvodina is porous to 
influence from Serbia – there exist at the same time several different patterns, that 
in Serbia and Vojvodina there actually exists a hybrid reality. I wouldn’t embark 
now on the clarification of these patterns, something I occasionally do but more in 
writing, because there are complicated things involved. In many situations we can 
still see the mark of that which goes by the name of communist integrationism, 
that is, an ideological outlook on multiculturality. We can also perceive ethno-
anarchist trends from the 1990s as well as codes of Europeanized nationalism in 
evidence from 2000 to the present day, and it seems to me that they will continue 
to develop in accordance with the post-election arithmetic. Of course, there also 
exist, sheepishly and unconvincingly, elements of what we call multiculturalism, 
that is, what the people gathered at this table are appraising in a normative way. 
Those who want to get to know Vojvodina will have to have the strength to 
differentiate between these two trends. 
 
 
Snezana ILIC 
TOWARDS EFFECTIVE MINORITY POLICIES 
 
Professor Losoncz, being a very good professor, gave me as many as three 
cues for what I am about to say. Now, first I’m going to refrain from approaching 
multiculturality as a concept, a political theory, something which most of this 
afternoon has been devoted to in this or that way. This means that I’ll try, 
drawing on my particular subject of study, to offer an assessment of the policies of 
multiculturality in Serbia, or in Vojvodina.  
Since one can always measure consistency in the framing of a policy, as 
well as measure effectiveness and transparency in policy implementation, I’ll 
focus on this in brief outlines. This is the second cue Professor Losoncz offered 
me, namely making assessments of a policy, and although he was referring to 
something else, I’ll reduce this to a practical level. The third cue follows up on 
this, on the fragility of Vojvodina, the porousness of its borders vis-à-vis the wider 
state framework, vis-à-vis Serbia as a whole. In this connection it could be said 
here that the majority of problems, or shortcomings characteristic of the 
implementation of minority policies, policies of multiculturality, are generated at 
central level and exported to Vojvodina.  
As to Vojvodina itself, it is necessary to point out for the nth time that there 
is a great disparity between Vojvodina and the rest of Serbia regarding the 
completeness and efficiency of minority policies implementation. This disparity is 
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noticeable in all respects. Being a Germanist, it will give me pleasure – and I hope 
you will not find it boring – to quote in this connection too what the inspiring 
Goethe wrote more than two hundred years ago: ‘Tolerance as such can only be 
an initial disposition, it must grow into an acknowledgment, for forbearance is, in 
fact, insulting!’… (An interruption by D. Prole, in German…) Dr Prole, being a 
good philosopher, is also very familiar with German literature… So, Goethe says 
in the end: ‘True liberality lies in acknowledgment!’ Therefore, at the heart of any 
serious policy of multiculturality, there must lie acknowledgment, respect for an 
identity, in this case recognition of a collective identity and the rights stemming 
from it, of specific minority rights.  
I’m going to discuss this multiculturality field, as it were, from a purely 
practical point of view, I mean, I’m going to address the policy of multiculturality 
by trying to outline its implementations on four planes: political, legislative, 
criminal-law and institutional planes. By appraising the effect on all these planes 
and the degree of earnestness on all these planes, we can actually make a general 
assessment of the extent to which a state itself, a state formulating and 
implementing a minority policy, is acting as a truly concerned, benevolent 
manager of the cultural differences involved.  
So, what does it look like viewed on all the four planes?  
The political plane of a minority policy would involve, as we have stated 
repeatedly, the creation of an ambience, with the minorities being partners of the 
state rather than a burden. A good illustration of this is the oft-repeated comment 
of the director of the Institute for Publishing Textbooks, who said: ‘We’re losing a 
lot of money on the printing of minority textbooks!’ As if profitability were the 
ultimate criterion regarding education in minority languages! In other words, 
minorities are too often treated in public as a special liability and burden of the 
state. Further, speaking of minorities as partners of the state, let us find out to 
what extent minority representatives participate in the making of decisions. There 
aren’t any minority representatives on many bodies – the Broadcasting Agency, 
National Educational Council… Decisions, of importance for the minority 
population, are made without their participation, depriving every third resident 
of Vojvodina, or every fifth resident of Serbia, of a chance to exert their influence. 
As to the campaigns for promoting tolerance, intercommunal tolerance, a subject 
discussed by Dr Korhec, among others, one must not lose sight of the fact that 
campaigns involving public opinion polls are, after all, short-lived and of limited 
effect. The question is solved in the long term by systematically including specific 
content in the educational, informational, cultural subsystem, where it finds its 
proper place and survives from one generation to the next.  
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I’m not going to dwell too much on what we all know: on the legislative 
plane we have a completely unfinished story, an unfinished legal framework, that 
is, an incomplete legal basis for a minority policy. The last, most recent report of 
the Council of Europe, from February this year, also highlights the absence of a 
law on national councils. Now, we’ve had this situation for years, as Professor 
Losoncz put it aptly, ‘…as if now is still the year nineteen-ninety-something…’, 
regarding our discussion of the legislative plane of minority policy, we said the 
same things in 2005, 2006, 2007 and, now, we’re again saying them in 2008. 
Therefore we found ourselves in a position to be surprised when in April this 
year, before the election, on 8 April to be precise, the Constitutional Court ruled 
that the minorities were required to collect the same number of signatures for 
their lists as the majority parties as a condition for participating in the elections, 
and we also forget that nothing has been done about amending the Law on the 
Election of National Deputies for years. Therefore, by not addressing this question 
legally, the state, that is, its highest legislative body, sent out a clear signal that in 
dealing with the problem of minority political representation it is guided above 
all by party calculations, rather than aiming for a long-term, well-rounded legal 
solution.  
Let us now have a look on the criminal-law plane of the implementation of 
minority policies. Let us proceed from the simplest thing: statistics regarding the 
enforcement of Article 317 of the present Criminal Code, the article that sanctions 
the dissemination of racial, religious and intercommunal hatred. Such statistics 
could serve as an accurate indicator of the earnestness of the state in addressing 
the prevention and punishment of ethnically-motivate violence. First, the state 
organs have no integrated, comprehensive record of incidents targeting ethnic 
minorities, and the same applies to religious minorities. The state says: there have 
been 60 attacks on members and property of religious minorities.... According to 
our records, there have been from 150 to 200 attacks on property and members of 
smaller religious communities. This is compounded by lenient punishment of 
such criminal offences. For instance, a petrol bomb is thrown at the Adventist 
prayer facility in Sombor, at night, into the bedroom of the priest and his family, 
and that is designated as ‘causing damage to others’ property’. So, recourse is 
had, impermissibly and unpardonably, to the mildest designation under the 
criminal law. Needless to say, the outcome of this is that the people concerned feel 
like second-rate citizens, like citizens who don’t have the protection of the state 
and are as such exposed to harassment and violence that is not punished. Also, 
the system omits informing the public fully and timely about ethnically or 
religiously motivated incidents and their sanctioning, thus also failing to send 
unequivocal, encouraging signals to any person who has been threatened. 
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Lastly, I should say that the implementation of minority policies, as viewed 
on the institutional plane, paints a rather gloomy picture. It has been pointed out 
repeatedly by the Council of Europe and by all the organizations and individuals 
concerned with minority problems in any way that the key institution, that is, the 
Service for Human and Minority Rights, is impermissibly politically and 
institutionally weak. The Council of Europe points this out again in its latest 
document on Serbia. This government agency does very little of what falls within 
its competence. It ought to be initiating amendments of the law. It is not initiating 
any. It ought to be reacting in various ways in cases of violations of human and 
minority rights. It is not reacting. The service should be working towards the 
empowerment of minority self-government bodies, or national councils, as well as 
of state bodies competent for human and minority rights. It is not doing this. Its 
work is shrouded in mystery, there’s no website, no public announcements about 
the various events; for instance, the Constitutional Court’s April ruling was a 
good occasion for it to react. Not a thing! You can see Petar Lađević in public only 
when he turns up at specifically Roma happenings, as it were, during the Roma 
Decade. The provincial administration is actually more sensitized to a serious 
approach to the implementation of multicultural policies, there are sound 
initiatives, there are continuous efforts in accordance with high standards. 
Nevertheless, in Vojvodina too some things are not done in a thoroughly thought-
out manner, they are done as part of short-term political wheeling and dealing. To 
recall, a year go, in May 2007, there was talk of introducing guaranteed seats for 
minorities in the provincial parliament, of introducing a bicameral parliament, 
talk that the AVP Assembly was going to amend electoral legislation in Vojvodina 
in June 2007, and so on – there was talk about it for several weeks, than it all died 
down… Further, a new body called the Provincial Council for National Minorities 
was formed two years ago. The council was envisaged as a counterpart to the 
republic Council for National Minorities, was going to be made up, like the 
republic one, of prime minister, ministers or secretaries in charge of relevant 
secretariats and representatives of all minority councils, and was going to 
coordinate the work of all Vojvodina national councils and provincial organs. So, 
what became of it? Why, there aren’t any substantial, visible results! Actually, a 
constituent session was held and, so far as I know, another session, with the 
founding act incorporating a decision to hold council meetings every three 
months.  
So, lots of things exist on paper, but in practice we have an insufficiently 
serious and insufficiently wide reception of multicultural theory on the part of the 
professional public, and an insufficiently sincere and insufficiently through-out 
formulation and implementation of multicultural policies on the part of the state. 
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Though, to tell the truth, viewed in a broader context, it’s not only the state that’s 
inconsistent, inefficient and inert regarding this matter of minorities. This applies 
to many other things. Consider, for instance, the way in which the question of 
competence of local self-governments is being dealt with and you’ll see that 
there’s nothing great about it, the situation regarding that question has been 
obscure for years.  
The intention behind this approach to today’s topic is, basically, to point 
out the existence of comparatively clear and precise parameters for evaluating 
effectiveness in the implementation of multicultural policies. This means that the 
shortcomings and omissions can be clearly defined and then eliminated and made 
up for. But not at this rate and speed, the way it’s been done so far! Why am I 
introducing the factor of time now? Because the demographers are warning us 
that the minorities are dying out. They are documenting this convincingly with 
minority population demographic trends between the last two population 
censuses. Well, this is now practically a race against time. If we go on at this pace, 
in a few decades we’re likely to have wonderful, effective minority policies but 
without the ‘consumers’, because those meant to benefit from such policies will 
gradually diminish in numbers. Or rather, there will be very few of them! The 
degree of earnestness of a minority policy will be in inverse proportion to the 
demographic performance of its consumers.  
They will constitute small but very satisfied minorities.  
 
 
Dusko RADOSAVLJEVIC 
LACK OF POLITICAL WILL 
 
Someone observed here that we’ve been talking about multiculturalism all 
the time, without first talking about the existence of an elementary culture in 
these regions, of a political culture. Why am I saying this? We look forward to 
every year and every new election with great hopes, but afterwards it turns out 
that we’d been pulled by the ears, afterwards we’re surprised and always content 
with the small progress we made at the polls. Then we find fault with this and 
that and feel resentful, but why do we feel that way, given that we knew in 
advance that we’re going to blame it on one thing or other? So, this year yellow’s 
all the rage, we’ve painted ourselves yellow, we’ve put very, very much trust in a 
political option which, of course, will not prove itself worthy of it, as it has shown 
several times. What are the implications of this? How can we talk 
multiculturalism in Vojvodina, seeing as the leading political option in Vojvodina 
and beyond has never declared that multiculturalism is its commitment, it has not 
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confirmed this as the holder of political mandates in the Assembly and the 
executive, nor has it tried to put this into practice. A question to ponder: can you 
call yourself a civil party and celebrate a religious community’s saint’s day as 
your party slava? This talk – we’re all democrats in a way, only we celebrate the 
slava of St George – I for one don’t buy it; why, if the members of the Socialist 
International wanted to look more convincing, they could unite in a ‘Social 
Democratic Party’ and celebrate as their slava the day of St Joseph the worker, to 
make me trust them, they could mark the 1st of May, that would somehow be OK.  
What’s the problem here? What really is the problem here? Let’s not play 
around with this Serbian political scene mainstream thing any more, I keep 
repeating maliciously that neither the stream nor the main part of it believes in 
multiculturalism. Now, I myself would translate multiculturalism into nice 
manners, a responsible behaviour. They know that, if they want to build a state, a 
nice, decent and responsible one, they must put all this in, because a nice, 
responsible state is a mixture of human rights, democratic institutions, market 
institutions and all the rest. Can anyone make big political profits, can anyone 
make big economic profits, can anyone make any kind of profits if people behave 
responsibly? Try to imagine us, creating a very responsible state and then being 
bored like the Swedes!! Why, as you know, generations have been returning from 
the West saying: It’s boring over there! Think of it, the trains run on time over 
there, the round tables start on time, the theatres start…, why, everything starts 
on time. I was in the Czech Republic recently, I was surprised, the tram cars are 
controlled by computer, something of the sort…no uncertainty there! No excuses 
such as we usually make – I was fifteen minutes late, I waited for the bus, 
transport… Public personages, professors come and tell us there’s no creativity in 
Europe, no ‘life’s juice’, no real life, you know, no struggling with daily problems, 
no challenges, like, whether there’ll be any petrol, cooking oil, powdered sugar, 
no things that help us sharpen our wits while believing that life consists in 
overcoming such basically trivial things… 
That’s the story, we always have the impression that something will change 
of itself, but then we end up with the holders of political mandates, the top ones, 
those in whom we put our trust every year, being re-elected with the rationale, 
why, better him than the other one! No positive programme there! Well, you 
know, I also think that Boris [Tadić] looks better than Toma [Nikolić], I don’t have 
to go into my concepts of aesthetics today, but let me put this question: what do 
we have after four years of that, has the president of the republic put 
multiculturalism into practice? He has not! What’s going on? What is the 
Democratic Party’s approach to solving the problem, the problem of political 
involvement of national communities in Vojvodina? It consists in picking out one 
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‘minority man’ from each [minority] and telling him: ‘You’re going to be my 
candidate for deputy!’ But then, the ‘minority folks’ aren’t politically illiterate, 
they say: ‘I’d better vote for A.T. or whatever than vote for a list not featuring a 
fellow national of mine’, A.T. is said to be better than X.Y., and so we cast our 
ballots. Then we ask him: ‘And what have you got to show for it, for these last 
four years? What did you do in the years you were there?’ Nothing!!! What did 
you do, my Orthodox brother, or whatever your religion, colour and nation, over 
there in the Assembly? Nothing! Apart from milking the Assembly coffers dry 
every month, you may have contracted a condition in that place that has to do 
with too much sitting, what with those hard benches and the like. So we keep 
talking about the political situation, saying not that it is getting more complex, but 
that there are going to be elections again, someone’s going to say again that 
yellow is nicer than blue – if you ask me, it may not be nicer but it’s more useful 
to vote for – again we’re going to find ourselves in a position to be told: at this 
election the vote is not about the character of Vojvodina, but about the character 
of Serbia – why, hasn’t our voting been about the character of Serbia all these 
years? Shouldn’t the Serbian political scene change its tune at long last, so that 
tomorrow we can become normal people? You’ve heard what they’re saying in 
Belgrade – that tendency of yours towards autonomy, the election didn’t bear it 
out! Why, of course it didn’t, considering that the leading political parties in 
Serbia won’t disown Milošević’s concept of Serbia, an autarchic and xenophobic 
country, desirous of somehow cuddling up to Europe without adopting its values. 
And these mean decentralization, Vojvodina’s autonomy, multiculturalism… 
Now is time to answer the question: Did Vojvodina figure at the elections? If the 
parties belonging to the pro-Europe bloc truly meant Europe, then it did; but if 
they merely went through the motions about it, then we have a problem. I keep 
saying that the true solution of all these problems begins with the framing of a 
credible policy on the part of the relevant actors on the political scene, above all 
the parties of the pro-Europe bloc. 
The Serbian political oligarchy has turned the state into a two-party system: 
those are ugly and we are good! As clear cut as that. But how come the good ones 
never get round to making multiculturalism work, that’s the question? Actually I 
fall for this kind of logic too, I too feel better voting for this guy, though in fact I 
didn’t vote quite that way, I voted for some others, but you fall for that kind of 
logic all the same! Let’s not vote for Čeda [Čedomir Jovanović, LDP], we’re told, 
that’ll be throwing away our votes – that was interesting! Come, others say, don’t 
vote for the SVM [Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians] – because I was involved in 
Istvan Pastor’s campaign in some way, a high-ranking official of the Democratic 
Party asked me bluntly: ‘Did you do that for money?’ I replied in the negative, 
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saying I did that because Pastor was the strongest political candidate. The man 
crossed himself and turned away! He objected: ‘But he’s a Hungarian!’ ‘Why, are 
you trying to say that your candidate is politically stronger?’ He didn’t tell me 
that he was – that would lead to an argument; instead, he asked: ‘But how come 
you’re voting for…’. Why, didn’t the president of the Republic himself wonder 
that the Hungarian coalition should have a candidate for the state presidency! 
And that in Serbia, which used to babble to itself about being a civil state. Now 
then, on the other hand, what was it that made me go on and on about this? I was 
appalled by the fact that the president of the Republic, in his capacity as leader of 
the election winning party, should say, ‘Let’s go for a historic reconciliation!’ Well, 
I can’t help asking myself – who exactly are we reconciling with? The 
multiculturality supporters are now coming round to my way of thinking as to 
why things have come to such a pass. Who are we supposed to make it up with? 
With a party which is still unable to say, to condemn the crime committed 
precisely against [inaudible?], as it were, from chauvinistic motives. With a party 
never able to come up with a plausible reply to the question, say, how come that 
485 bodies were found fifteen kilometres from the centre of Belgrade? Was that a 
contribution to multiculturalism? Was that the contribution of the party that 
shelled Vukovar from, say, my birthplace of Šid? One hopes that journalists will 
arrive some day and write something about how, all of a sudden, between five 
and seven thousand Croats happened to disappear from around Šid. After all 
that, the leader of ‘all democratic Serb folk’ comes to us and tells us: ‘We’re going 
for a historic reconciliation.’ Who with? What with? With Ivica Dačić the ‘noble 
one’? Can you imagine Dragan ‘Palma’ Marković as a great builder of Serb 
multiculturalism, as its personification by virtue of his mental makeup… But we 
could go on and on like this… Anyway, as I’ve already said, there can be no 
European Serbia without decentralization, multiculturalism, protection of human 
and minority rights, without standards… Does this mean that Serbia has no 
chance? No, only that at last it must – and this is where the role of certain parties 
is indispensable – take the plunge and begin to live ‘like all other people!’ I mean, 
like those in Europe above all.  
 
 
Antal BOZÓKI 
VOJVODINA’S IDENTITY AS A POLITICAL ISSUE 
 
I’d like to set out a few reflections of mine about the things we’ve been 
discussing at this round table today.  
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Because Vojvodina’s identity was brought up, I wish to say that this kind of 
identity is more than an ‘academic topic’ and that it is not mentioned only in 
‘scholarly books’, as was said here, but that it also talked about in the highest 
political bodies of the European Union and the Council of Europe. This means, 
then, that the question of Vojvodina’s identity and the related question of 
Vojvodina and its autonomy is not only an academic matter but also a political 
issue, an issue which is discussed in Europe too, and it seems to me that we often 
forget that is also has international-law implications.  
Therefore, I’d like to call your attention to, say, three or four documents 
relevant to this topic: the first is the 16 September 2004 document of the European 
Parliament concerning the harassment of national minorities in Vojvodina 
[P6_TA(2004)0016], which was published in the official journal of the European 
Union (C 140E/163). In this document the European Parliament ‘expresses deep 
concern at the repeated breaches of human rights in the province of Vojvodina’ 
and ‘insists on the importance of immediate and effective action, so that similar 
events are not left unremedied and are prevented in the future’.  
The second is the Council of Europe document of 29 September 2005 
(document HLC140.E), which includes positions on the safeguarding of the 
multinational character of Vojvodina, namely the topic we’re discussing today. 
This document, in point 6, calls on the organs of the then State Union of Republic 
of Serbia and Montenegro to restore to Vojvodina the autonomy it enjoyed until 
1990 and to establish the subject matter jurisdiction of the parliament in 
Vojvodina, thus enabling the regional parliament to frame relevant policies in this 
multinational region. 
The third document, adopted by the European Parliament on 25 October 
2007, contains recommendations to the Council of Europe concerning relations 
between Serbia and the European Union. This document is somewhat larger, 
comprising forty-nine points which summarize Europe’s expectations of Serbia in 
the process preparatory to European integrations. Point 32 calls on the Serbian 
authorities to take additional measures to promote the development of national 
minorities in multi-ethnic Vojvodina, to promote peaceful coexistence amongst 
them and to ensure that the police, the judiciary and other state bodies act on an 
ethnically neutral basis. In addition, it states that in order to build the necessary 
trust amongst the population towards those institutions, the Serbian authorities 
are to ensure that the ethnic composition is adequately reflected on the staff of 
those authorities. 
To this should be added the fourth document, namely the 14 December 
2007 report of the Council of Europe working body against racism and intolerance 
published on 29 April 2008, which states that in Serbia there is still a climate of 
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hostility against religious minorities and that this climate is partly created by 
certain media outlets and politicians. The report urges the Serbian leadership to 
pay more attention to racially motivated incidents and to launch an information 
campaign with a view to contributing to better mutual knowledge and 
understanding of various groups. 
I’m asking you, we can actually all ask ourselves whether there is anything 
being done about this at all, to implement these positions of the European 
institutions, and what is really being done in Serbia other than discussing the 
unstable political situation? One should also bear in mind that the European 
institutions didn’t adopt these documents in order merely to publish them in the 
official gazette. They certainly didn’t, because there are people and institutions in 
Europe concerned with how documents and political positions are implemented. 
My impression is that the topic being discussed today is still approached 
largely from theoretic positions, not from the point of view of practice, of how 
multiculturality is realized in practice. I must admit that I have seen no specific 
research on this topic. Of course, this topic can and ought to be discussed from a 
theoretical point of view, but my preference is that we should talk about how this 
matter is realized in practice. Therefore our round tables should have two parts, 
theoretical and practical, so that we could find out how some things are realized 
in direct practice.  
This is also necessary because the meaning of certain things is not clear to 
some people: some look upon multiculturality as something dangerous, 
something aimed against national minorities, while on the other hand, there are 
people who advocate focusing on oneself and one’s own nation, which would 
result in the ghettoization of national minorities. In this connection, it should be 
said clearly that the distrust between national communities stemming from the 
1990s still exists in Vojvodina. I think that we shouldn’t keep silent about such 
things. Overcoming this distrust will take a long time, some say twice as long as it 
took to sow it.  
Our politicians often brag, especially in front of guests from abroad, that a 
great many national minorities live in Vojvodina, some say there are members of 
twenty-six and others twenty-nine nations. In spite of that, we in Vojvodina have 
no official institution concerned with those intercultural, multicultural, or 
interethnic relations. What is more, there is no official institution concerned, on a 
professional and scientific basis, with the study of development of inter-
community relations, problems arising in those relations, the implementation of 
international treaties in the field, and so on.  
So, as far as multiculturality is concerned the situation is not idyllic, 
whatever we may have heard from politicians here today or might have inferred 
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on the basis of some of the keynote speeches. I personally consider that much 
more could have been done on this plane, and that not everything that could have 
been done has been done.  
In my opinion, any serious discussion of multiculturality, or of any other 
topic, must involve various perspectives including those concerning analogy and 
comparison. Every comparison of states and information is precious because it 
makes for a deeper insight. It is not enough to say, for instance, that we have so 
many new institutions; it is necessary to say whether such institutions have 
existed before or not. For instance, the opening of two secondary schools in the 
Hungarian language in Vojvodina is by all means important, but it ought to be 
said whether this is more than we had before or less. I don’t know the answer to 
this question. I don’t think we have much cause to be particularly self-praising 
about having two new schools! This, if you ask me, is quite a normal thing and 
not a merit of any organ of government. As you know, members of national 
minorities are entitled to education in their native languages.  
Talking about schools, I think we ought to talk seriously about the extent to 
which the school and school textbooks contribute to multinationality, 
multiculturality and the development of intercommunal relations. Has everything 
been done on this plane that could have been done? I think that it has not and that 
it is necessary to prepare a serious analysis of the content of our school textbooks. 
I know that there are many objections, especially regarding the history textbooks. 
I’m no expert in this field, but I hear that the textbooks don’t take sufficient 
account of the distinguishing traits of Vojvodina. If this is true, then why are we 
surprised at our children’s incomplete knowledge of the history of the other 
nations to which their peers, their school mates belong? Apart from that, the 
abolition of teaching of the language of the social environment in Vojvodina was a 
cardinal mistake. Reintroducing the teaching of this language is an urgent 
necessity, because any talk of multiculturality makes no sense if one doesn’t speak 
the language, as a condition sine qua non of mutual communication. 
To repeat, textbooks are of primary importance, as is the learning of 
languages, with regard to multiculturality. This is of key importance for young 
people learning about each other. Snežana Ilić spoke about what the Serbian 
authorities ought to have done in this regard but failed to do.  
In the end, I propose that the Helsinki Committee do an analysis of all this, 
because the organs of power are either unable or unwilling to concern themselves 
with that for some reason. This document should include an analysis of the imple-
menttation of documents of the Council of Europe, European Parliament, so that 
we could see where we are and also force the organs of power to act more 
efficiently.  
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Any failure on the part of the organs of power to fulfil their obligation is, 
namely, a serious challenge to the credibility of the state. In this matter there’s no 
need to think up anything new because Europe and the international community 
have already said what they want. We who act in the sphere of civil society and 
are present in the public have the obligation to remind the authorities to do their 
job. Any serious discussion of multiculturality is impossible without being 
involved in an analysis and consideration of these aspects.  
 
 
Danica STEFANOVIC 
ON MULTICULTURALITY 
 
When this question of such vital importance for Vojvodina is discussed, it is 
most often discussed from highly theoretical and scientific points of view. The 
impression one gains from such an approach is that multiculturalism is something 
which belongs in the books and that it is for this reason that it is important to talk 
about it, not because it means life in the streets, homes, schools, squares… 
something which is so closely bound up with life.  
I am not trying at all to say that this scientific angle for considering 
multiculturality is not necessary. On the contrary, it is exceptionally important, 
but the life approach is just as important. Multiculturalism is namely a condition 
of life in communities which differ in ethnic, cultural and linguistic terms. 
I am therefore addressing this question from the aspect of life, from an 
angle I am familiar with. And this means my attitude to neighbours, colleagues, 
friends and all the unknown ones who are different from me or those from whom 
I differ. I am therefore asking both myself and you, what is actually 
multiculturalism? Does this word, which sounds fine, mean coexistence? Does it 
mean living together, or does it have a third meaning? And if it means just that – 
which it certainly does – I’m asking right away, how can people live together? It is 
to this that I wish to make a small contribution devoid of any pretence and 
representing merely view from my angle. 
Actually, we’re debating this question (I won’t say problem) for the nth 
time, and we’re establishing ‘good’ intercommunal relations for the nth time. This 
can only mean that the practice during the past fifteen years or so (or is it only 
fifteen years or so, what about the ‘brotherhood and unity’ story?) has left a deep 
mark and that we must invest a great deal of good will, much effort and patience, 
much tolerance to rectify what the regime in the 1990s called ‘good and stable’ 
intercommunal relations.  
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Multiculturality and good relations with neighbours can’t be established 
artificially. They can’t be a one-sided affair. The system of legislative measures 
taken by the state lays the foundations for building a normal situation and the 
affirmation of national diversity.  
It is necessary at long last to build a society which will respect fundamental 
human rights and thus lay good foundations for the charting of good 
intercommunal relations. This in order that we shouldn’t begin talking about 
multinationalism instead of multiculturalism.  
I think that in approaching this extremely complex issue one should 
proceed from the reasoning of the citizen of our country or region called 
Vojvodina. To find out the attitude of the citizen, of his needs and to proceed in 
that direction. To explore the potential of the Serb citizen, the Hungarian citizen, 
the Slovak citizen and of all other citizens and their willingness for integrative 
processes. Or how the citizen looks upon this phenomenon called living together.  
As part of the project called Multiplikacija – živeti tolerantno 
[Multiplication – Living in Tolerance], we are exploring precisely such views of 
the citizens in eight Vojvodina towns and learning to think that civilization and 
tolerance are the assets and symbols of the Vojvodina clime. This is a good 
foundation for a good new beginning. 
If we accept that civilization and tolerance are the asset and symbol of our, 
Vojvodina, region, then it is possible to make an attempt to establish a new form 
of dialogue between people belonging to different ethnicities. By establishing a 
new dialogue one actually establishes communication between people from 
different cultural, linguistic or confessional groups. By establishing 
communication between diversities one creates the possibility of a genuine 
heightening of awareness of what we call civil legacy and the legacy of diversity. 
But diversity as an asset, not as an impediment or a source of division. 
Our approach to the question of multiculturality as citizens rather than as 
members of a majority or minority group is what perhaps distinguishes us from 
others in this project. Our approach is from the position of the citizen who regards 
his otherness as an advantage and an asset, as his wealth, rather than as a burden. 
I think that this is the key to our success as well as to our singleness of purpose. 
Of course, both this approach, an alternative approach, and the nongovernmental 
sectors to which I belong offer an alternative view of the world. Maybe because 
this kind of approach does not encumber us with various prejudices, we are able 
to bring together around ourselves different individualities, groups – very 
professional, worthy, creative people from all national groups – and to pursue our 
alternative approaches in a very professional manner.  
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Why is this so easy with us in the nongovernmental sector? Maybe only 
because these people are not burdened by their nationality and because, being 
free of such a burden, they can prove their worth as people, as experts, artists, 
musicians, professors… So, in asking himself, ‘Who am I?’, the individual doesn’t 
identify himself in terms of what he was taught or acquired, not as a Serb, Hunga-
rian or someone else but as a painter, professor, resident of Novi Sad, and so on.  
This, it seems to me, is as relevant as ever for communication between 
people as the underlying principle of our work. But how is communication 
established? To return to the beginning, to the question of the notion of 
multiculturality which includes the moment of communication. If this means the 
coexistence of citizens who differ in terms of their ethnicity, culture or language, 
then it would also have to carry a message of permeation. But today, we have in 
reality small, cosy Vojvodina towns such as Bečej, Temerin, Subotica…in which 
there is coexistence in the same geographical area but without or with little 
communication. We ask ourselves immediately, what’s the problem? 
In order to solve it, one might have to begin from the beginning. If 
language as one of the fundamental human rights is the right key to better living, 
understanding, greater trust, then let’s learn the language of our neighbours. And 
thus take a step in the direction of a better life.  
And that means the permeation of diversity, but this is a topic related to 
interculturality. And this is what we work towards through our programmes. The 
thing is not to be afraid. No need to be afraid of interculturality, is our message, 
with more and more citizens responding positively to such kind of 
multiculturality. 
To conclude. The things we in our parallel, nongovernmental sector have 
achieved through our alternative approach, including creating a broad basis for 
mutual tolerance, may serve as a model to governmental institutions. And so, 
we’re offering models. All the governmental institutions need to do is show some 
initiative and adopt these models as a possible work pattern or just as a topic to be 
considered. That would be a good beginning in establishing communication. 
Possible topics to consider could include: 
- how to implement decentralization and further local initiative in an 
interesting and programmatic manner, 
- how to contribute to the fostering of diversity through an alternative 
approach to creative expression. 
Perhaps also through model approaches to cultural and educational work. 
Everything is preceded by ‘perhaps’, but some day it may become a reality. 
Who knows? 
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Marija GAJICKI 
A MULTICULTURALITY ‘IMPRISONED’ WITHIN THE HOLLOW  
FACADES OF A POTEMKIN VILLAGE 
 
Current discourses about multiculturality in Vojvodina and Serbia remind 
me of the hollow facades of Potemkin’s villages. Why? Because for the last twenty 
years in Serbia, from the moment the former Yugoslavia began to fall apart, we 
have lived within the facades of notions and meanings laid down after the Second 
World War which cannot provide a realistic explanation of the state affairs 
existing in the 21st century, in Serbia. Discussion of multiculturality today is only 
important for Vojvodina, it doesn’t exist so far as the rest of Serbia is concerned. 
Multiculturality as a subject of discussion is reduced to various manifestations of 
folklore art, to promoting national cuisines and drinks, an occasional window-
dressing for an ‘idyllic’ state of good neighbourly relations between the most 
numerous national groups living in Vojvodina. In the last ten years or so 
multiculturality has been promoted only through singing, food, dancing, with no 
mention made of either education, or literature, there’s been no mention of 
anything belonging in the domain of high art and culture representative of 
members of other national groups in Vojvodina. There is, actually, only one level, 
the level of the Potemkin village facades bequeathed to us. On the other hand, the 
European Union and the Council of Europe look upon what we have in 
Vojvodina as a good example, thinking how to establish and maintain a good 
climate of intercommunal coexistence and how to make a step further by building 
on that.  
Future debates about multiculturality must consider the direction in which 
the level of multiculturality achieved in Vojvodina should further develop and, 
more importantly, how to proceed from the rung of multiculturality to that of 
interculturality. We must also bear in mind the fact that, as a result of wars in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, the national structure of Vojvodina’s 
population has changed, that there are, in addition to the traditional national 
groups making up the population of Vojvodina, new groups which are also 
becoming part of the multinational and multicultural body. Therefore, we must 
take account of this too, because there can be no serious discussion of the content 
and form of multiculturality in Vojvodina if this is left out.  
There is another thing which is well know to all and which may not have 
been very visible in the last two or three years, although it was in the period 
between 2000 and 2005, namely the seclusion and ghettoization of national 
communities. In simple terms, communication between minority national 
communities began to shrink and weaken, and only communication of minority 
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communities with the majority nation intensified, there was an exchange of sorts 
with a more or less pronounced tendency to assimilate the minority communities 
in the majority community in Vojvodina.  
In my opinion, the situation will not improve until the political elites in 
Vojvodina, and also in Serbia, take a clear position on the direction in which 
things should move, on how to continue developing multiculturality in Vojvodina 
and, especially, on the direction of that development. Unless that happens, we’ll 
remain on a parallel track for ever, we’ll keep receiving information and 
assessments of one kind from the European Union and of another from either 
local institutions or those at provincial and republic levels, and our 
communication will go on suffering from interference of one kind or another all 
the time. For instance, every time we receive from the Council of Europe, say, a 
report or an assessment warning against our impaired intercommunal relations, 
we’ll interpret it as an incorrect report and an unfounded assessment, as 
something that fuels conflict, because of the fact that the report or the assessment 
was drawn up by various minority lobbies, and so on. I mean, we’ll think up all 
kinds of excuses and never seriously deal with the issue we’re supposed to 
address.  
I wish to point out that we must bear in mind that a large number of people 
have found their place in Vojvodina or are in the process of doing so, that the 
national structure of the province has changed. True, most of these people speak 
the Serbian language, but they’ve brought with them some of the cultural habits 
they practiced in the places in which they lived before. Therefore, I think that it is 
important to involve this population in future discussions about multiculturality 
in Vojvodina and in Serbia. Unless we do this, an ever greater number of those 
who regard themselves as a minority on account of certain cultural differences 
will not look upon this society as a space where cultural diversity represents a 
quality that combines but as something that divides and causes rifts between the 
minority and majority populations in both Vojvodina and Serbia.  
 
 
Mirko DJORDJEVIC 
THE CHURCH IN A MULTICULTURAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
This problem, which has never been fully elaborated, must be addressed at 
three levels. One should first bear in mind that the Christian Church has from its 
very advent existed within the systems of the day, from slavery to feudalism to 
modern capitalism. It is there but it does not identify itself with any system. This 
is clear at least from a doctrinal point of view, because it was created above the 
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system and form of government, chiefly as a distinct supranational entity. In other 
words, by virtue of its doctrine the Church is a distinct system of values and this 
was decided, as it were, at the very beginning. We would know little or nothing 
about the Colossians as a people if Apostle Paul had not addressed them in his 
well-known epistle. The epistle – Chapter 3.11 – lays down this doctrine of the 
Church’s supranational essence and internationalist values: ‘Where there is 
neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, 
bond nor free: but Christ is all, and in all.’ These references are necessary if only to 
point out that while, according to the doctrine, things should still be that way, the 
reality is quite different. The Christian Church keeps jumping out of the system of 
that indisputably universal culturological pattern and betraying it by defining 
itself in ethnic-national and politically recognizable terms. Through the force of 
historical circumstances – and this is where quite concrete problems begin – the 
mark left by the Church throughout history is smaller than the mark the world 
has left on the Church.  
While the teaching of the Church remains officially the same, its attitude to 
the cultural pattern is another matter. The example of Vojvodina in particular is a 
situation which is not simple to treat of at all.  
The conduct of the churches in Vojvodina is characteristic in this regard: 
while their doctrine it is not in question, the attitude of the churches and religious 
communities is. A cursory glance at the state of affairs, without the need for any 
detailed sociological analysis, is enough to realize this. We shall therefore cite 
some of the problems. All the Serbs under the jurisdiction of the SPC are 
Orthodox, all the Rusyns are Greek Catholics or more popularly ‘Uniats”, the 
Hungarians are for the most part, but not all, Catholics, and so on. The fact that 
there are, say, Serbs who are not Orthodox doesn’t interest the SPC, which is also 
not interested in any cultural pattern ‘framework’ within which a pluralist rather 
than a narrowly nationalist value system could be pursued. Consider briefly the 
number of incidents on religious grounds – there are more and more of them – 
and you’ll conclude without difficulty that churches divide more than they unite, 
the graffiti messages are something that’s easily understood because they are 
reduced to a national or political key within which they are interpreted. All of a 
sudden all Serbs who are Adventists are seen as enemies, or all who have not 
committed themselves nationally are regarded as enemies and given dirty looks. 
This is also the attitude of others towards Serbs. In this connection, problems arise 
within the cultural pattern itself. Many in the SPC object to the Orthodox baroque 
style and would like to have it destroyed, arguing that churches in Vojvodina 
should be built in the Rascian-Moravian style. This rather characteristic position 
betrays an attitude that is doctrinarily challengeable and culturologically untena-
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ble. The monistic cultural pattern is more than simply unacceptable, it is the sour-
ce of tension and strife which endangers multiculturality as a state of being and a 
value category. The matter is even more complicated if considered on a multicon-
fessional plane. Examples of this indeed abound. Vojvodina Orthodoxy has distin-
ctive traits which do not dovetail – although they should – into the current SPC 
national-confessional scheme. We have here something which is only a seeming 
paradox: instead of multiculturality and multiconfessionality being as asset of 
Orthodoxy and Christianity in general, we have an opposite situation. A specific 
sociological analysis would bear all this out, and it couldn’t be said that such 
analyses do not exist. Everything points to a conclusion which is officially not in 
issue, but in practice things don’t happen that way. The Churches and religious 
communities, therefore, are yet to ‘revert’ to the universal of their beginnings. 
In principle, multiculturality is more in line with Church teachings, though 
in the example of Vojvodina the lesson appears not to have been learned.  
The state of affairs is such as to make it necessary to repeat the conclusion 
already emphasized. In terms of the scale of values, churches and religious 
communities ought to be moving forward, but the opposite is the case. Put this in 
a more specific context and the conclusion becomes more evident: although it has 
been recognized that politically motivated forced clericalization will bring no 
good to the Church as such, the Church itself is not aware that the clericalization 
holds no promises for it. An open democratic society is a more suitable 
‘framework’ for the Church as it provides greater scope for its mission. Not only 
the SPC but other churches and religious communities as well look upon this not 
only as paradoxical but also as scandalous. This speaks volumes in itself. Add to 
this the fact that the line separating the confessional and the secular was recently 
violated in both Vojvodina and Serbia, and we shall easily agree that this topic is 
acquiring wider implications. That the Vojvodina multiculturality model is a 
success in a historical sense is clear, but something else is also clear: it can be 
endangered and denied ever anew.  
Political considerations, then, are at both the beginning and the end of the 
problem of Vojvodina’s multiculturality as a value system.  
 
 
Nedim SEJDINOVIC 
THE MEDIA AND MULTICULTURALITY 
 
The role of the media in the promotion and articulation of the multicultural, 
intercultural life and values of a civil society is inestimable. However, the 
Vojvodina media have proved themselves unequal to this task, the Vojvodina 
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media do not recognize multiculturality as an asset or something which is 
Vojvodina’s distinctive trait. One of the causes of such a state is certainly the 
complete domination of the central media in Belgrade of the Vojvodina market: 
they dominate it not only by their circulation and coverage, but also by 
successfully forcing their topics, ideas and values on the passive provincial media 
projects. As experience has shown, the Belgrade media are either acting in bad 
faith or are not sufficiently, if at all, sensitized to Vojvodina’s values or the values 
of multicultural life.  
The majority cultural model being reproduced in the media sphere is, 
unfortunately, not capable of communication with other cultures because it is 
convinced in its superiority. Interculturality, however, is based on an ‘encounter 
in equality’ and rules out a relationship in superiority-inferiority terms. 
Vojvodina’s intellectuals have pointed out repeatedly that minorities figure in our 
media only in a folklore context, which reflects the majority culture’s superior 
attitude bent on divesting everything different of its human face. ‘The minorities 
which only dance and sing’, as featured on our television, are actually mere 
dehumanized dancing robots. 
Unfortunately, Radiotelevizija Vojvodine, which is funded with all citizens’ 
money, leads the way in promoting such a media and cultural model. Research by 
the Novi Sad School of Journalism shows that the Vojvodina public broadcasting 
service encourages simplified, sensationalistic and intolerant reporting on 
minorities (covering only incidents), as well as being selective in cause-and-effect 
terms regarding information about phenomena characteristic of minorities, their 
rights and position in society being often linked to petty crime (Roma). At the 
same time, the public broadcasting service also encourages the dissemination of 
stereotypes and prejudices, promotes the discriminatory use of politically 
incorrect language, and ignores minority problems as a whole. 
Unfortunately, the changes which have occurred on the Vojvodina media 
scene in recent time as a result of the process of so-called media regulation, 
privatization and allocation of radio and TV frequencies, have not contributed to 
an improvement of the media content. What is more, numerous retrogressions 
have been noticed in respect of reporting on diversity, multiculturality and 
interculturality, or reporting on the Other and Different. The retrogressive 
changes are also in evidence at the level of information about the recent past, the 
topic of war crimes having been banished even from the few media according the 
subject a modicum of attention. The privatization of local print media carried out 
by the consortium Vojvodina.info was probably aimed at undercutting local 
newspapers in Vojvodina as one of the few successful media projects in these 
regions. There are notorious cases of newspapers losing almost their entire 
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editorial staff overnight as a result of ownership change. Editors and journalists 
have been leaving newspapers out of refusal to discharge their duties in an 
unprofessional manner, to ‘frame’ certain political options. The new proprietors 
are targeting in particular political options advocating a higher degree of 
autonomy for Vojvodina. 
The role media play in multicultural environments such as Vojvodina is 
exceptionally important because they can contribute to the development of 
tolerance and the harmonization of communities, as well as to desired 
acculturation (affirmative and sorely needed interaction of groups with different 
cultures). Conversely, they can do what they are doing now, namely encouraging 
the stereotypization of minority cultures and widening the gap between the 
cultures and cultural groups. Such a social model can have very bad consequences 
for the citizens of Vojvodina especially in crisis periods, when they can become a 
powerful generator of conflict and lack of understanding. 
Media must promote interculturality as modern society’s asset which 
enriches its daily life and possesses strong potential for not only cultural and 
political but also comprehensive development of the community as a whole. 
Media should stimulate intercultural exchanges which contribute greatly to the 
relaxation of intercommunal and intercultural relations. The role of the media and 
media workers is: to identify and ‘quarantine’ stereotypes and prejudices existing 
in society; to contribute to the knowledge of other communities and their positive 
as well as critical evaluation; to stimulate attitudes, behaviour and social changes 
in the direction of the abolition of all discrimination. 
 
 
Tomislav ZIGMANOV 
MULTICULTURALITY vs. INTERCULTURALITY 
The case of Vojvodina  
 
When talking about multiculturality, or interculturality, we must be aware 
that these are complex phenomena linked to problems of the functioning of liberal 
democracies. Although they sound similar, they are quite distinct concepts. They 
were called into being by post modern art, having discovered the simple fact that 
modern democratic states are largely self-sufficient and not only in ethno-cultural 
terms. What is more, they act as a source or generator of injustice, the target of 
this being mostly numerically weak subjects. This injustice does not stem from a 
classic economic or, more narrowly, political framework but is situated in the 
sphere of culture. Now, the inequality in public life of particular aspects of 
culture, say language, has negative effects on the person speaking the language in 
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question; importantly, these negative effects do not remain in the sphere of 
culture alone but spread to other spheres of life, for example affecting the social 
status of members of a social group. One of the foremost theorists of 
multiculturality at present, Will Kymlicka, believes that belonging to a culture is 
the context in which we chose our goals and recognize their value. If our culture is 
not recognized as being of equal value, then the feeling that our objectives are 
worthy of realization cannot be a precondition for self-respect. And self-respect is, 
according to the renowned modern political philosopher, John Rawls, the most 
important primary good, which is attained precisely through the successful 
realization of own goals. In this sense, multiculturality represents a normative 
ideal whose purpose, through the pursuit of various policies, is to help achieve 
the equality of cultures, and consequently greater justice in society. A 
fundamental prerequisite for such policies lies in the creation of equal conditions 
for the unimpeded establishment and development of several collective identities 
within the framework of relatively distinct coexisting spaces. The intention of 
interculturality, on the other hand, aims for something quite different: it wants to 
realize cultural communication, interchange and joint action in the creation of 
new values. It goes without saying that these goals must not be mere attitudes or 
projections of the individual’s wishes but must be translated into specific policies 
by the authorities. By policies I mean such programmes, institutional mechanisms 
and activities of public authorities, political actors and civil organizations as 
establish and develop systemic responses to the problems, needs and challenges 
encountered by the citizens.  
In this connection, if someone were to ask me which of these two concepts I 
would opt for and why, I would reply that I’m for both because they are mutually 
complementing. In other words, their relationship is not one of an ‘either-or’ 
exclusion but involves this presumption: if you want to achieve interculturality, 
you must ensure multiculturality. This involves a variegated dialogue with the 
Different, and in order for this to happen both must be equally equipped for it. 
This has been noted in discourses of the post-colonial world, in the course of 
which it was realized that a dialogue with the West is not at all easy because it is 
superior in many ways. A similar situation obtains on the plane of intercultural 
communication in modern national states too. Can a university professor discuss 
the challenges facing modern man with a person in charge of a minority 
community’s folklore society, for folklore is what cultural practice among 
members of minorities is most often reduced to? In all probability there would be 
very little the two of them could talk about, with the folklore man being at a great 
disadvantage. 
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Now, what is our reality in Vojvodina in this regard? This depends above 
all on the culture segment in question. If you take the widest, anthropological 
definition, according to which it includes a codified everyday behaviour and 
value system, then one must admit that we are a markedly monocultural city with 
a low cultural level into the bargain! Consider the citizens’ attitude to the 
environment: Vojvodina has never been dirtier in its history, with illegal dumping 
grounds becoming almost a distinguishing feature. Or take the authorities’ 
attitude to the architectural legacy: this attitude is almost devoid of any cultural 
elements because it is dictated by the profit logic of the alienated power centres! 
If, on the other hand, you consider culture in a narrow sense, as a relatively 
autonomous area of human activity which is internally heterogeneous and 
ethnically marked, then you come to the conclusion that you don’t have a 
developed multiculturality but possibly a biculturality, given that not all national 
groups enjoy equal conditions for their cultural practice, and little is being done to 
change this situation. The negative effects of this are also felt in the field of 
interculturality – given that equality is not always there, you have a relationship 
of supremacy and, occasionally, even hegemony. Of course, Vojvodina should 
partly be amnestied in this regard because a substantial number of policies with 
consequences in this area are formulated by the central government.  
It should also be pointed out that the attitude to multiculturality is today 
more a matter of posturing, albeit resting fairly stably on decent traditions, or of 
role playing out of faddishness, than a result of serious and conscious striving. As 
such, they often end up in absurdity. At the beginning I said that these concepts 
are part of the traditions of liberal democracies, and we’re still in an age of infancy 
in this regard… For instance, these traditions imply wide participation on the part 
of the public, especially the professions, in the work of the organs of government, 
but we’re often aware of the fact that the authorities keep treating us as mere 
subjects. Also, out there steps are taken judiciously with a view to their long-term 
effects rather than with a frantic rashness: in our midst, this is best exemplified by 
the erection of churches – they are springing up chaotically like mushrooms after 
rain. 
There is something else that must be mentioned: out of fear of being 
assimilated, minority communities are voluntarily shutting themselves off. 
However, the following consideration is important: a ghetto has never in history 
been a matter of free choice, of voluntary decision. It is the consequence of 
exclusive policies, those acts on the part of the authorities which exclude certain 
categories of the population from certain segments of society. This probably 
obtains even today, but it is not of primary importance. But more decisive is the 
demonstration of arbitrariness and self-sufficiency on the part of local cultural 
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circles as well as their unwillingness for creative encounter. This, in fact, is more a 
product of insecurity and incompetence on the part of the culture bearers, which 
is generally characteristic of provinces, than of their planned efforts. Certain 
aberrations occur on the margins, that is, among those who are not in possession 
of power. 
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